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# West Europe Report

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5 January 1984

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## GOVERNMENT EXPECTS FOLKETING TO CUT EUROMISSILE FUNDS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 83 p 8

[Article by lk: "Majority Withdraws 50 Million NATO Kroner"]

[Text] The government accepts, as a natural consequence of the voting during the missile debate last week in the Folketing, that a majority will withdraw the 50 million kroner in the defense minister's budget, which is the next Danish contribution to the deployment of NATO's nuclear missiles, in voting on the proposed amendments to the budget proposition of 14 December.

The 50 million kroner is a part of the defense budget which was arranged between the conciliation parties, and it is therefore expected that the amount is to be transferred to other purposes within the defense establishment.

The Radical Liberal Party has proposed an amendment which removes the 50 million kroner from the budget. Since the Folketing on Thursday, without the participation of the government parties, voted that Denmark will now work against the deployment of NATO nuclear missiles, the Defense Minister Hans Engell considered it an unfortunate but natural consequence that the 50 million kroner would fall out of the Danish contribution to NATO's missile program. He emphasized that the reduction of the Danish contribution means that the other NATO nations are going to pay more.

9287

CSO: 3613/54

PAPER PONDERES WHAT POLICY OF SDP IN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 83 p 12

[Editorial: "Toward the Abyss"]

[Text] The Social Democratic Party is on the way to an abyss from which it will find it difficult to pull itself out. Anker Jorgensen has moved it so far that there is no longer any firm ground underfoot. During the past week he has taken further steps without openly realizing the risk he is bringing to himself and his party.

The Social Democrats have allowed themselves to be led by Anker Jorgensen without a thought for what it will cost the party, which for so long has been the country's largest, and which for so many years has been a responsible element in society. They have carried out a total break with the foreign and security which has been their own policy since the liberation, and which is anchored in Danish membership in the Atlantic Pact. It is a breach which thoughtlessly has gone so far that only the demand to withdraw the country from NATO remains.

The Social Democrats have undertaken this turnabout with the help of parties which they previously hated heartily, and which they can not possibly build their future on. They have an old fellowship with the Radicals, but the People's Socialists and the Left-Socialists, who have always bit them on the ankles, can not be people that they want to get close to.

How can Anker Jorgensen imagine the future now being shaped for him, when the present government's time is up? He can not seriously believe that it will be possible for him to be prime minister based on support from the existing government parties for a policy such as the one he has so violently described during these past weeks. But neither can he believe that a new government can form a fruitful foundation with the help of the Socialist People's and the Left-Socialist Parties. They would agree with him on foreign policy, but whether they would agree on anything else would be on condition that he goes for a much more socialist policy. Such a policy would lead to his downfall.

In his view of the world, Anker Jorgensen perhaps expects that he can lead his party back to a foreign policy which can re-create broad unity. In that case he forgets that in the process the Social Democrats have lost their credibility, which is a requirement for parties to live and work with each other. Gallup's political index shows that the population is not sympathetic to the Social Democrats' fight against the government. They have fewer votes than they received in the election defeat 2 years ago.

Don't the Social Democrats realize at all that they are about to lose their foothold?

9287

CSO: 3613/54

## ORGANIZATION TO JOIN WORLD PEACE COUNCIL

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 2 Nov 83 p 18

/Article by pk: "Sorsunnata Takes Part in International Peace Effort"

/Text/ The Greenlandic peace movement has been called upon to join a larger international collaboration with peace movements in other countries.

The Council for World Peace contacted Sorsunnata with respect to eventual collaboration. The Council represents national committees in 137 countries throughout the world, and it performs a long list of activities for peace, disarmament and solidarity. "In addition, we maintain close contact with movements in a large number of countries," says a letter from the Council for World Peace to Sorsunnata.

In its answer to the Council for World Peace, Sorsunnata expresses interest in cooperation with other movements which work for peace, disarmament, understanding and peaceful coexistence in a troubled world. Sorsunnata, whoever, demands that the peace movements be politically independent, and that they remain neutral in the ideological battle between different political and economic systems.

An additional condition is that individual freedom movements in the Council for World Peace have a right and a duty to work independently.

In a press release, Sorsunnata expresses satisfaction that a debate on national security has begun in Greenland.

"It appears to us to be of great importance for the future political development of Greenland that security and the presence of American bases in Greenland become themes of debate throughout the country.

"Therefore, we are especially happy about the questions which Arqaluk Lynge has raised in the Landsting at the fall session."

12573

CSO: 3613/41



## PAPER COMMENTS ON CONTROVERSY FOLLOWING KOIVISTO UN TALK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Interpretations of First Use Abound"]

[Text] President Mauno Koivisto's two major speeches during his recent American trip have provided new material for the discussion concerning the content of foreign policy, in which alternative points of view have been brought up in recent weeks. This material, which is modernizing the liturgy, has also been susceptible to misunderstandings, of which the most important concerns the ban on the first use of nuclear weapons.

The president's special foreign policy advisor, Jaakko Kalela, put matters in their place on Tuesday with respect to the first-use ban. He rejected the already publicly accepted assumption that the president had taken a stand on the doctrine of first use.

The interpretation of an adjustment to Finland's policy with respect to first use saw the light of day immediately after the president's UN speech at the end of September. The official Finnish sources present at the time stated that Finland is now ready to vote for such a suitably formulated resolution which would ban the first use of nuclear weapons.

Members of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, who had been with Koivisto a full 2 weeks later, stated that the president had confirmed as correct the above-mentioned interpretations of his UN speech. At that time it was confirmed that Finland is ready to support proposals banning the first use of nuclear weapons.

The matter was confirmed a day later on the radio by Political Section Chief Seppo Pietinen of the Foreign Ministry. He justified his position by the strengthened opposition to nuclear weapons in which opposition to nuclear war in general also logically contains a stand with respect to the first use of nuclear weapons.

According to a statement transmitted by STT [Finnish News Bureau], in the UN Finland would be ready to vote for a proposal prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons if the proposal is the same as the one made a year ago. At that time Finland abstained from voting, but Sweden, for example, supported the proposal.

In clarifying the background officials of the foreign ministry pointed out the rather large number of agreements and UN resolutions in particular concerning nuclear weapons. More than 50 resolutions have been adopted. Some of them Finland has supported, and in others it has abstained. Thus the Foreign Ministry has a basis in fact when it states that a change of voting behaviour with respect to one issue, first use, does not yet mean a change of policy, but a logical development of policy. A policy line is made up of many votes and proposals, which even themselves change in a changing world.

The apparent contradiction between previous public belief and Kalela's new position is even the more astonishing. If the experts are able to split hairs in the meaning of words, laymen are left with the impression of a need to define terms jointly used by the presidential palace and the foreign ministry.

It is presumed that Kalela's speech did not reprimand the foreign ministry, but rather attempted to correct the more impetuous comments in which it is considered Koivisto has already released Finland from the role of a physician and placed it among the ranks of judges. But when the Foreign Ministry had already made its own interpretation public and even the president had time to approve it, later attempts to make corrections seem to be quite retrospective.

10576

CSO: 3617/40

## ADVISOR DENIES KOIVISTO UN SPEECH MEANT CHANGE OF POLICY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Nov 83 p 9

[Article: "Koivisto Took No Position in UN on First Use of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Jaakko Kalela, the special foreign policy advisor to President Mauno Koivisto, rejects as misleading the argument that the views on nuclear weapons expressed by President Mauno Koivisto in the UN and in Los Angeles mean a change in Finland's traditional foreign policy line. According to Kalela, Koivisto did not take a stand on the controversial doctrine of first use.

According to Kalela, nuclear weapons held a central and sometimes even dominating position for nearly 20 years in President Urho Kekkonen's stands on international politics. This question has always become predominant when relations between the superpowers have become aggravated, when changes have occurred in nuclear weapons strategy, and when the danger of nuclear war has increased in this way, stated Kalela.

"In the present international situation President Koivisto has precisely defined Finnish positions, which have taken shape over the years, into a logical totality, which has been characterized by a consistency of principles," stated Kalela on Monday when speaking to the 89th National Defense Seminar.

"They are based on a total view of the worldwide nuclear problem, but are directly concentrated on questions tangent to Finland's security, on which our right to speak cannot be denied."

Kalela directed his attention to three circumstances in particular in analyzing Koivisto's U.S. speeches.

In the first place, Koivisto repeated Finland's stands on the Geneva Euro-missile negotiations from the most prestigious possible forums. In the second place, the president quite forcefully emphasized that there are already too many nuclear weapons in existence at this time and the deployment of even one new nuclear weapon will not increase anyone's security. In the third place, Koivisto demands a ban on the use of all nuclear weapons since even the most limited use for the purpose of revenge would in a crisis situation presumably lead to a full-scale nuclear war.

"Even though Koivisto thus touched only lightly upon the controversial doctrine of first use, he did not take a stand on NATO's internal theoretical dispute, among other things. He stated that the logical conclusion from the impossibility of a limited nuclear war is the imperativeness of reaching an agreement on banning the use of nuclear weapons in all forms," stated Kalela.

Kalela pointed out that recently an exceptionally large amount of attention has been given to Koivisto's two major speeches during his visit to the United States.

"For the first time they have provoked a discussion concerning the content of foreign policy, during which it has even been argued that the views presented on nuclear weapons by Koivisto in the UN and in Los Angeles meant a change in Finland's traditional foreign policy line."

Kalela also subjected Finland's attitude toward nuclear weapons to a broader examination. According to him, a decisive change in attitude took place in the beginning of the 1960's, particularly as a consequence of the diplomatic note crisis and the Cuban missile crisis. The practical conclusion was Kekkonen's proposal for a nuclear-free Nordic zone.

Kalela stated that even though Kekkonen's plan has not been precisely defined in the form of a draft agreement, for example, over the last 20 years, all the central aspects of a nuclear-free zone concept have been defined in Finland's positions over the years.

According to Kalela, the Finns have participated in a restrained manner in the discussions on arms control actions augmenting the zone arrangements of the nuclear power states since nuclear weapons in the vicinity of the Nordic area have not been seen as a direct threat to our own country's security. The exception, however, is the deployment of cruise missiles, primarily cruise missiles fired from submarines and aircraft, he stated.

10576

CSO: 3617/40

## PAPER DEFENDS UN VOTE AGAINST FIRST-USE NUCLEAR ATTACK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Nov 83 p 2

/Editorial: "Nuclear Weapon Ban"/

/Text/ On Wednesday Finland's UN policy experienced the second peak of a lively fall when the world organization voted on two disputed matters. Finland's peculiar neutrality policy was shaken, but it seems to be still firmly in place.

In the General Assebmly, Finland abstained for the fifth time from voting on a resolution about Afghanistan, because it is seen as a classic great-power conflict. Originally, almost four years ago, Finland partly justified itself in explaining its vote with the Soviet Union's announcement that the troops would soon be brought home.

A few weeks ago, however, Finland did not see any classic east-west conflict in Grenada, but a clearly condemnable attack.

Thus in explanations of votes geography shows itself to be a function of morality.

Morality was also present on Wednesday in the second vote, where Finland, changing its position in the General Assembly's first committee, voted in favor of a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are morally condemnable, even though they symbolize the great-power conflict more aptly than anything else.

A tighter line against nuclear weapons would remain a weak effort on distant matters, unless at the same time efforts were made to insure freedom from nuclear weapons in our own country. President Mauno Koivisto proclaimed Finland's desire to be free of nuclear weapons in the UN. It is therefore satisfying that attempts are being made, as far as is known, to include in the nuclear-energy law in preparation a paragraph that will forbid the import of nuclear explosives to the area of Finland.

Freedom from nuclear weapons prescribed by law could of course seem too uncertain a protection, but at least the ETYK /Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe/ countries should respect it. They have committed themselves not to break one another's laws.

HARD-LINE CP PAPER HITS MODERATE RIVAL FOR REPORT ON USSR

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 15 Nov 83 p 2

/Editorial: "World Situation and Responsibility of Our Press"

/Text/ For Communists, following the principles of proletarian internationalism /and/ defending and publicizing the Soviet Union and true Socialism have become an increasingly necessary part of the struggle for peace. This results from the place of true Socialism in preserving world peace and from the fact that the most reactionary imperialist circles under the leadership of Ronald Reagan are accelerating nuclear armament and proclaiming the destruction of Socialism as an organization for society as the goal of their "crusade" in the nuclear area.

Defending true Socialism /and/ telling the truth about the Soviet Union and its peace policy have thus become a question of life and death for Communists and the Communist press. In our country, the same applies to the People's Democratic press. It is not a question of any foreign "responsibility." It is a question of necessity connected with the preservation of peace.

The more freedom of movement the Communists and the press within the Communists' sphere of influence give to anti-Sovietism, to the fomenting of general mistrust and anger toward the Soviet Union and Socialism, and to the super-power theory and to claims that the United States and the Soviet Union are equally guilty of arms build-up, and the more Communists permit within their own midst the fashionable distancing from true Socialism, the more opportunity for turmoil is had by poisoners of the atmosphere, those who accelerate arms build-up, and those who are preparing for war, and the weaker are the positions of the peace movement.

Now that the United States is placing new nuclear missiles, representing a new phase in quality, in Western Europe, the responsibility of the Communists and the press within the Communists' sphere of influence is great and their task is concrete. The responsibility of imperialism must be explained. It is also necessary to explain the significance

of maintaining the balance of strategic military power as an indispensable condition for the preservation of peace and the necessity for counter-measures from the Soviet Union.

In this matter and in this situation, the greatest clarity is required of the Communists and the papers within their sphere of influence. The article by Jorma Hentila published in KANSAN UUTISET, according to which the Soviet Union should adapt to changes in the balance of power, should remain the last example of irresponsibility and the spreading of confusion.

9611

CSO: 3617/51

MOSCOW-ORIENTED CP ORGAN: CRUISE MISSILES INVOLVE USSR PACT

Helsinki TIEDONARTAJA in Finnish 10 Nov 83 p 2

/Editorial: "The Cruise-Missile Threat"/

/Text/ The President's special foreign-affairs assistant, Jaakko Kalela, has made an important speech in which he observes that cruise missiles constitute a threat to the security of Finland.

According to Kalela, the nuclear weapons in nearby Nordic areas have not been seen as a direct threat to our own country's security. The cruise missiles are an exception, however.

Although the propagandists of the western military alliance, NATO, have claimed that in a crisis situation the cruise missiles would "go around" the area of Finland, the statements are intended only to delude public opinion.

According to experts, it is quite clear that in a crisis situation the cruise missiles will make their way to their targets through areas where it is unlikely that the missiles will be shot down.

For Finland's part, the archipelago of southern Finland and Lapland are the areas most threatened, areas that NATO could make use of in a crisis situation in an attack against the Soviet Union.

The statement of Kalela leads naturally to a conclusion that must give direction to Finland's foreign-policy activities for the coming weeks. It must be announced more clearly than before that Finland opposes, on account of its own security as well, the deployment in Europe of new Euro-missiles, including cruise missiles.

The YYA /Mutual Friendship and Assistance/ treaty requires us to take care--if necessary in cooperation with the Soviet Union--that our country is not used in an attack against the Soviet Union. The YYA-treaty obligation also applies to preventing use of the airspace of our country.

9611

CSO: 3617/51



## PAPER EXPRESSES DISAPPOINTMENT IN NORDLI FOR VOTE ON TNF ISSUE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Nov 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Play With Security"]

[Text] Neither Gro Harlem Brundtland nor other leading Labor Party politicians have been able to give an objective and credible reason for the change in that party's security policy. That was clearly revealed during the missile debate on Monday. Many of the arguments that were presented to justify the actions of the Labor Party were of the type that could backfire on the Labor Party. There must be limits to what a presumably serious party--our largest party, at that--can accomplish with political excuses.

It was particularly disappointing to hear former Prime Minister Odvar Nordli excuse the Labor Party's break with the obligations of the dual decision by pointing out that the United States now had a new administration under the leadership of Ronald Reagan. According to Nordli, the NATO dual decision would not have been supported by the Norwegian government in 1979 if it had negotiated the decision with an American government similar to the present administration.

Nordli's statement is striking for several reasons. He is guilty not only of seriously underestimating the American president's desire to negotiate and his firm commitment to achieve concrete results at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. It is far more serious that our former prime minister now advocates selective cooperation between Norway and other NATO countries. Apparently, the Labor Party chooses to ignore binding agreements with the United States, our largest and most important ally, as long as Reagan is president.

Such views, if followed, soon would lead to the collapse of NATO. Of course, Nordli has not thought about this possibility. For this reason, we choose to believe that his statements on Monday were a desperate attempt on his part to explain why he no longer recognizes the obligations he accepted as prime minister when the dual decision was made. Retreat is an extremely painful and humiliating business. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, the joint defense of NATO must be based on something other than the "selective support" outlined by Nordli.

The chairman of the Labor Party, Gro Harlem Brundtland, initiated the many strange attempts to explain away her party's total about-face on the missile issue. The chairman said that the "problems" within NATO were the result of the wave of conservatism in the United States and Western Europe, which has given the alliance a different profile than the one it had when the Social Democratic parties controlled the governments of several important NATO countries. Nothing could be further from the truth. The primary characteristic of the conservative governments' actions with regard to NATO is that they have consistently and whole-heartedly lived up to (and advanced) the measures and political positions previously agreed on by the Social Democrats and the Conservatives. Gro Harlem Brundtland should know that these two political groupings together have been the very backbone of NATO cooperation.

For this reason, we have reached a serious turning point, now that the Labor Party and various other Social Democratic parties have decided to jump off the bandwagon now that they are out of power and in opposition. We hope that the Labor Party leader soon will realize that she cannot experiment and play around with alliance policies without having disastrous consequences for our own security.

9336

CSO: 3639/39

## ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, SECURITY TO BE MAJOR 1985 ELECTION ISSUES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Nov 83 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] The deployment of new Western missiles has begun. Parliament has finished dealing with NATO's dual decision. A bitter debate has divided parliament. The situation may be summarized as follows: The Labor Party changed from a controversial "yes" to a collective "no" to our NATO obligations. The Labor Party leadership was divided. Some did not dare and others simply did not want to live up to the dual decision. Now the question is whether unity on security policy will again be possible in Norwegian politics. Can broad agreement be reestablished, despite the deep wounds caused by the missile debate? This will be answered in part by the coming debates over the nuclear freeze and nuclear-free zones.

Norway approved the deployment of new missiles by a majority of only one vote. This approval was a response to the fact that the Soviet Union now has 361 SS-20 missiles, compared to 140 when the dual decision was made in 1979. NATO now has no medium-range land-based missiles in Europe and the deployment that recently began has been extremely cautious.

The debate over the dual decision can be summarized as follows:

The decision was made with the full support of NATO in December 1979, when Odvar Nordli was prime minister. The NATO countries agreed that the missile modernization would be jointly financed by an increase in NATO's infrastructure program.

In the spring of 1980 Thorvald Stoltenberg, as Norwegian defense minister, hosted a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Bodo, at which NATO agreed on a timetable for negotiations and deployment. December 1983 was chosen for the beginning of deployment.

Finally, it is extremely important to point out that the final document of the dual decision clearly stated that British and French nuclear weapons should not be considered in the negotiations.

Now it can be stated that the Labor Party Has abandoned all the obligations mentioned above. First a minority of the Labor Party group members broke away in the spring of 1982 and voted against appropriations for the missiles. Only months later the entire parliamentary group of the party voted against appropriations.

Opposition to the deployment was made manifest at the Labor Party Congress last spring. The so-called missile report laid the groundwork for what would become a rejection of the position held by Odvar Nordli, Knut Frydenlund, and Thorvald Stoltenberg. AUF (Labor Party Youth Organization) leader Egil Knudsen, in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN, described the missile report as a necessary detour to total rejection of the deployment of Western missiles.

Eventually, the Labor Party also changed its position on the British and French weapons.

#### New Battles

In all probability, security policy will dominate the debate in Norway during the parliamentary election campaign in 1985. The battle over the dual decision will be followed by a broader discussion in which one of the key words will be "freeze." Even during the discussion of the defense budget in parliament on 8 December, SV (Socialist Left Party) announced that it would propose that Norway support a freeze on nuclear weapons.

In addition, the foreign affairs committee is gradually developing its position on the government's disarmament report. In addition to the freeze, nuclear-free zones will be a key element in the debate.

Many in parliament now are asking themselves if these debates can result in broad support for Norwegian security policy. Despite the bitter struggle over the missiles, several speakers in Monday's debate, including Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm, made conciliatory gestures. The government's decision to abstain from voting on the Swedish-Mexican freeze proposal at the United Nations has led some to believe that a more pleasant security policy debate is possible.

Many things could go wrong, however. Like it or not, the Labor Party's break with NATO solidarity has made a new consensus on security policy more difficult. The government believes that if the largest opposition party cannot play by the most basic rules, then reconciliation will be difficult. From the standpoint of the government, all disarmament initiatives must be joint Western efforts and not Norwegian or, for that matter, Nordic solo initiatives.

The middle parties will play a key role. Both the Christian People's Party and the Center Party platforms are similar to the Labor Party position on the freeze and on nuclear-free zones. For this reason, there will be some interesting battles, even within the government. It appears that the Labor Party will utilize this situation to the utmost.

Developments within the Labor Party will demonstrate whether or not the left wing has gained control over the party's security policy. Gro Harlem Brundtland has proven to be a unifying party leader, but the point is that she has unified the party behind principles that are whole-heartedly approved by the party's many outspoken NATO opponents.

If a reconciliation between the two largest parties on security policy is to be possible, then the Labor Party leadership must reach an agreement with its left wing. In addition, the party must show in practice that assertions that SV is the party's guide dog on security policy issues is as incorrect as Gro Harlem Brundtland claims.

9336

CSO: 3639/39

## BASQUE OFFICIALS' REACTION TO ANTI-ETA MEASURES

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 13

/Text/ Bilbao--Carlos Garaicoetxea, prime minister of the autonomous Basque Government, is skeptical about the "antiterrorist" bill sent by the Council of Ministers to the Congress of Representatives. The "lendakari" told a group of journalists yesterday that "with no intention to revive the old polemic on political measures versus police measures, my position in this matter is common knowledge: skepticism about the almost exclusive emphasis that may be placed on this kind of action." The Basque prime minister added: "Furthermore, and though I have not made a thorough study of it, I believe that the application of the law will demonstrate its harshness, its effectiveness and the other effects that may be produced and, in this case, the aspects of the law that will be found to be open to criticism." Except for the Socialist Party of the Basque Country--PSOE /Spanish Socialist Workers Party/ and the Peoples Alliance of the Basque Country, which have reaffirmed their positions favoring the bill, all of the political forces of the Basque Country continue their criticisms with respect to the framework of antiterrorist measures approved by the Council of Ministers.

## Welcome

Even if the Basque Government conditions its final position on the sanction of the government bill by the legislative assembly, Mario Fernandez, vice president of the autonomous executive branch, described as "welcome" the aforementioned actions anticipated by Felipe Gonzalez's cabinet, "provided they respect the principles of the constitution."

Insisting on the position held by the government in Victoria, Mario Fernandez, in statements made to the EPE Agency, again referred yesterday to the need that the political and judicial measures anticipated for the fight against terrorism be accompanied by others of a political nature.

Jose Antonio Aspuro, representing the chief management organism of the PNV /Basque Nationalist Party/, postponed the release of "a more responsible opinion" until the publication of the antiterrorist measures through "legislative channels."

Approached at a meeting held yesterday in Bilbao by the coalition, Herri Batasuna said that it will make its position with regard to the government bill known today.

The Peoples Alliance of the Basque Country reiterated its position in favor of the measures announced. Javier Zarzalejos, secretary general of that party, feels that the government text contemplates the application of "severe" and energetic" measures that are, in his judgement, directly proportionate "to the dimension of the problem they propose to eliminate."

Ana Miranda, spokesperson of the Socialist Party of the Basque Country--PSOE, indicated that her political organization agrees with the government measures. She said: "In any case, it is much better that there be legislation on these measures instead of having to refer back to successive decrees."

For his part, Juan Maria Bandres, representative of the Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) /Basque Country Left/, said yesterday that the draft bill leaves the door open to torture and impairs the discretionary power of the judicial authorities.

Juan Maria Bandres likewise criticized the permanent nature of some of the measures and stressed the differences, which are vast, in his opinion, between the "repentant terrorist" anticipated in the draft bill and the former militants of the ETA /Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group/, who voluntarily opted to abandon armed conflict and took shelter under the measures promoted by the EE and assumed by the managing boards of the UCD//Democratic Center Union/ and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. "Euskadiko Ezquerria upholds the idea that everyone should be at liberty to abandon armed conflict and defend his convictions, with no exceptions, by availing himself of the processes of democracy, the processes of peace. To the contrary, in the draft bill people are urged to act as informers and this is something that has no future in the Basque Country, because here," added Bandres, "there are people who are willing to change their methods and to accept democratic legality, but one thing you will not find is betrayers."

8089

CSO: 3548/116

## POLICE ANTI-ETA SUCSESSES ON DECLINE UNDER PSOE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 13

/Article by Bonifacio De La Cuadra/

/Text/ Madrid--The number of detentions of presumed terrorists made by the state security brigades and followed by imprisonment by court order has declined proportionately during the socialist term in office from a "success" rate of 68 percent in 1982 to one of 58 percent in the first 10 months of 1983. The decrease in detentions which were initially endorsed by the judicial authority is particularly worthy of note in the case of those arrests made by the Civil Guard, since whereas in 1982 57 percent of the supposed terrorists detained went to prison, during the first 10 months of 1983 the proportion dropped to 39 percent, which represents a decline of 16 percent.

According to the data obtained by EL PAIS from competent juridical sources, the facilities that the Antiterrorist Law in force (which the government does not plan to strengthen) grants to the security brigades show a dangerous tendency, which increased during the early months of the socialist government, toward permitting the detention of innocent people or persons in whose regard in the opinion of the judicial authority there is not the slightest evidence of criminal activity of a nature that would justify their being sent to prison.

The adverse consequences of every variety both for the rights and liberties of the citizens affected by the mistaken or ineffective detentions and for the antiterrorist fight itself, since these detentions produce an increase in popular support of the terrorists, are obvious and have been repeatedly pointed out by the socialist leaders. The prime minister himself, Felipe Gonzalez, before the joint session of the congress of representatives on 20 September last, spoke of the advisability "of adjusting detention to prosecution, of examining the question of the arrest and the necessary data side by



side for the purpose of making certain, as a result, that the individual detained is indeed one about whom there are well-founded suspicions that he is committing a criminal act in the area of terrorism."


#### The Prime Minister's Calculations

The prime minister explained the value of this higher level of police success: "People are not affected that are later found not guilty by the courts." He added that every government must flee the temptation to answer a terrorist attempt with "an immediate reply that tries to cover the responsibility of that government with mass arrests (...), although 98 percent of those arrests are no more than the spectacular nature of the arrests themselves and therefore fail to produce results for the prosecution."

The data obtained by this newspaper reflect the fact that, of the total number of detentions made in 1982 in application of the Antiterrorist Law, the judicial authority, which in the matter of terrorism is the National Court or the central tribunals dependent therefrom, gave sentences of imprisonment to 68 percent and of release to the remaining 32 percent, while in the period between 1 January and 17 October of 1983, the same judicial authority sent 58 percent to prison and released the remaining 42 percent. In the light of these data, one is surprised by the statement made by Felipe Gonzalez at the parliamentary session mentioned above, according to which "the number of detentions has been adjusted to a much greater degree during the time in which the socialist government has been in office to the number of actual prosecutions, than was previously the case."

On the other hand, in view of the preference for the Civil Guard in the antiterrorist fight shown recently by the incumbent head of the Ministry of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, special note should be taken of the levels of increasing ineffectiveness that are apparent from the above data in relation to the aforementioned security brigade both in comparison with the police and with respect to the detentions made before the socialists took office.

While the detentions made by the police have remained at a similar level of success (the judicial authority gave prison sentences to 70 percent of those detained in 1982 and to 67 percent of those detained in 1983),



/Key/

- (1) Detentions of supposed terrorists during the last two years
- (2) Persons detained
- (3) By the Civil Guard
- (4) By the Police
- (5) Released by the judge
- (6) Sent to prison by the judge
- (7) \*The data for 1983 refer to the period between 1 January and 10 October
- (8) The graph shows the percentage differences between those detained and those released in 1982 and 1983

the Civil Guard has gone from the figure of 57 percent for court sentences calling for imprisonment last year to 39 percent in the first 10 months of 1983. And so, during the socialist term in office (counting, for the present purpose, only from January, since in the last weeks of 1982 the government of the PSOE was in the process of "getting itself anchored"), court orders for the release of supposed terrorists under detention went from the 32 percent figure of 1982 to 42 percent. And while 33 percent of those detained by the police were released (30 percent in 1982), 61 percent of those detained by the Civil Guard were released when they came before a judge (43 percent in 1982).

8089

CSO: 3548/116

## ETA ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTING PORTUGAL'S FP-25

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 16 Nov 83 p 9

[Article by Luis Rodrigues]

[Text] (Lisbon, special service)--Every day the conviction is growing that the ETA is giving support to the terrorism which the "25 April Popular Forces" organization has unleashed in Portugal.

Four attacks have been carried out in the Lisbon area in the last 2 weeks. These violent actions against business leaders are aimed at creating a climate of intimidation and blackmail in the face of labor agitation and citizen insecurity. Responsibility for these attacks was claimed by the above-mentioned organization "25 April Popular Forces," a movement ideologically linked to Marxism-Leninism, whose origins go back to the now defunct Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades.

This group, which carried out an intense campaign of sabotage activities against military objectives in the 1960's--Portugal was then fighting on three fronts in Africa--came under pressure from the police forces in the 1970's and turned to a legal existence, abandoning the armed struggle. This was the reason why a split arose in the ranks of the Portuguese brigade members and a new terrorist organization appeared.

Recently, police sources reported that the FP-25 is receiving financial and tactical support from the Spanish ETA-m terrorist organization.

This situation stems from the fact that on one hand the French authorities tend not to make it easy for ETA elements to stay in their territory, and on the other, a decompression movement has begun which follows police actions in Spanish territory. Those factors could very likely cause the creation of new "sanctuaries" for the ETA in Portuguese territory, in view of the almost 800-kilometer-long border between the two Iberian countries.

Furthermore, the lack of police intelligence and terrorist surveillance, as well as the difficulty in covering that lengthy stretch of frontier, make it possible for organizations like ETA to move about freely. Among other things, it could be useful for ETA in their transitional position to take advantage of the existence of an organization like FP-25 April, which is

anxious to prove its revolutionary strength, and which has an infrastructure capable of preparing and facilitating the carrying out of more important actions.

In this context, the recent appointment of Marcelino Oreja Aguirre as Spanish consul in Lisbon increases the concern of the Portuguese police authorities. Indeed, Oreja is considered to be a top priority target for the ETA, and there is a possibility that the ETA may take advantage of the circumstances of Adolfo Suarez' former minister's presence to undertake some action in Portugal. It appears that some ETA centers are geographically mobile, and everything seems to indicate they may be transferred to Portugal.

8131

CSO: 3548/108

TERRORISM

SPAIN

# NICARAGUA DENIES ALL TIES WITH ETA

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 23

[Text] Managua (EFE)--The Sandinist government has confirmed that it has "no ties or any kind of relationship" with the Basque terrorist organization ETA, according to Luis Yanez, president of the Institute for Iberoamerican Cooperation (ICI).

In a press conference which was held in Sandino International Airport, the Spanish politician declared that high authorities of the Managua government with whom he met during his visit to this country "had confirmed this." The president of the ICI added that he has no reason to doubt that statement.

He said that those pledges voiced by the Nicaraguan Government "indicate Nicaragua's firm commitment to maintain friendly relations with Spain, which would be damaged if there were an official relationship between the Nicaraguan Government and ETA."

He said that in his contacts with the revolutionary leaders he did not observe any "nervousness" because of "an imminent invasion of that country," which, as he said, "does not mean that one might not take place." The Spanish politician expressed the concern of the Spanish government about certain aspects of the internal evolution of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process to the people he spoke with in Managua.

One of those aspects, as he told it, is the democratization of the revolution itself, the promise of the Sandinists to hold elections in 1985, press freedom for the opposition, "which is guaranteed in any democratic system. I have the impression" said Yanez, "that the Sandinist junta and the Front have been softening their positions, allowing there to be better prospects for the future holding of elections."

Yanez stated that in order for elections to be held, "there must be a climate of peace, first there must be political pluralism, and therefore Spain is making parallel efforts to see that the government of Nicaragua is not harassed at this time."

8131

CSO: 3548/125

## POSSIBLE ETA-SENDERO LUMINOSO LINK ON RUBIA KIDNAPING

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 2 Dec 83 pp 1, 7

[Article by Tomas Barbulo]

[Text] Jose Antonio Onrubia Romero, Spain's honorary consul in the Peruvian city of Piura and a prominent local businessman, is still in the hands of unknown kidnappers who on 7 November killed his driver and forced him into a car that disappeared amid the labyrinth of Lima's streets, sources in the Office of Diplomatic Information have confirmed to EL ALCAZAR.

According to the magazine OIGA, one of the most serious and influential publications in Peru, the Investigative Police is considering the hypothesis that the terrorist organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] is responsible. The Onrubia family, which has always prided itself on its Basque roots, has not yet received any messages from the kidnappers. Until now, in fact, the entire incident, which has been a genuine scandal in Peru and made the front pages of newspapers and the covers of magazines, has been kept out of the Spanish media. The Foreign Ministry has not furnished any information on the matter.

The kidnapping occurred at 0739 hours on Monday 7 November near the headquarters of the Association of Riding Horse Breeders in the Lima district of Miraflores. After Jose Antonio Onrubia had gotten out of his silver Volvo (license plate BQ-8914), three husky young men dressed in sports clothes and armed with Beretta pistols grabbed him by the arms and dragged him to the other side of the street, where they tried to shove him into a beige Aspen (license plate CQ-7444). While he was struggling with the kidnappers, his driver, Garcia Chero, got out of the car to help him. One of the kidnappers noticed him and ended his life with one bullet through the chest. Aided by his companions and three other accomplices who had been waiting until then in a nearby bar, the terrorist hit the financier repeatedly on the head with the butt of his gun until all six were finally able to whisk him into the car, which sped away turning left on Nery Revett Street and vanished into the darkness. The entire incident took little more than 3 minutes. Eyewitnesses have asserted that the kidnappers looked like foreigners and spoke perfect Spanish.

## The ETA Hypothesis

According to OIGA, the Investigative Police is considering the hypothesis that Shining Path, Peru's strongest terrorist organization, employed foreigners in the kidnapping. The magazine notes that the theory that the Basque terrorist group ETA was responsible for the kidnapping has been gaining support in recent days: "ETA's presence in the region was revealed not long ago by the capture of a Basque commando group in Central America that was endeavoring (Nicaraguan communists might have been paying them) to eliminate the main leaders of the anti-Sandinist group ARDE [Democratic Revolutionary Alliance], including Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora himself. This is the basis for the PIP [Peruvian Investigative Police] probe.

The Onrubia Romero family is from Logrono, an area near the Basque Country that has often been hit by ETA, and has numerous Basque family ties. The founder of the Romero clan in Peru, Mr Calixto Romero, a Spaniard by birth, married Rufina Iturrospe. They were the grandparents of the current members of the Romero group. Again according to the OIGA report, we should thus not overlook either the family's contacts in the Basque Country or the so-called "revolutionary tax" that ETA terrorists are fond of exacting all over the world from wealthy individuals of Basque origin, taking reprisals if their demands are not met, reprisals that could include kidnapping, as has already happened in Colombia and Venezuela.

## Covering up the News

In spite of all the time that has past since the incident, the Spanish public has been kept in the dark about the entire affair. The Foreign Ministry was careful not to reveal any information on this major story even though our embassy in Lima apprised it thoroughly of what had happened and our ambassador to the Belaunde administration, Pedro Bermejo, had made himself available to the kidnapped man's family from the outset. Furthermore, just a few days ago the Peruvian Embassy in Madrid received a telex in which Peruvian authorities noted tersely: "You will receive information on this case at the opportune time." A spokesman from the Spanish Office of Diplomatic Information tried to downplay the affair in statements to this paper, pointing out that in the opinion of ranking officials in Santa Cruz Palace "this was just a case of banditry, which is very widespread in that country. Kidnapping is very common in Peru," he explained, "so much so that the families prefer to deal directly with the kidnappers and not to inform the police." When our reporter expressed surprise and commented that it was impossible for any country's security forces to remain on the sidelines when a consul has been kidnapped and his driver killed, the spokesman conceded the point: "Well yes, this case is somewhat different." He stressed, however, that the Peruvian authorities have not communicated to Spanish authorities their suspicions about ETA's involvement, that everything points to this being a case of banditry and that "if Shining Path or some other terrorist organization had

been involved, they would have claimed responsibility, because these groups basically want publicity for their activities."

Jose Antonio Onrubia Romero, Spain's honorary consul in Piura, a major banker and a member of one of Peru's leading families, is married to Teresa Holder; they have three children, two daughters and a son. One of the daughters, Inmaculada Onrubia Holder, is married and lives in Spain. In the wake of her family's tragedy, she left for Lima on Friday 11 November.

8743

CSO: 3548/131



## TESTIMONY IN ALLEGED TORTURE OF ETA MILITANT

Guipuzcoa EGIN in Spanish 30 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] Two Superior Police Corps inspectors were put on trial yesterday at the Madrid Provincial Courthouse on charges of "maltreating" (the prosecutor's accusation) and of "torturing" (the private accusation) ETA-military wing activist Joseba Arregi, who died 9 days after he had been arrested, exactly 10 days before 23 February.

At yesterday's session the physicians testifying for the defense endeavored to raise doubts as to whether the wounds on Arregi's feet had been caused by torture, in spite of the statements by the coroners.

In their autopsy report, which was accepted yesterday in the fifth section of the Provincial Courthouse, the coroners contend that the wounds were caused by cigarette burns or "something similar." Other physicians deny that possibility.

Seated in the defendants chairs were Superior Police Corps officers Julian Marin Rios and Juan Antonio Gil Rubiales, whom the public prosecutor charged with "maltreatment" (a crime that carries a 3-month jail sentence and a 2-year suspension) and the private prosecutor, Jose Maria Mohedano, accused of torture (which carries a 4-month prison term and a 4-year job suspension).

Domingo Martorell, another defense witness, claimed that self-inflicted wounds are "a common ETA tactic." He was implying that Joseba Arregi, whose body was covered with bruises and burns, spent the entire time he was in police custody (we should remember that according to his own statements he had remained in police offices all the time and was never taken to the basement) injuring himself in front of police agents.

Defense attorneys Adolfo de Miguel and Jose Zugasti asked in their summation that their clients be acquitted.

Madrid--The oral proceedings against two Superior Police Corps officers, Juan Antonio Gil Rubiales and Julian Marin Ros, began yesterday in the fifth section of the Madrid Provincial Courthouse. The Public

Ministry has charged them with involvement in the death of ETA-military wing member Joseba Arregi, which occurred 9 days after he had been arrested on 4 February 1981 in Madrid.

The public prosecutor is asking for a 3-month jail sentence and a 2-year suspension of professional duties under Article 204 of the Penal Code (a crime committed by a public official in violation of individual rights). The private charge, as filed by Jose Maria Mohedano, describes the crime as torture and calls for a 4-month prison term and a 4-year suspension.

Testifying during the first phase of the hearing were the two defendants, the two physicians who wrote the autopsy report, three of the policemen involved in the arrest of the deceased, Superior Police Corps Commissioner Tomas Agrela and Officer Antonio Piqueras.

The small section five courtroom was completely filled, and Civil Guard forces were in charge of security.

### "The Best Spellers"

Joseba Arregi was arrested on 4 February 1981 near the Prado Museum, along with Isidro Etxabe, after a wild chase during which shots were fired. After they were arrested and transferred to the Regional Information Brigade for questioning, the police discovered an ETA safe house in Pozuelo de Alarcon and a safe apartment on Don Quijote Street in Madrid and proceeded to arrest some 20 alleged ETA members and collaborators.

Arregi passed away on 13 February at the hospital in Carabanchel prison; according to an official note, the cause of death was pneumonia.

Inspector Marin testified during the first phase of the hearing that he first saw Arregi "on the evening of the 10th or the morning of the 11th," when his superiors asked him to draft the detainee's testimony; Gil Rubiales, the other defendant, served as the clerk in this process.

Marin asserted that the only thing he noticed about Arregi was "some redness about the eyelids," to which he did not attach much importance because he thought that "this was to be expected after being held for 8 days." The inspector also stated that his statement was formalized in normal fashion and that "a tone of familiarity even developed," which led the detainee to admit that "the only thing he missed was not being able to see girls while in prison."

In response to questions from the defense, Marin explained that "the officials who are the best spellers were chosen to handle these formalities" and that at no time did they maltreat the arrested man, "nor did they see other colleagues doing so."

## Interrogations Not Difficult

Marin denied that interrogations of ETA members are difficult, inasmuch as "they usually blurt out at the outset everything that we already know so that the questioning does not last too long."

Gil Rubiales, who was transferred to the Regional Brigade temporarily at the time of these arrests, acknowledged having questioned Arregi, as well as several other detainees, on various occasions between the 4th and the 11th and "having seen the medical services coming in to treat Arregi several times."

"His physical condition was not normal from the first day," Gil Rubiales pointed out, attributing this to the violent circumstances of his arrest. In response to a question from the private prosecutor, he explained that the detainee's written statement was a corrected transcription of the notes from prior interrogations and that, therefore, Arregi had not been questioned again, although the statement was read to him before he signed it.

## "Death Caused by Pneumonia"

Drs Rollo and Ugedo, who performed the autopsy on Arregi, testified that the principal cause of death had been cardiorespiratory insufficiency resulting from extensive pneumonia

According to the physicians, there were superficial lesions and hematomas on the body that were unrelated to the cause of death. Among the lesions were burns on the soles of both feet "caused by a hot, flameless surface about the size of a cigarette between 6 and 10 days before the autopsy."

## Did Not Notice That He Was "Barefoot"

Two of the policemen who were involved in Arregi's arrest testified that it was the most violent that they recalled in their years of service. They noted that Arregi resisted and kicked about even after being handcuffed.

They indicated that they had not noticed that he was barefoot until he was in the police vehicle. "Some passers-by handed over to us a pair of shoes in which we later discovered ammunition in the false bottom," they claimed.

Tomas Agrela, the commander of the Regional Information Brigade, stated that "I often visited the offices where the detainees were being held and I never observed anything abnormal." He explained that they were held in the offices instead of the basement "to prevent them from talking with each other, which would have jeopardized the success of the interrogations." He could not remember whether Arregi was barefoot or not.

Martorell: "Self-Inflicted Wounds Are a Handbook Tactic"

Among the witnesses who testified in court were Francisco Laina, the former director of State Security; Joaquin Domingo Martorell, the former commander of the Central Information Brigade; Gabriel Garcia Gallego, the former Madrid police chief, and other State Security officials, several of them physicians. One of the many spectators was Manuel Ballesteros, the former director of the MULC.

Both the two defendants and the witnesses denied that Arregi had been maltreated during the 9 days that he was held at the offices of the Regional Information Brigade under the Anti-Terrorist Law and said that it was customary for "accused terrorists to inflict wounds on themselves to avoid interrogation and to demoralize police officials.

Domingo Martorell said that this tactic was suggested in all terrorist handbooks, adding that "the alleged 'illegal' ETA members swore at, insulted and spit at the officials questioning them and occasionally tried to butt and bite them." He also said that they were not taken to cells in the basement because they sometimes would hurl themselves down the stairs.

He added that judges taking statements from them have to be protected and that security rooms have even had to be set up because some have tried to attack the members of the court with the courtroom crucifix.

All-Out Effort

The national policemen who took part in the arrest of Arregi and Isidro Etxabe Urrestrilla told the court that the two resisted fiercely and that they had to make an exhausting, all-out effort to subdue them.

"It was a very violent arrest," said the corporal who wounded Etxabe in the shoulder. He added that the two men had bullets under the insoles of their shoes.

Francisco Laina said that as many as 72 police officials passed through the office in which Arregi was interrogated, that arrested individuals were not prohibited from smoking at that time and that they were generally watched. He also acknowledged that Dr Martin Pachon asked him to have a pathology examination conducted on Arregi's feet to determine the actual cause of the lesions.

8743

CSO: 3548/131

## CALL FOR FULL SUPPORT OF ANTITERROR LEGISLATION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 15

[Editorial]

[Text] As it said it would do some weeks ago after the assassination of Capt Alberto Martin Barrios, the government has just approved in a recent meeting of the Council of Ministers the preliminary draft of the organic law against terrorism, which will be in effect for 2 years, and which will shortly be sent to the Congress of Deputies for debate and subsequent approval. The government document is the judicial instrumentation of its political response to the intensification of terrorist activities. The stiffening of penalties and sanctions, the extending of categories of crimes, is in proportion to the challenge which these armed gangs are offering to the state, and is in conformance with the stipulations of article 55, section 2 of the Constitution.

In doing this, the government is only facing up to this grave terrorist threat to the free and peaceful way of life in Spanish society. Thus, the measures and resources which are available are being mustered both against the authors of these acts of banditry and their accomplices and helpers. The government must be able to count on everyone's support in this effort, regardless of the political position and ideological stance of each sector of society. The vast majority of Spaniards have been asking for suitable toughness in the repression of terrorist activities for quite some time. The preliminary draft of the organic law against terrorism comes in answer to this demand from the nation.

However, in its natural eagerness to cut off terrorism on every side, the government document contains some disturbing definitions and omissions. When it opens up the administrative possibility of temporarily shutting down newspapers which apologize for terrorism, it is falling into an error which should not occur under a government of law. Only the courts should have the authority to do that. In the same way, the proposed relaxing of penalties--which in some cases could even go so far as a pardon itself--for repentant criminals, is quite questionable legally. If to this we add the fact that the preliminary draft does not view the payment of the so-called revolutionary tax as a crime of cooperation with

the terrorist gangs, we begin to see a legislative picture with some repressive measures which are superfluous and other repressive measures which are not strong enough. This, from the perspective of a government of law, can seriously compromise the effectiveness of these initiatives.

It is to be hoped that these deficiencies will be corrected in the bill's passage through the Congress of Deputies, and that these omissions will be made up for by the respective amendments of the parliamentary groups. Because both as regards the relaxation of penalties for reformed terrorists, and the closing down of newspapers, as well as regards the objectively obvious crimes of economic cooperation with terrorism (yet another topic is the condition of terror which these criminal practices generate, and which it is the duty of the state to correct) the preliminary draft of the organic law against terrorism must seek to bring into harmony both political effectiveness and the rule of law.

8131

CSO: 3548/125

## PNV CRITICIZED FOR POLITICAL FAILURE IN ANTITERRORISM

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 16 Nov 83 p 9

[Text] On the very same day that the press reported the murder by the ETA in Bermeo of navy Lt Antonio de Vicente Comesana, a Madrid newspaper published a long interview with the president of the autonomous Basque government, Carlos Garaicoechea. It began with a question which cast an ominous and timely light on the relationship which exists between the criticisms by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] of the development of the Autonomy Statute and its participation in the struggle against violence, a polite way to refer to the struggle against terrorism--since there are other kinds of violence, and different topics can not be added together. Strangely enough, Garaicoechea replied that it was a case of "a huge misunderstanding, which at times is deliberately encouraged." Then who created that "misunderstanding," and who constantly encourages it, if not the leaders of the PNV themselves, who are determined to bring up the development of the Statute every time that there is talk of its responsibility in the struggle (or passivity) as regards terrorism? In the same interview Garaicoechea states then when the ETA or self-government are discussed, "they are simultaneous problems." What does he mean by that? What is the relation of cause and effect? That appears to be clear from the context of these and other statements in which the Basque Government, as its head of government knows, has repeated that the struggle "against violence" is based on the combination of "political and police measures." That is, as we have also repeated in these pages, the Basque Government is basing action against the so-called "violence" on the obtaining of new advances in the political area.

But the astonishment of the reader reaches its maximum when he hears Garaicoechea state that "in this country we are the ones who have been the nationalists, the ones who have done the most to counter violence, because we have mobilized the broadest sectors of society." He must be referring to some demonstrations in which they have participated, like the one held after the murder of Captain Martin, when they marched behind a "ikurrina" (without allowing the Spanish flag to be flown at the ceremony) and ended orchestrating the demonstration with a cheer for a free Basque Country, which is a cheer for independence. If that is all that the PNV has done to fight terrorism, and again, it is the most it has done, no one should find it strange that after the killing of the army captain

there came that of the navy lieutenant, along with a few workers thrown in between to give it flavor. A fitting atmosphere for asking for new "political measures." They are simultaneous problems.

8131

CSO: 3548/108



## BRIEFS

PAN-ESKIMO UN OFFICE--The executive committee of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) decided at a meeting in Kotzebue, Alaska to look more closely into the possibilities of opening ICC offices at the United Nations in Geneva and New York. ICC is an organization that represents the roughly 100,000 Inuits (Eskimos) in Canada, Alaska and Greenland in international affairs. The offices would be set up to utilize to best advantage ICC's status as a so-called NGO ("non-government office") at the United Nations, ICC's Greenland president, Hans-Pavia Rosing, said. The initial priority will be given to an office in Geneva, because contact with the United Nations in New York can be taken care of through ICC's Canadian contacts. The executive committee has decided to have itself represented at the United Nations by its president, Hans-Pavia Rosing, and the three vice presidents, Jimmy Stotts from Alaska, Mark R. Gordon from Canada and Arqaluk Lynge from Greenland.

[Text] [Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 25 Nov 83 p 3] 6578

CSO: 3613/51

## GOVERNMENT 'PURGE' OF SECURITY COUNCIL PLANNED

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 5 Dec 83 pp 1, 11

[Article by "pw": "Political Purge in Disarmament Committee--Foreign Minister Planning an Extensive Change in the SNU's Leadership"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is considering a change in the leadership of the government's Security and Disarmament Policy Committee, the SNU, that will involve the removal of people who frequently have taken a critical attitude toward the nonsocialist parties' security policies, sources in the foreign ministry allege.

According to what INFORMATION has been able to learn, the deliberations are just about completed, and the public will be informed regarding the new composition of the committee some day in the very near future.

Assistant University Professors Anders Boserup and Bertel Heurlin, who at present are members of the executive body, which is made up of six men, are to leave that body as of 1 January 1984. Inclusion in the committee as ordinary members, who in practice do not have very much influence, will be offered to them. Major Michael Clemmensen, who, among other things, has become known for his nontraditional views through articles published in INFORMATION, will also be removed from the executive body, and he presumably will leave the committee completely. The present chairman, Ambassador Skjold Mellbin, will be replaced at his own wish.

Furthermore, the press's representation in the general membership of the committee has been terminated. That affects Ole Sippel (Denmark's Radio), Ruth Northen (AKTUELT) and Jorgen Dragsdahl (INFORMATION). Other press representatives declined to participate when the committee was set up. Consequently, that part of the committee consists of people who represent research, governmental institutions and the political parties. The editor Niels Jorgen Haagerup, who is an EC politician at present, will be a member of the new committee, being taken in as a research worker.

## Norretranders Included

The foreign minister is demanding seats for two members. They are Henning Gottlieb, the prime minister's adviser on security policy, and Professor

Bjarne Norretranders.. For a couple of years now, the latter has been vigorously attacking the new course the Social Democratic Party's security policy has been taking.

Ambassador Kjeld Mortensen is being appointed the new chairman in place of Ambassador Skjold Mellbin. Furthermore, Assistant University Professor Ib Faurby, of Aarhus University, Professor Ole Karup Pedersen, of Copenhagen University, and Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Jensen, of the North Jutland Artillery Regiment, are being newly appointed.

Kjeld Mortensen is regarded in the foreign ministry as an official who will attach more importance to traditional security policy considerations and the government's policies than Skjold Mellbin, who attached too much importance to the disarmament aspect. Mellbin got into disfavor in some circles when he suggested, shortly after the SNU was created, that its first task should be a study of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Scandinavia.

Ib Faurby was the head of the secretariat of the SNU for a short time, but he left that position because he was dissatisfied with the committee's work. Since then, he has drawn attention to himself by defending NATO's dual track decision.

S.S. Jensen has worked for a number of years in the Ministry of Defense, where he was responsible for relations with NATO. By his colleagues, he was called a "civil-servant type who does not want to call attention to himself with nontraditional views."

Professor Ole Karup Pedersen is a literary critic for INFORMATION, and at times he has put forward criticism of Danish security policy.

Assistant University Professor Anders Boserup expresses "very strong misgivings" regarding the new composition of the committee, and he is considering the extent to which participation in the committee's work will have any meaning in the future. He says that it is "pretty clear" that a political purge has been carried out, stating that "the two members of the executive body who remain are the ones who did not have any misgivings in regard to the security policy the government wants to pursue, while all those who wanted to think without prejudice have been removed."

Anders Boserup goes on to say that, "With the new composition of the executive body, there is a clear-cut majority that points in the direction of more complete agreement with the nonsocialist parties' policies. Efforts to carry out a thoroughgoing analysis of the military aspects of security policy, in particular, have been completely stifled. The priority assigned to disarmament has been lowered in the new composition of the executive body, and the number of different professions represented has been reduced."

Boserup also thinks that "qualified and critical voices have been lost" with the abandonment of press representation. Press representation was capable of "constituting a means of remaining in contact with broader portions of the population than can be managed with the new composition of the executive body."

Boserup is afraid that the debate on security policy will fare less well. That may take place as a result of a change in the committee's liberal appropriations policy, which has benefited the peace movement, among other things, and also as a result of a change in the committee's own production of debate-creating, qualified material. "If the SNU, in the future, is perceived as a mouthpiece for the government, that will cause an unfortunate polarization of the debate," Boserup says. "It is the SNU's credibility as an independent organization that may be damaged," he says.

#### An Upheaval

The Social Democratic Party's spokesman on foreign policy, Lasse Budtz, who is a member of the SNU, says that reports "indicate an upheaval that bodes no good for the SNU's independence.

"Let us see how this is going to develop. One cannot be certain ahead of time," Budtz goes on to say, "but if the government thinks that the SNU should be a security-policy tool for it, that idea is far from being correct. It should be an independent committee.

"I have no trouble in understanding the problem regarding press representation, which was weakened by absences, but I do not understand how they can exclude Jorgen Dragsdahl when another journalist, Niels Jorgen Haagerup, gets in. The only explanation for his appointment must be that he is a Liberal Party man and a journalist. I also must say that Ole Karup Pedersen is finding it a bit lonesome in the executive body," he said.

Budtz says that, since it may be suspected that a political purge has been carried out in the executive body, which distributes the funds, the Social Democratic Party must watch what goes on in the SNU more carefully in the future. "At present, only the identity of those who have gotten appropriations is made known. In the future, we must also know who asks for and gets a painstaking explanation of why appropriations were awarded," he says.

9266

CSO: 3613/56

## FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROBLEMS WITH FOLKETING BEGAN BEFORE 1983

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 30 Nov 83 p 6

[Article by Henrik Heie]

[Text] It is not just his crude remarks at Sabroe Inn that could lead to the fall of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. The hair that holds the sword of Damocles over his head has been worn very thin for a long time now.

It may have been a chance shot that Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen fired off last Monday at Sabroe Inn. Although he later partially repudiated JYLLANDS-POSTEN's report while approving INFORMATION's with the comment that the remarks were meant for the Social Democrats and not the Folketing majority, this majority could not help feeling like a target. The serious thing--for the foreign minister--is that his remarks also apply to the Radical Liberals. This party more than any other supports the United Nations and must therefore find it extremely offensive when Ellemann asserts that "what is voted on in the United Nations is crashingly irrelevant."

How offended the Radicals are over this statement and other provocations on the part of the minister will be apparent tomorrow during the inquiry debate on the government's stand on missile deployment and other matters. It will depend partly on the foreign minister's own contribution to the debate whether a motion of no confidence in him is brought. At the moment all hands are keeping their cards closely guarded. But there is no doubt that there is no lack of desire to get rid of him among the opposition, especially the Social Democrats.

For prior to the latest conflict there has been more than a year, in fact the foreign minister's entire period in office, which has been studded with large and small episodes, skirmishes and real verbal battles concerning the way he has handled his job. Several times the distrust has been pronounced and a vote of no confidence was on the way. But even if the foreign minister saves his neck on Thursday, the assault or insidious attack on him will not be over. There are still several ticking bombs underneath his cabinet seat.

## Greenland Cod

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen started his term as foreign minister in the Schluter government last September. Not a week went by before he attracted attention in a way that caused political eyebrows to be raised. In a lightning strike he "solved" the "little" fishing conflict with West Germany which had demanded fishing rights off the east coast of Greenland. At a meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher the difference was settled by allowing the Germans to fish for 5,000 tons of cod. When one gets nothing in return, charged critics from the Social Democratic Party and the left wing, it is not hard to "solve" problems by just giving in.

The foreign minister's view, on the other hand, was that by getting rid of a minor problem he would attain some good will that Denmark needs in other matters, including getting a better overall fishing arrangement.

Immediately afterward he went to Strasbourg and told the EC Parliament and the press that the time had come to extend and not just enjoy the advantages of EC.

## Warning

As representative of the Danish chairmanship of EC in the second half of 1983, this of course could be taken as a general pronouncement, but it was regarded more as an expression of a new and changed Danish attitude toward EC. Especially in this country. And in the subsequent meeting of the Folketing Market Committee, Ellemann was both lectured to and reprimanded. Social Democrat Kjeld Olesen, whom Ellemann had just replaced as foreign minister, gave him a sharp warning: If that is the new style the government represents, it will not get Social Democratic support.

Market policy, on which there had previously been general agreement between the nonsocialist parties and the Social Democrats, began to crack.

A contributing factor was that the Market Committee--along with the Greenland home-rule government--had not been consulted at all before the cod sell-out. Uffe Ellemann did not think this could harm Greenland's interests, since there was room within the cod quota that the Greenlanders could not meet themselves. Nor did he think this set a precedent for West German fishing interests off Greenland, as critics charged.

Later German demands for special fishing interests off Greenland could suggest that the critics were right.

To follow up his success, the foreign minister in the subsequent period assumed increasing responsibility for EC negotiations on the fishing agreement. While formerly the leadership of the meeting under the Danish chairmanship had been turned over to Fisheries Minister Karl Hjortnaes when fish were involved, the foreign minister or other government members performed this task in following months.

## EC Committee's Role

It should be mentioned here that a committee of Danish officials prepares for EC meetings, the EC Committee which is led by officials from the Foreign Ministry and attended by officials from other affected ministries. The Foreign Ministry concludes the discussions in an outline that it sent to the government's Market Committee.

But in the past, Hjortnaes and others had at times set aside this report which was not presented in advance to the ministers concerned. This led the Foreign Ministry officials to start paying more attention to the views of the minister of fisheries.

Uffe Ellemann's behavior strengthened the Foreign Ministry in relation to the other ministries. That is one of the reasons why he is highly esteemed among his civil servants, which is reinforced by his energy, quickness in grasping the issues and his forcefulness in presenting his views.

## Battle Over Fish

But the Market Committee was on guard. In the painful fishing discussions the committee now held onto the ministers who could not acquire any negotiation mandate in advance. This meant that several proposals which the Danish minister of fisheries, Henning Grove, had entered with the reservation that committee approval was required were rejected there.

At one point the foreign minister presented the conclusion of a secret note to the committee. If talks on a fishing agreement were not ended by the beginning of 1983 Denmark could not prevent the other EC countries from passing a fishing agreement without Denmark, he revealed.

But in spite of this the committee stuck to its guns and in the end it was possible to get further concessions for Danish fishermen pushed through at the end of January 1983. It looked as if the foreign minister's political judgment was faulty when it came to the point.

## Sanction Issue

In the meantime the issue had turned up--namely the trade sanctions against the Soviet Union--that would lead to the sharpest clashes between Ellemann and the Social Democrats, led by Ivar Norgaard and Kjeld Olesen. There are still murky and dangerous elements in the issue which is still seething. But the main features in the course of events look like this:

The trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, which were introduced at the request of the Americans in March 1982 as punishment for the occupation of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland, which the Soviet Union was accused of being behind, were due to expire at the end of 1982. The sanctions were extremely modest and covered the importation of such insignificant product groups as upright pianos, caviar and honey, or less than 2 percent of our trade. The political impact was correspondingly hard to detect.

But the other EC countries, with the exception of Greece which had stayed out all along, wanted to extend the EC ordinance that was the basis for the sanctions. Then Social Democratic Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen had gone along reluctantly in March 1982 when Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, which deals with mutual trade policy measures but not foreign policy sanctions, was used instead of Article 224, which leaves it to each individual member nation to make its own decision. But the Social Democrats now wanted to get out of the sanctions and the EC ordinance. Since it would have been hard to accomplish this before New Year's Day, the Social Democrats agreed in advance to a 2-month delay in lifting the sanctions. At a meeting of the Market Committee on 20 December, therefore, the foreign minister was given a mandate to extend the ordinance for 2 months but no longer.

#### Confusion over Mandate

Here there is some confusion, however. The foreign minister claims that the mandate should be interpreted as meaning that it was enough for him to object on Denmark's behalf but not that he should veto the decision of the other countries to extend the sanctions for a whole year. One of the reasons was that the extension of the ordinance could not be blocked by Denmark anyway, since the decision could be made with a qualified majority of the council. The Social Democrats and the left-wing parties say that the ordinance should only have been extended for 2 months.

Another unclear point is what happened after that. The foreign minister claimed that he had registered a Danish objection at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. But when it turned out that there had not been a council meeting at all, just a written exchange of viewpoints, he changed his explanation to say that the objection had been made that way. But there was a discussion by the political committee of the 10 countries--which holds foreign policy meetings below the ministerial level--on 20 December 1982. Here there was support for a new discussion by the foreign ministers on this issue before 1 March 1983 and a feeling that Denmark could impose any restrictions it wanted to on a national basis after that.

On 15 February the political committee met and the other member lands agreed that there had not been enough of an improvement in Poland to justify lifting the sanctions.

#### Reservation

So much for the foreign minister's explanation. But questions have since been raised with increasing force as to whether the Danish government really presented its reservation with adequate clarity, as instructed by the Market Committee. The question has far more than merely academic interest. For in spite of the minor significance of the issue in real terms, it is of great interest in principle: Can an EC country unilaterally free itself from an EC ordinance that is extended with reference to the Treaty of Rome?



## Bill

At the end of February the government presented a bill on a national extension of the Soviet sanctions. But it quickly became clear that there was not a majority in favor of the bill. It is true that the Radical Liberals reluctantly voted for it, but the Progressives voted with the other opposition parties who were against it.

During the debate on the issue the foreign minister was very hard-pressed and he had to answer a long list of questions on honoring the mandate, on the legal and constitutional aspects of the Danish reservation, etc. Ivar Norgaard expressed deep distrust of the foreign minister on behalf of the Social Democrats and said among other things that the foreign minister had been given an express mandate to agree to a 2-month extension of the EC ordinance and that it was therefore "with amazement" that one could now read that the Council of Ministers had extended it for a whole year. He was also surprised by the foreign minister's disclosure of a review clause requested by the Danes that would allow the extension to be taken up for discussion 2 months later. The minister had said this had been approved by both the Foreign Policy Board and the Market Committee. But that was not true, Norgaard pointed out. The Market Committee, which has to take a stand, had not been presented with the review clause at all.

Ivar Norgaard said: "We think the foreign minister's conduct in the EC Council of Ministers is a very serious matter. It is an expression of a gross disregard of the Market Committee and thus the Folketing majority. Under the provisions of the law and in his speech in December 1982 the minister clearly violated his mandate. Against this background the Social Democrats want to investigate in an inquiry debate whether the minister still has the majority of Folketing behind him."

During the second and third debates the tone sharpened even more and the foreign minister felt pressed to refer to private talks he had had prior to the December meeting of the Market Committee with Anker Jorgensen and Kjeld Olesen. They supposedly said then that with the continued uncertainty in Poland there was no background for "giving the political signal for lifting the sanctions unilaterally on Denmark's part."

But by doing this, Ellemann-Jensen had overstepped an invisible line separating what one can and cannot do in politics. The Social Democrats were furious that he quoted private conversations. Kjeld Olesen, who was sick on the occasion of the second debate, took the floor during the third debate to say among other things: "It is one thing that the foreign minister has broken the unwritten laws by quoting private conversations, we will leave that out. It is something quite different that of course I did not say what the foreign minister says I did." And he concluded:

"For the sake of Danish foreign policy, I must deeply deplore the fact that we have a foreign minister whose lack of ethics and propriety is jeopardizing the broad agreement on Danish foreign policy which the foreign

minister himself says is dear to his heart. It goes without saying that contacts between the foreign minister and the Social Democrats must in the future occur in other ways than in private conversations."

The gauntlet was thrown down! The foreign minister felt "very deeply and very unpleasantly affected by the strong personal attack" and excused himself by saying that he had not "directly" referred to the personal conversations but only to the impression he had received from them.

In the months following, the aftermath of the sanction issue has popped up over and over again in the form of questions and interpellations, but it was never possible for the Social Democrats to gather enough support for a resolution of no confidence.

In addition there were new conflicts that gave the Social Democrats a reason to reproach the foreign minister for what they regarded as disloyal conduct toward the Folketing majority.

#### Resolution of 26 May

This applies to the resolution of 26 May that instructs the government to work for an extension of the Geneva missile talks and a postponement of the American missile deployment. Since the majority did not feel the foreign minister had given more than "lip service" to the resolution, it was further sharpened to instruct the government to work "actively" for this policy.

Prime Minister Schluter included the resolution of 26 May as part of the government's policy in his opening address to Folketing in October. But it was the general impression that the foreign minister deeply disagreed with this and would rather have had the government "dig in its heels," as he put it later in talking to INFORMATION after the Sabroe Inn meeting.

#### Digging in His Heels

Perhaps Uffe Ellemann-Jensen has reached a crossroads. Not only does the left-wing opposition disagree with his political judgment and steadiness. The Radicals are also unpleasantly affected, but so far they have refrained from going so far that it could cost the foreign minister his post or lead to the resignation of the government. Therefore it will probably take more than disapproval of some frank statements that were undoubtedly an expression of the foreign minister's indignation over what he regards as political persecution and harassment.

That something more could be a clear finding in Folketing that the foreign minister will not pursue the policy of the majority.

But it could also be a demonstration that somewhere or other in the complicated procedures of the sanction issue or the other conflict issues he has said or done something that cannot tolerate closer scrutiny.

## EC Issue

The Market Committee has decided to appoint a subcommittee to look into whether access can be obtained to such things as the correspondence between the EC Commission and the Danish government on the sanction issue. Since the resolution in Folketing, the foreign minister has received at least three communications from the commission--one shortly after the bill was rejected, the second in July and the latest just a few weeks ago.

Although the communications have not been made public, since the foreign minister regards them as government papers, it is known that the latest communication was in reference to Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome which enables the commission to "issue a reasoned statement" on a matter when the commission feels that a member state has not lived up to formal commitments. First, however, the country is given a month in which to explain itself. If it does not comply with the commission's reasoned statement, the commission can bring the matter up before the EC court.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann first denied that there was an issue at all and later said that he refused to believe that any action would be taken on it.

But if his fiercest opponents gain access to the correspondence and find proof there that the minister has totally misjudged the issue or has even misinformed Folketing or the Market Committee, one thing is clear: the hair that is holding the sword of Damocles will break.

6578

CSO: 3613/51

## ELLEMANN-JENSEN COMMENTS ON SURVIVAL OF ATTACK FROM LEFT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Birgit Rasmussen: "I Feel Almost Invigorated"]

[Text] Conversation with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who is becoming a more cool, calculating and distant person, who pays attention when the blood begins to pound in his ears... Besides, he did not think for a moment that he would fail last Thursday. That would have been politically illogical, he said. And he has not been scolded by the prime minister.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen believes it is wonderful to be foreign minister... Always away... But as to how fond he really is of the job, one can hardly use the term limpet about a man whose place at the top is more like a catapult seat, and who has not been afraid to play a little with the trigger while the good fortune supposedly has held, and the "evil eye" has shone with the gleam of expectation.

He was not fired on Thursday, but is still among us, although a little groggy from having been boxed around in the ring, plus the crazy work period he has experienced, with the special council meeting in the EC and the position of chairman of the Ministerial Committee of the European Council. He claims to be strong as an ox--but not unaffected by the mental pressure.

"I am not that tough either," he said on the afternoon after the fight, and apologized that he "is moving around so confused, I do not usually do that."

The role of repentant sinner is not the best for the foreign minister's talent, and he did not like our saying that he reminded us of such a person, as he sat there in the Folketing Hall so quiet and serious and often with his head bowed.

"It is no fun to be exposed to hard personal attack, but I honestly felt that I had nothing to be repentant about. If I held a low profile, it was not to create further difficulties either for myself or for my colleagues. And from home I have received orders to keep smiling and take it easy. The

last thing Alice said to me as I was leaving was, 'Now behave yourself nicely all day!' It was great fun to try. Perhaps it can become a habit."

"Then you could not resist throwing the no-confidence motion into the wastebasket immediately?"

"But should the devil decide how one should behave? I do that with all printed paper, because I am fantastic for making up my own mind. But Henning Christophersen said that I should keep it, because it would be a historic document. So I picked it up again right away. I have it in my briefcase."

Not Satisfied With Himself

"Would you have been very unhappy if you had failed?"

"I never had that thought. Partly because I had a good conscience, and believed that my papers were in order, and it would be politically illogical if things had gone wrong. People can say a lot of bad things about Christiansborg, but things are never entirely illogical there. A reasonably relaxed sober analysis has, in my opinion, always showed that that will not happen. When you call it a game, as some have called it, as if it were a question of kill or cure, one can ask whether the game is 'played' at Christiansborg or in the media. It can be very difficult to determine. I believe that sensationalists in several places have gotten out of control, but much of what happens there compels the media, and it is clear that those who want to overthrow me in Christiansborg have been interested in causing the trouble. The most fantastic thing was the radio ad on Wednesday, in which Kjeld Aes breathlessly said that he had it from a reliable source that I would resign the next day. Therefore when unnamed sources appear in references from Christiansborg, that is foul play!"

"Are you now pleased and satisfied with yourself?"

"No I am not. If we begin soul-searching, I believe that I deserved the slap in the face I got from using strong words about the Social Democrats, who are of course especially vulnerable at the moment, which also came forth in the debate on Thursday. I must leave that until the future, even if the blood pounds a bit in my ears in the meanwhile. I must decide for myself if by irritating them I am creating problems for the government's work, and I obviously cannot permit myself to do that. I will save my remarks about the Social Democrats until the election campaign, which will probably come in the second half of 1985. In the meanwhile I will restrain myself and work hard. And a cooler, more calculating and distant person will result from it..."

"Do you believe that you can restrain yourself?"

"Obviously I can. Over the past 13-14 months I have successfully moved around the world without losing my temper. Naturally it is easier, when it is not here at home where it is traditional in political debate to speak very straightforward Danish to each other without someone getting surly about it. Dear God, if you look at the words I used at Sabro, there were some that would cause eyebrows to rise several centimeters in a convent. Oh, I was much worse when I was political chairman, but I did not go in for witch hunts."

(One remembers that when Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in 1979 was political chairman, the Liberal Party group did not vote for the no-confidence motion against Karl Hjørtnaes, with the result that Hjørtnaes remained seated.)

Good Fortune From the Social Democrats

"Is a personal grudge also involved in the game, because the Social Democrats went after your scalp?"

"No, I think that is something written in the morning papers. I believe that I have a fine personal relationship with most Social Democrats who are involved in this issue, and we have had many pleasant hours together at our homes, where we can relax and be human. It has also been a positive experience meeting some Social Democrats who said, 'Yes, good for you...'"

"Who has supported you this time?"

"Primarily my wife Alice. And good friends are kind enough to phone, and to be patient when I phone them to talk. And my father has been very good to talk to in this situation, because he can very well judge the problems which arose when they attempted to bring in the celebrated issues such as parliamentarianism and that sort of thing. No, he did not scold me... To my regret I have read in some newspapers that I was scolded by Schluter and Henning Christophersen and by the Liberal Party group. I was not, for we have all experienced being misquoted in a newspaper. But naturally we would have preferred the situation to be different."

"But there is no cold breeze around you?"

"Not among my own. Now I have not been at home much... But we have had some discussions in the Liberal Party group, where some believe that I should not invest so much time in this part of foreign policy which is security policy, but should concentrate on other issues. It can not be forgotten that basically we all agree. It is of course not as though I have come out and said anything which the others strongly disagree with."

"Can it be expected that some of the older well-known Liberals, who have seen younger lions overtake them, are rubbing their hands? You have of

course made rapid advancement. Entering the Folketing in 1977 after 3 weeks membership in the Liberal Party..."

"If some feel that way, it can be said to their praise that they have not showed it, as far as I have seen. But many have, both in group meetings and at meetings out in the country, backed me strongly, and that is a rare experience when one obviously feels himself hanging by a thread."

Did Not Offer to Resign

"It has also been important that both Henning Christophersen and Schluter, who also personally were closest to me, were fantastic good to talk to. They gave me friendly advice about my personal problem."

"Did it ever occur to you to offer to resign so that the government could avoid all that row?"

"No, for I do not believe that the row would have been avoided in any case. I mean that the row did not basically concern me personally, but concerned the deeper disagreements between the government and the opposition. One should not be deceived into thinking that it was a personal problem."

"But it was you who traveled around and 'sold' a product which you determined was not worth buying, but on the contrary was rather shabby. Is that valid?"

"Just after the famous May resolution was approved, I traveled around with a product which I myself had tried to have changed, but I presented it realistically. I was brought up in a political environment with deep respect for popular government and parliamentarianism. I have believed in that from the start, and therefore I am very attentive to the rules of the game and the role that I am to play, and the role I can not permit myself to play. And I completely understand that as a minister I should not disparage a Folketing majority."

"When I have been **hard** on Social Democrats it is as known because they turned 180 degrees from the time that they gave up government power, in a change of course which I know that many Social Democrats disagree with."

To Sell the Product

"Do otherwise intelligent people necessarily need to deal foolishly and irresponsibly, or have dishonest motives?"

"Naturally not. I actually tried also in one of the debates to say that we should respect each other's motives, because we all want peace, freedom and security, but we have such different ideas of how the wishes can be realized. I have not tried to cast doubt on the motives of, for example,

the Radical, Socialist People's and Left-Socialist Parties, because they have always believed as they do now, and I believe that they do it out of idealistic motives.

"I have reacted strongly against the themes that suddenly are used in a domestic political connection by some Social Democrats, who have previously obligated Denmark to something which I must now go out and say no to. And that has created some problems... But I am in the situation as before a majority is created, and the government for other reasons desires to remain seated, I will be loyal to the decision of the majority. And sell the product as well as I can. And that is what I intend to do."

"You do not feel that the last time has weakened you politically so that you will have difficulty operating?"

"Instead I feel strengthened. Because a number of things have been clarified."

"Do you look at the future with confidence?"

"If one does his work properly and has a good conscience, he does not need to lack confidence."

#### Strong Attitudes

"Are you deeply grateful to Niels Helveg Petersen?"

"No, I believe that the Radicals did the right thing... They dealt with the issue seriously, and went right to the point: the parliamentary rules."

"Do you believe you will eventually be held in check, and be sharply criticized for your actions?"

"Of course that was what they did last year. Here it is only a part of the 'business.' Then the row was about EC sanctions, and now I will go in and defend something about an asbestos directive. To my surprise I read a long eager article in INFORMATION about my breaking a rule by being present at the approval of an asbestos directive without having a mandate for that. I am certainly not guilty."

"Can a minister have attitudes and feelings which are too strong?"

"That can make his existence more difficult, but I do not think that is anything negative. There are, both in Christiansborg and in the Foreign Ministry, many solid things which can be set down in a debit and credit statement, and say that such and such gives you the most possible pleasure. But if to that extent you become deeply absorbed and forget to have a feeling for living, for the world around you and for society and that, as some say, that 'we have borrowed from our children' you will become a narrow person."



"I have traveled much in the eastern countries, and studied socialist planning in Prague in the beginning of the 60's. I was also there when the Russians came, and had a supershort interview with Dubcek. It is also some of that which has strengthened my feelings and attitudes about living in a free society. I think Denmark is such a wonderful country, and when I have been on a trip it is splendid to come home again. But see how vulnerable, how exposed we are... When some do not take it seriously enough, I can become alternately angry and sorrowful."

In addition Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen understandably enough prefers to "count the happy hours" and certain questions he answers simply by saying that "he will not willingly go out into the quicksand." Rather, we should move in toward the more positive sides of his job as foreign minister. For example the policy toward the developing countries, which he is deeply involved in, and where he has had such good cooperation with the Social Democrats, and the Danish proposals for financial reforms in the EC, where we have really been taken seriously by others...

As said before, he believes his job is wonderful, partly because of the "fantastic, skillful, loyal and exciting officials, and because one can believe that he is doing something which produces results."

"Something entirely different than being an opposition politician. The last time I was becoming a little frustrated, wanted to use my powers to do something constructive. During past years we could not rightly achieve cooperation, and I know that the Conservatives felt the same way. But when the Liberal group in the opposition held their morale high, Henning skillfully started the work in the group so that everyone always had something to do. We made great economic plans and much else besides. When the opposition is kept busy that way, it does not play dirty tricks..."

On the positive side, listen to the answer to our question of what Schluter said to Uffe after Thursday: "Lets go up to my place and have a drink."

#### The Daughter and Peace

The family means a lot to the foreign minister, even though lately, when his son Jakob for ten years has not had much fun in the schoolyard, he is apt to say that politicians should not have families, because it is always they who bear the brunt of such situations. He has four children, two from his first marriage. Helene at 17 is a very active member of the local peace group.

"It is partly her influence that causes me time after time to affirm that I have great respect for the peace movement. When Alice had dinner with Gromyko in Moscow, she delivered a greeting from Helene, and told him that she was in the peace movement, which pleased him greatly because 'we should

listen to them.' He took it well when Alice said, 'The greeting to you is that you should therefore also scrap all your disgusting missiles.'"

After all that has been said about the foreign minister, it should be noted that he is good with children and animals, and that on Thursday he did not call the dogs that he and Jakob share, because when he got home they had had their supper, and could not be disturbed...

He proved that he has both courage and a good stomach recently on Greenland. After having learned that the prime minister gave up on the raw seal liver, he determined to eat everything put before him, and that included the liver, seal intestines and dried fish, which had been hung too close together so that it really was not dry, but rotten. A meal which most Greenlanders were very fond of.

So could he not also devour some camels?

9287

CSO: 3613/54

## ACTIONS AT CONGRESS INDICATE LEFT SOCIALISTS IN DECLINE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 29 Nov 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Party of Monks"]

[Text] When the Left Socialist Party (VS) held its 13th congress last weekend, it took the decisive step into the ranks of small political groups. VS is still represented in Folketing, but the results of the congress are a symptom of a serious political crisis that will probably lead to the party's departure from Folketing in the next election. Which is also confirmed by most of the recent opinion polls.

VS refused once more to open the doors to the press, leaving the public with the feeling that the party's discussions are either so secret or so incomprehensible to ordinary people that it would not benefit the party to come forward openly. An attitude that is truly worthy of a closed fraternal order.

And VS has again rejected a proposed resolution from Preben Wilhjelm and others underlining the party's clear-cut defense of democracy in all situations.

But there is nothing new about this kind of political signal from VS. It really sounds like a report from earlier congresses. Of course it is not so good that VS seems to lack the ability to renew itself. But can this justify a claim that VS has now taken a definite step on the downward path toward political isolation?

The course of events leading to the repeated rejection of the proposal of Wilhjelm et al. on democracy and socialism is especially interesting in this context. When the VS met for its 12th congress in May 1982, 248 members--including Preben Wilhjelm--had prepared a resolution draft on democracy and socialism that stated that VS is working for the unlimited defense of freedom of speech and law and order for all citizens--under both capitalism and socialism. At the same time the resolution rejected terrorism in any form whatsoever.

At the 12th congress Wilhjem's resolution was rejected by 73 votes to 57. Preben Wilhjem said then that the decision was "highly regrettable," but he was glad that the congress had shown much more determined support for the resolution than there had been at the preceding 11th congress, where the resolution was also rejected.

At the just held 13th congress, the same resolution on democracy and socialism was rejected by an even larger number of votes than at the 12th congress: 76 opposed and 31 in favor.

A big political setback for Wilhjem's movement in VS. Wilhjem was also forced to admit this at the press conference following the congress.

In other words VS is still working on the basis of a policy that opens the way for dispensing with democratic rights under special political conditions and accepting political violence and terrorism as long as these means of fighting are used by the right people at the correct time.

The major political resolution that was passed, "Schluter must go--and what then?" was also a sign of the movement of VS toward political isolation. The resolution makes no attempt to give any political message concerning the left wing's tasks in a situation where the nonsocialist government has been toppled and there is a possibility of establishing a labor majority. Nor does the resolution say anything about how the left wing would establish a political alternative to the nonsocialist policy of cutting spending without ending up in a flat defense of prosperity's welfare state.

The main message in the resolution is that there must be a mass political strike to overturn the Schluter government. But who will throw themselves headlong into a general strike unless there is a clear political purpose for this action? To reduce one's political message to pure technique is politically naive. That is a policy that can only stand the test in a group that is cut off from political reality.

The resolution's message to the peace movement and the VS people who take part in the struggle against the arms buildup is equally meager. Seven lines saying that VS supports arms reduction in East and West and a Nordic nuclear-free zone. That is all VS has to say in a situation where one expects to find the peace struggle at the top of the agenda for the congress of any left-wing party.

The Left Socialists are losing their political profile. VS is no longer a party for exciting clashes between political currents on the left wing. The party has gradually lost its political foothold in the movements that in the 1970's gave the party its strength and broad influence in spite of an always limited number of members. Movements like the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement, the women's movement and others that have mapped out clear political alternatives to both nonsocialist and Social Democratic policy.

One of the most striking indications of political isolation is the total absence of women's policy. The women's political discussion in the party has largely died down and the party's feminist work lies in ruins. As the most tangible sign of the malaise, only 17 percent of the delegates at the VS congress were women.

What kind of political party is it that appeals exclusively to socialists of the male sex?

6578

CSO: 3613/51

## LEFT-SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS AGAIN REJECTS RIGHTS GUARANTEE

## Legal Rights Under 'Socialism' at Issue

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Nov 83 p 7

/Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Left-Socialist Party Opposes Guarantee of Democratic Rights"/

/Text/ Preben Wilhjelm suffered a big defeat at the Left-Socialist Party's congress on his proposal concerning democratic rights. The party also decided to establish a youth section.

"The Left-Socialist Party is going in the wrong direction," Folketing member Preben Wilhjelm thinks, after that party's congress voted down his resolution on democratic rights by a big majority yesterday.

The congress decided, by 76 votes to 31, that under certain circumstances limitation of the democratic rights of those who previously had been in power could be considered when socialism is introduced in Denmark.

The draft resolution by Preben Wilhjelm and Klavs Birkholm was up for discussion at a Left-Socialist Party congress for the third time. It is maintained in the proposal that a limitation of democratic rights can never be considered under any circumstances, and Preben Wilhjelm himself believed that more and more members of the party supported the proposal. "But that has changed now. It has gone the other way--the wrong way. We are moving in the direction of the Communist Party's views now. They have always taken an equivocal attitude toward democratic rights. But I had hoped that the Left-Socialist Party, in a completely unique and categorical way, would stand up for democratic rights," Preben Wilhjelm said yesterday at the meeting of the press after the congress that was closed to the press.

"This is an unfortunate development, but I want to stress the fact that there are no other parties that have undertaken a discussion of democracy at all.

"Am I tired out?" he asked. "No, I have been in minority groups almost the entire amount of time I have belonged to the Left-Socialist Party, and

I have felt comfortable there. There is nothing particularly new about this. Now I will spend the next few days chewing over everything that happened at this congress."

Preben Wilhjelm also suffered a defeat on another point. A majority of the delegates to the congress decided to establish an organization called Left-Socialist Youth, although the party earlier had opposed having a special young people's unit.

"I am sorry that we are going to have a young people's organization now. Youth associations always take a critical attitude toward their mother parties. There is a possibility that a polarization will take place, so we will probably have trouble with this group," Preben Wilhjelm said.

In the executive committee election, four factions were assured of representation on that committee. The Collective Professional List got five, the Vesterbro Group and Line 2 got three apiece and the Cross-Section List got two members. The other eight committee members do not belong to any factions. Out of the 21 members of the executive committee, only two are women, and the party's press group, consisting of Preben Wilhjelm, Folketing member Anne Grete Holmsgard and City Council Member Jorgen Lenger, very much deplored that fact.

The congress passed a major political resolution whose declared purpose was to get the nonsocialist government removed from office. That means that there apparently is a movement behind the demands being made of the Folketing, and that work outside of the parliamentary body therefore is the lifeblood of the Left-Socialist Party's work.

#### Reflects Long Radical-Moderate Split

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, in Danish 28 Nov 83 p 8

/Editorial: "Undemocratic Right to Freedom of Speech" /

/Text/ If democracy is to function, it is necessary to know the views that are held by both friends and foes. That, among other things, is the principle we follow in putting out this newspaper. And it is a principle to which Danmarks Radio necessarily must adhere. Universality is an obligation to permit everyone to have a chance to speak.

Therefore the political parties should also have a chance to put forward the views on which their policies will be based. They should have that chance in the daily press and on Danmarks Radio. One should never go so far as to undertake to distinguish between views which, from a political point of view, deserve to be made public and those which do not. Once one has gotten oneself into that situation, no clear borderline between a fundamental democratic attitude and various degrees of authoritarian impulses exists any longer.

However, the communications media do not bear the exclusive responsibility for the free circulation of ideas. The political parties also bear that responsibility. If the daily newspapers are to be able to provide adequate reports on what is going on in a party when its views are being shaped, that can only be accomplished by giving the press free access to information. If Danmarks Radio is to give viewers and listeners an adequate picture of what goes on at a national congress, that can only be accomplished if the national congress is open to the necessary coverage by Danmarks Radio's personnel.

This mutual obligation ordinarily is observed without any friction by the parties and the media. But there are difficulties in that regard on the left wing. Many viewers still have a lively recollection of how two of the smartest reporters for TV-Aktuelt made a rush at a person who suddenly popped up and presented himself as the party leader of the Socialist Workers Party. Perhaps the onslaught seemed a bit savage, but in the background was the fact that the reporters had been ordered to interview him because his party had held a national congress. There was not a soul who had observed the national congress because it was closed to the press and in other ways took place like an almost illegal clandestine meeting of revolutionaries.

Now the Left-Socialist Party has played that same trick. First a national congress is held to which the press does not get access, and after that they demand time on television for a party-leader interview on the basis of existing agreements.

It must be said as forcefully as possible that that is an undemocratic way of behaving. It would make no sense at all for the television establishment to make journalists and apparatus available for a telecast for which the proper amount of preparation cannot be provided. An interview with a party leader in connection with a national congress can only be given a satisfactory amount of preparation if the journalists have had sufficient chance to form their own opinions in regard to what went on at the national congress.

If internal dissension in the Left-Socialist Party is so acute that the delegates do not dare to wash their dirty linen publicly, they cannot possibly assert that Danmarks Radio should make viewing time available to them to explain the compromises at which they arrived at their congress. That is misuse of the democratic right to free speech, and in the future Danmarks Radio should unambiguously ask to be excused in similar situations.

9266

CSO: 3613/45



## POLLS INDICATE SDP FAILING TO MAKE GAINS FROM MISSILE STANCE

## Conservatives Are Biggest Losers

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Stronger View on Missiles Has Not Benefited the Socialists"]

[Text] The November opinion poll shows that the coalition parties must continue to receive assistance from both the Radical Liberal Party and the Progress Party if they are to have a majority after an election.

Precisely on the 10-year anniversary of the big protest election of 4 December 1973, which brought the new parties, the Center Democratic Party and the Progress Party, into the Folketing, those two parties can be pleased with the results of the Gallup political opinion poll.

They are far below the results obtained among the voters at that time, but people are talking about a pronounced increase by comparison with last month's opinion poll.

The Progress Party advanced by 2.4 percent and the Center Democratic Party by 1.9 percent.

The Gallup survey was made during the period from 1 November to 30 November, when the debate on the deployment of NATO's nuclear missiles before the Folketing's decisions on 1 December was very prominent. The survey shows that it is not the Social Democratic Party that is gaining support among the voters for its stronger views on nuclear missiles, but that, instead, a slight advance by the Social Democrats of 0.8 percent and the by Radical Liberal Party of 0.5 percent during the period can be observed.

The Conservative People's Party suffered a severe decline in voter support of 3.3 percent by comparison with the October opinion poll, but the party still wants to gain an outstanding victory when an election is held with an increase of 17 seats in the Folketing by comparison with the 1981 election results. The Liberal Party also suffered a slight setback in voter support in November by comparison with October, and the Christian People's Party will slip out of the Folketing, according to this survey, if an election were held now.

The distribution of seats in the Folketing calculated on the basis of the Gallup poll shows that, after an election, it now will still be necessary for the present government to get votes from the Radical Liberal Party and the Progress Party in order to be able to obtain a majority. It also shows that the Social Democrats still must have Radical Liberal votes if they want to generate a majority in opposition to the government. The Folketing seats are distributed as follows:

	<u>Gallup Poll</u>	<u>Now</u>
Social Democratic Party	58	59
Radical Liberal Party	8	9
Conservative People's Party	43	26
Socialist People's Party	21	21
Center Democratic Party	11	15
Christian People's Party	0	4
Liberal Party	17	20
Left Socialist Party	4	5
Progress Party	13	12
Independents	0	4

#### Radical Liberals Down in Second Poll

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 4 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] According to an opinion poll by the AIM analysis institute that is being published in BORSEN today, the Radical Liberal Party is losing some seats in the Folketing and the four-leaf-clover government can continue with support from the Progress Party alone.

According to the analysis, an election now would produce the following distribution of seats in the legislature (the present figures are given in parentheses):

Social Democratic Party:	55	(59)
Radical Liberal Party:	5	(9)
Conservative People's Party:	48	(26)
Socialist People's Party:	21	(21)
Center Democratic Party:	10	(15)
Christian People's Party:	4	(4)
Liberal Party:	18	(20)
Left Socialist Party:	4	(5)
Progress Party:	10	(16)

Simultaneously, the survey shows that more than one out of every ten who voted Social Democratic in the last election will vote for one of the nonsocialist parties, and especially the Conservative People's Party, which is the only party that will increase the number of Folketing seats it holds.

## Political Index

Collecting Period: 19-30 November 1983

Question: What party would you vote for if a Folketing election were held tomorrow? (in percentage)

	<u>8 December 1981</u>	<u>May 1983</u>
Social Democratic Party	32.9	32.8
Radical Liberal Party	5.1	3.9
Conservative People's Party	14.5	23.6
Single Tax Party	1.4	-
Socialist People's Party	11.3	10.5
International Socialist Worker's Party	0.1	-
Communist Party	1.1	-
Center Democratic Party	8.3	5.4
Christian People's Party	2.3	-
Communist Workers Party	0.1	-
Liberal Party	11.3	9.7
Left Socialist Party	2.7	2.2
Progress Party	8.9	7.7
Other parties*	-	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0

\*Parties with fewer than 2 percent of the votes.

Question: "Which party would you vote for if a Folketing election were held tomorrow?"

[Reprint only if Gallup and BERLINSKE are cited as sources.]

### SPD Paper on Radicals' Setback

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 5 Dec 83 p 8

[Editorial: "The Radical Liberal Party"]

[Text] The situation is the same with political opinion polls as it is with weather predictions--the almanac predicts, but God rules. Gallup, Observa and AIM predict. The voters decide. Consequently, the most recent AIM survey in BORSEN can also be taken with the traditional grain of salt. On the other hand, the tendencies in those different surveys may well be in line with good, common sense.

The most recent AIM poll confirms the assumption that the Radical Liberal Party's day is on the point of running out. In the December 1981 election, the Radical Liberal Party got 5.1 percent of the votes. According to the AIM poll of Deember 1981, its share of the total had fallen off to 3.1

percent, and on top of that there is the Radical Liberals' role in the attempt to overthrow the government during the most recent week. That does not produce improvement in the Radical Liberals' percentage of the total. Quite the contrary.

Many parties are encountering contrary winds, including the Social Democratic Party, if opinion polls are to be believed. AIM gives them 30.9 percent as compared with 32.9 percent in the 1981 election. But let us take a look now.

It is more probable that the Conservative People's Party, as the dominating nonsocialist party, is picking up votes. There is nothing new in that. It is only underscored again and again, and now AIM says that the Conservative People's Party can manage with its traditional support--without the Radical Liberals. That is Niels Helveg Petersen's partisan conclusion. And actually it is a very natural one to arrive at. There is no need for the Radical Liberals any longer. The party's voters can just as well give direct support to the Conservative People's Party themselves. For that reason, Helveg is afraid of this election.

9266

CSO: 3613/53

## GROWING POWER OF HARD-LINE FACTION HURTING LEFT-SOCIALISTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Dec 83 p 12

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Preben Wilhjelm Warns the Left Socialist Party against the Fatal Lines"]

[Text] The Left Socialist Party has big internal problems. Members have trickled away and the Joint Professional List faction has paralyzed the party. If the Left Socialist Party is to continue to be represented in the Folketing, it will be necessary for it to settle accounts with the Joint Professional List's destructive line.

That is what Preben Wilhjelm thinks. He is serving his last electoral period in the Folketing. He also thinks that the Left Socialist Party's Folketing group is the only part of the party that has retained a certain profile.

"The Folketing group has had a high profile in the area of legal policy, we have made an effort in the area of mental disorders and we have pursued a policy in regard to children. But it will also be difficult for the Folketing group in the long run if the destructive line is pursued. Whether we are going to continue to be represented in the Folketing depends entirely upon how the party behaves in the future. The line the Joint Professional List has taken has weakened the Left Socialist Party to a great extent and prevented us from going on the offensive. It is a fatal line, and the party cannot be expected to survive in this way. The main effect of the Joint Professional List's work has been that we have not succeeded in making the party effective enough."

## Democracy

The Left Socialist Party's congress that recently drew to a close also demonstrated that problems existed. It was after the congress that Preben Wilhjelm stated that the Left Socialist Party was moving in the wrong direction after the congress persisted in a former decision that the democratic rights of the former rulers can be curtailed when socialism is introduced. Preben Wilhjelm tried for the third time at the congress to get acceptance of his proposal that democratic rights should be guaranteed.

And he concluded by appealing to the other members of his party in the following terms: "If we think that the Left Socialist Party, with its credibility intact, can take an ambiguous position toward fundamental democratic rights, can defend terrorist actions against meetings of people who think differently, can raise protests against Israel's bombings of Palestinian refugee camps without protesting against the destruction by one PLO wing of the other wing's refugee camps, and--taken as a whole--can practice the most "clear-cut schizophrenia" on questions of democracy, we should just persist in the resolution of the last congress. But that represents an entirely different concept of socialism than the one we stood for, and which the Left Socialist Party originally stood for."

The matter has indirectly been in the process of turning around again since the Left Socialist Party's Folketing group held a meeting the other day with the party's new executive committee. Preben Wilhjelm now claims to have gone deeply into the question of whether the Left Socialist Party's resolution regarding democracy will have any influence on the initiatives its Folketing group can take in regard to legal policy.

"I hope that the executive committee will arrive at a decision of its own accord. Does the concept of democratic rights harmonize with our position in that area otherwise?" he asks.

The congress voted, by a four-vote majority, to exclude the public from the congress, but Preben Wilhjelm thinks that, in spite of everything, an understanding is spreading that the Left Socialist Party has to be more outgoing.

"If the people in the Joint Professional List had not voted as a unit at the congress, the congress would have been opened to the public. But a feeling for better presentation in the media is developing. A closed congress can cause feelings of suspicion, and the costs to the party of something like that are too great," Wilhjelm says.

A problem having to do with sex also cropped up at the Left Socialist Party's 13th Congress. Only two of the executive committee's 21 members are women. And only about 20 of the 140 delegates were women.

"The fact that only two women got into the executive committee provided food for thought," Wilhjelm said. "It must be a party goal and a working goal to get more women into party work. Yes, the people who say that the party is just fine for single men with no obligations to support anybody are right. The level of activity in the Left Socialist Party has always been great. There is extensive informational material to keep up with. It is clear that there must be more delegating of responsibility and more decentralization in the party. The Joint Professional List did not want to have anything to do with that."

"Why does the Joint Professional List have such great influence? It declined considerably at this congress. But the Joint Professional List uses a revolutionary jargon, and the party members who are unsure and do not want

to be regarded as reformists succumb to it. When one is replacing experienced members and bringing new, inexperienced members in all the time, they succumb to that jargon, which is only empty talk," Wilhjelm said.

#### A Hard Tour

The Left Socialist Party's rules on rotation are the reason why the 48-year-old Preben Wilhjelm will leave the Folketing when the next election is held. In theory, that does not preclude him from trying to get renominated later on.

"But I don't think so now," he says. "For one thing, a tour in the Folketing for the Left Socialist Party is pretty hard. One knows that it has to come to an end after a period of time, and that makes one go on until then and put out a great deal of work. Consequently, one does not feel an immediate urge to extend it, even if one still has an ambivalent attitude toward doing so. For another thing, I am "well up in years," and when I go out into the job market I will think it over a good many times, if I succeed in finding a job, before quitting it."

9266

CSO: 3613/56

## JORGEN LINGER, RISING STAR IN LEFT-SOCIALISTS, IS HARDER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Dec 83 p 12

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "On the Way to the Top in the Left Socialist Party"]

[Text] The Left Socialist Party's coming man, Jorgen Lenger, has deliberately placed himself in the middle in that party. He has made a trip around in some of the party's factions, but now he has almost created his own group occupying a position in the middle. And he is leading a fierce campaign against the Joint Professional List.

Jorgen Lenger, 30 years of age and a clerk in the Social Administration in Arhus, was Number 1 on the party's so-called top-20 list of Folketing candidates for the coming year last summer. That means that he is sure of getting into the Folketing--that is, if the Left Socialist party gets in--because he automatically gets the best district for the Left Socialist Party.

Since 1978, Jorgen Lenger has been a member of the town council of Arhus, and the effort he puts into his work has been recognized. He works in the same way as Preben Wilhjelm does, among others, and as Erik Sigsgaard did in the Folketing. "Always well-founded factually. That produces respect deep inside other parties. So one can permit oneself to be bold," as they say.

Jorgen Lenger was recently elected to the executive committee at the Left Socialist Party's congress, and he is regarded by everybody as being on his way up at a rapid pace. He was one of the many who would have opened up the political part of the Left Socialist Party's congress. But he was not prepared to make any far-reaching interpretations of the defeat Preben Wilhjelm suffered at the congress with his proposal concerning democracy.

He would like to make the Left Socialist Party more democratic and has talked in INFORMATION about how one must eliminate the practice of thinking things out painstakingly "and learn to act more from indignation and on the basis of concrete attitudes. Act, and then make corrections afterwards. Learn from your political experiences and don't try to tailor your experiences to a 'doctrine.'"

In that same connection, Jorgen Lenger says that the Joint Professional List should leave the Left Socialist Party and that a split would be a political leap forward.



## BRIEFS

GREENS GATHERING ELECTION QUALIFICATIONS--The newly-formed environmentalist party, the Green Party, is collecting signatures to enable the party to run in a future Folketing election. The party estimates that it already has well over half the 20,000 signatures required under the election rules for the party to be entitled to run, it disclosed in a press release Thursday. In 15 out of a total of 17 counties and nomination districts, members are working to form local groups and nominate Folketing candidates. According to one of the party's founders, deputy mayor Preben Bjorn Madsen of Tastrup, several hundred new members are on their way into the party. The book, "Revolt from the Middle," has been the major inspiration for the Danish green movement which cooperates with similar organizations all over Europe. However the party declines to be linked with the West German "Die Gruenen," the press release said. The party has prepared four preliminary program points for its policy. These call for scaling down defense, so that the Danish military systems cannot be used for attack purposes, new attitudes toward our natural resources and combatting pollution, economic autonomy for local areas and a change in the social sector that includes a fixed citizen's wage for both adults and children. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 25 Nov 83 p 4] 6578

COMPETITOR PARTY TO COMMUNISTS--Union chairman Preben Moller Hansen was unanimously elected as the new chairman of the Common Course Club. Preben Moller Hansen replaced Jorgen Tved, who continues as vice chairman. At the Common Course Club's congress, where Preben Moller Hansen was elected, the question of forming a new communist party was the topic of a great deal of discussion. A proposal to make Common Course into a party was made by two Common Course divisions, but was not passed. But within the Common Course Club it is believed that the election of Preben Moller Hansen is a strong indication that the Common Course Club wants to develop into a party that can replace the Danish Communist Party. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 Nov 83 p 1] 6578

CSO: 3613/51

## PAPER AFFIRMS VALUE OF CONTINUED UNION WITH DENMARK

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 2 Nov 83 p 2

/Editorial by J. F.: "Sentimental Nonsense?"

/Text/ Professor Poul Meyer thinks that Denmark should dissolve the union with Greenland. Denmark derives no happiness from such an arrangement. Only ingratitude has been returned for the millions which Denmark has spent on Greenland. There is no substance in the union. The whole thing is just sentimentality.

The professor should have thought more carefully before firing off such a torrent of words. Given his interest in Greenland, he could not be ignorant of the fact that Denmark and Greenland share much history and culture; his claim that the union is founded on sentimentality is too facile. Both countries have a common religion, and the Lutheran Church is deeply rooted in Greenland to this very day. We have the same flag, and the Danish language is understood and spoken by nearly all young people of Greenland.

If we look at the political aspect, we see the union also plays an important role. Atassut, the largest party in Greenland, has the preservation of the union as a declared objective, and none of the other parties desires secession.

Such are the facts; we are perfectly aware that we need each other. The union functions well today, and no-one in Greenland wishes things to be different.

12593

CSO: 3613/41

## PAPER VIEWS PROBLEMS AHEAD FOR SORSA CABINET

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Nov 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Difficulties Ahead"]

[Text] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa has given a positive evaluation of his government's performance to date: The first half year has gone according to expectations or relatively well. There is no need for a reevaluation of objectives. Thus he also instills in his cabinet the necessary spirit and will of cooperation, which is already because of his office a part of a prime minister's duties.

It would, however, be erroneous to imagine that the government does not have any difficulties in the management of its affairs as well as among its ruling partners. The most difficult of the ruling partners has been the SMP [Finnish Rural Party]. Its sudden rise from a long-term period of opposition to government responsibility has caused adjustment difficulties, which have been the most apparent within the parliamentary faction.

The weekend with its meeting of the SMP's representation did not change the situation very much in this respect. It did, however, reinforce suppositions of the SMP's serious desire to remain in the government. Government participation increases the self-esteem of the party's rank and file and supporters. They no longer have to feel that they are only in a propaganda war for that forgotten people to whom the party leadership previously promised, for example: If the party were in the government, it would eliminate unemployment in 6 months. However, unemployment exists and will also continue to exist after the Labor Ministry's new promise regarding the 1985 budget should become fulfilled.

The prime minister's attitude toward the new ruling partner has been businesslike and generous as one should expect from an experienced politician. The discordant voices and deviations coming from the ranks of the SMP's parliamentary faction have not yet affected the economic policy line agreed upon by the government. But the actual difficulties are yet to come.

The biggest test of the fall session will be next year's budget proposal. The demand of loyalty connected with it concerns all the ruling factions. The budget debate in particular will represent a certain test of maturity

for the SMP in spite of the fact that next year's municipal elections are beginning to tempt it and its individual members to march to the beat of their own drummer, as is also the case with the other parties.

The government will also soon be faced with participation in labor contract and income solutions. In its program it promised to begin negotiations on the implementation of such solutions that would achieve the goal of a 6-percent inflation rate and "secure a positive development in purchasing power". Characterizing this task as difficult is an understatement. The signs do not bode well: maneuvering and the atmosphere are becoming more serious particularly in the state sector, in which the position of the wage earner is even otherwise the most secure.

The prime minister has also seen the effort to revise the constitution as one of the above-mentioned difficulties, which include, among other things, the reform of the manner of electing the president and a revision of his authority as well as a change in the stipulated majority- and minority statutes. If all these efforts, including the questionable procedure of enacting the economic policy proxy laws, are intended to be packaged together, then the government is earnestly seeking difficulties for itself.

10576

CSO: 3617/40

## FERM AFFAIR: LEADERS WORRIED OVER WORSENING SWEDISH-USSR TIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by DAGENS NYHETER Helsinki correspondent Kaa Eneberg: "Ferm Affair Worries Finland"]

[Text] Helsinki, Sunday. The uproar over UN Ambassador Anders Ferm's actions relating to his Soviet conversations has attracted much attention in Finland. Here they are viewing with concern, even on the nonsocialist side, that Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union are worsening, and leading newspapers complain that the current confrontation in Sweden makes normalization of relations impossible.

President Mauno Koivisto has previously, as reported in DAGENS NYHETER, acted as an intermediary with peace invitations from the Soviet Union. That happened when in the beginning of August Olof Palme met Mauno Koivisto, who had a personal message from Russian head of state Yuriy Andropov. It proposed, according to what DAGENS NYHETER has learned, that all talk of Russian submarine violations be discontinued, since they could guarantee that there have been none since Karlskrona.

When President Mauno Koivisto, in his birthday interviews on his 60th birthday on 25 November, expressed doubt about further Soviet submarine violations, this aroused anger in Sweden and depression in the Foreign Ministry and others concerned in Finland. Since then they have done everything possible to tone down the criticism that Koivisto obviously voiced.

## Mistrust

The chief editor of the Swedish language newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, Jan-Magnus Jansson, chairman of the Paasikivi Society and former presidential candidate, wrote under the headline "High Seas in the Swedish Debate" that Palme is in an unfortunate situation. He is greatly handicapped in acting in a situation where superpower relations are out of balance and he is at the same time confronted with mistrust by a portion of domestic opinion.

"Here in Finland, independent of the ideological preferences, Sweden's government is seen as a cooperative partner in a harsh world, and we have reason to deplore the situation."

Jansson wrote, as did the leading newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT, that SVENSKA DAGBLADET in its defense of publishing the secret letter, used the abusive word "Finlandization." Both newspapers are said to know that this is the first time the newspaper has used this term which, obviously in Finland, it promised not to use.

#### Will Not Take a Stand

Jansson will not take a stand against SVENSKA DAGBLADET, with which his newspaper has editorial cooperation. HELSINGIN SANOMAT, however, considers that: "Palme truly does not practice Finlandization policies. But it is clear that the crisis between Palme's boys and Foreign Ministry officials weakens confidence in Swedish foreign policy."

The newspaper points out that the Ferm affair is the climax of a number of foreign policy affairs that Palme has had with the press since last fall. Among other things there was the dispute about West German Social Democrat Egon Bahr's roll in Palme's recommendation for a nuclear weapon-free corridor and the leak to the press of the paper about the border conflict with the Danes over Hasselo.

9287

CSO: 3650/72

## COMMUNISTS SUFFER SETBACK IN LARGEST UNION'S LEADERSHIP VOTE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 10 Nov 83 p 10

[Article: "Social Democrats' Hold on Metal Workers Stronger"]

[Text] Industry's largest trade union, the Metal Workers' Union of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions], is under the control of the Social Democrats more tightly than ever before since unity was restored to the trade union movement. The Communists, who have gone from one defeat to another, were not able to break the spell of misfortune even in the elections of the metal workers' convention.

The results of the elections, which concluded on Tuesday, were still being counted throughout all of Wednesday. Small changes were made to Tuesday evening's preliminary results, but the overall picture remained the same.

The Social Democrats advanced across the board in the elections, which have in general been considered to be a dependable gauge of mutual power relationships among the workers' parties. The number of people entitled to vote in the elections was 150,000.

For example, the Helsinki district of the Metal Workers' Union has clearly had a Communist majority. Now more Social Democrats than Communists were elected from Helsinki to the convention to be held in December. Clearly the Social Democrats have strengthened their positions in the election districts of Uusimaa, Oulu, and Central Finland also.

In the elections 471 representatives were elected to the convention, which will elect a new leadership for the union as well as members to the executive committee and the council. The Social Democrats received an unconditional majority at the convention.

The results of the elections will ensure that the new chairman of the SAK's most influential union will be Per-Erik Lundh (Social Democrat), the present secretary of the central organization. The present chairman, Sulo Penttila (Social Democrat), will retire at the Helsinki convention.

According to Penttila, adherence to the principle of proportionality means that the Communists will have to relinquish administrative positions to the Social Democrats at the convention.

### Voting Percentages and Positions in Metal Workers' Elections

	1971		1975		1979		1983	
	%	Positions	%	Positions	%	Positions	%	Positions
SDP	52.8	(249)	50.4	(259)	50.5	(233)	52.8	(256)
SKDL	47.0	(215)	47.1	(241)	44.9	(211)	41.9	(199)
Kepu	0.2	( 1 )	2.1	( 6 )	4.3	( 14)	4.2	( 14)
SMP	--	( --)	--	( --)	--	( --)	0.7	( 2)
Others	--	( --)	0.4	( --)	0.3	( --)	0.4	( --)

#### Key:

SDP = Social Democratic Party  
 SKDL = Finnish People's Democratic League  
 Kepu = Center Party  
 SMP = Finnish Rural Party

The power relationships between the Social Democrats and the Communists in the metal workers' executive committee or governing body are now 11--8. The Social Democrats want the new power relationship to be 12--7. The Social Democrats in the union's council want two-three more positions in the union's council according to Penttila. Now the Social Democrats have 30 council members, the Communists 24, and the Center Party has one. The Center Party will be able to retain its only position.

On Wednesday it was thought that after these elections the Metal Workers' Union will no longer belong to the so-called balanced unions, but the power relationships have clearly changed and are seemingly permanent.

The Social Democrats have advanced in all the metal workers' elections since the restoration of unity. The first elections were held in 1971. The union was the first trade union to adopt a relative or open political election procedure. Elections are held at 4-year intervals.

#### Communists Stayed Home

On Wednesday it was estimated that there was a connection between the low voter turnout and the definite defeat for the Communists. The number of Communists voting dropped by more than 7,000 since the last elections, the number of Social Democrats dropped by a little less than 3,000.

It is thought that the confused internal situation in the Communist Party and the disillusionment of its constituency resulted in the fact that Communist support groups abstained from voting. Generally the Communists have done better in elections in which the voter turnout has been lower.

The voter turnout now was 65.3 percent while in the last elections it was almost 74 percent.

The Center Party retained its position as the largest bourgeois faction in the trade union. As a new participant the Finnish Rural Party received two positions in the convention -- one of them from Helsinki and the other from



Wartsila's Hietalahti Shipyard where the trade union section has a Communist majority.

#### Low Voter Turnout a Disgrace

The celebrations of the Social Democratic election victory in the Metal Workers' Union were disturbed on Wednesday by one circumstance: the collapse of voter turnout. Approximately 10,000 less metal workers went to the polls than in the previous election in 1979.

The Metal Workers' Union has generally been able to take pride in voting percentages which have been among the highest in trade union elections. Four years ago a 74-percent turnout was achieved, now it was around 65 percent.

The most eager critics saw in this decline of voter activity a sign that union democracy is not working: the trade union and the rank and file have drawn farther away from each other.

The same fate was predicted for the trade union elections as for the student elections, which are no longer capable of interesting students. What goes for university students today, goes for workers tomorrow -- in 10 years the voter turnout for trade union elections will be around 35 percent, predict the critics.

#### Unemployment Took Away Desire to Vote

Chairman Sulo Penttila of the Metal Workers' Union gave the assurance that his union will make a serious effort to correct the problems connected with voter turnout. Penttila, however, warned against hasty conclusions in deliberating the reasons for a poor voter turnout.

Penttila did not exactly believe in the fact that the reason for the low voter turnout was that Communist voters stayed home. According to him, indifference taxed Social Democratic as well as Communist votes.

Penttila was particularly satisfied with the elections results in themselves. "We have become accustomed to percentage changes measured in tenths of a percent in metal workers' votes. Now the changes in the power relationships were significantly more definite," stated Penttila. "It will be easy to retire after such an election result."

Penttila considered the change in the power relationships to be a permanent phenomenon. According to him, the Metal Workers' Union is no longer a balanced union in which power relationships could flip flop in any direction.

Deputy Chairman Veikko Lehtonen (Communist) of the Metal Workers' Union confessed that he expected better results. In Lehtonen's opinion the continuing election defeats should give the People's Democratic movement reason for thought.

"Each election defeat should be a lesson," philosophized Lehtonen. According to him, the most important condition for breaking this cycle of defeats is that the Communists put their own house in order.

In Lehtonen's opinion the election defeat does not mean that there is something wrong in the trade union policy of the Communists. According to him, the general decline in Communist support is sufficient to explain this defeat.

#### Threshold High for Bourgeois Parties

Eino Takkunen, the trade union secretary of the Center Party, was satisfied with the fact that their position as the largest bourgeois faction was retained in spite of SMP and Conservative Party efforts.

However, Takkunen estimated that the movement into a SAK trade union movement will remain quite modest as long as the procedure for nominating candidates remains as difficult as it is now. The opportunities of the bourgeois parties are eliminated in the initial round already according to Takkunen since the nomination of a candidate requires a list of ten names.

Without the help of the organizational machinery the collection of names is difficult at job sites watched by the workers' parties according to Takkunen. And if there are not enough candidates, there will also not be enough votes. "In the next election we should receive 15 percent of the votes in order to get a foot in the door," stated Takkunen in calculating the Center Party's chances.

Rolf Sormo of the SMP, which received two convention positions, considered the metal workers' elections to be a successful test. "This was an opening of the channel, the results encourage us to continue.

The results were considered a disappointment by Ari Aberg, the trade union secretary of the Conservative Party, who criticized the low voter turnout and the difficulty of the system for nominating candidates. The Conservative Party has now tried in vain for the second time in the metal workers' elections.

10576

CSO: 3617/40

## POLL: ONE IN EVERY FIVE EXPECTS GREAT POWER ENTANGLEMENT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Nov 83 p 9

[Article: "One in Five Believes in Superpower Entanglement"]

[Text] Every fifth Finn believes that a serious military entanglement between the superpowers is probable in the near future. Three-fourths consider such to be improbable. The possibility of an entanglement is now considered to be somewhat greater than in a poll conducted at the end of last year, but clearly less than in the fall of 1981.

This information comes from an opinion poll conducted by Finnish Gallup in the middle of October. The poll was commissioned by the National Defense Information Planning Committee.

Two-thirds of Finland's citizens consider NATO's decision to deploy new missiles in Europe to be especially or rather threatening from the point of view of peace between the superpowers. Two-fifths consider NATO's missiles to be threatening from the point of view of peace in Finland.

Less than one-tenth of the respondents considered the situation in Lebanon, the war between Iran and Iraq, or the downing of the South Korean aircraft to be especially threatening. In addition, two-fifths considered the situation in Lebanon to be rather threatening, less than one-third considered the war between Iran and Iraq to be rather threatening, and the aircraft incident was considered to be rather threatening by a little less than one-fourth.

A comparison with previous polls indicates that the situation in Lebanon is evaluated pretty much in the same manner as in December 1982. NATO's Euro-missile decision has been brought up for 4 successive years. Now it is felt to be threatening by approximately the same percentage of people as in 1981, somewhat less than in last year and more than in 1980.

The poll also contains positive evaluations of Finland's peacekeeping role in Lebanon.

Almost three-fourths consider the decision to provide peacekeeping troops for UN use in South Lebanon to be a good decision from the point of view of

our country's foreign policy. This was considered to be a poor decision by 15 percent of those interviewed.

The decision is considered good from the point of view of troop security by 55 percent and poor by 35 percent.

Compared to a poll conducted last December the assessments of the foreign policy benefits of the decision fell off somewhat and the assessment of troop security improved slightly.

Approximately 330 adult Finns participated in the interview.

10576

CSO: 3617/40

## ACTIVITIES OF ULTRA RIGHTIST PARTIES, GROUPS

Athens ENA in Greek 3 Nov 83 pp 44-46

[Text] With boards and blankets they had set up four outdoor bookstands a short distance from the monument at Vitsi [Dedicated to the Greek Army dead, fallen in battle against the Communist guerrillas during the last offensive of the Greek Civil War in 1949]. Youths were selling books extolling nationalism, nationalsocialism and anti-Zionism. Two or three of them wearing black leather battle dress jackets had spread before them pro-Hitler publications such as Adolf's speech of 30 January 1942 at the Sportpalast in Berlin. Around the marble monument to the fallen, small groups among the collected crowd held placards and streamers with slogans for the former king, for April's "dictator," Papadopoulos, and for various organizations of the extreme Right or of the so-called, by its known cadres, "orthodox Right." The passion, fanaticism and the sloganeering of these nuclei brought to mind the atmosphere of the beerhall in pre-Hitler Bavaria.

"It was not the first time during the past 2 years that a mobilization of conservative citizens was "topped" by groups of the extreme Right," it was stressed by political exponents in certain newspapers on the day after the anniversary of the Grammos-Vitsi battle. They observed that "there is an intensive mobilization as well as a fragmentation in that sector." ELEVTHERI ORA editor, Grigoris Mikhalopoulos, in whose newspaper there are expressed and advanced the views of the "Aprilists" and of the cadres of the extreme Right, is not optimistic about the results of these activities.

"There are about 70 groups in the extreme Right" he told ENA. "Little groups and store front units that, in my opinion, are not about to unite. They conserve their own identities and they have fragmented the struggle of the nationalist movement. The result is one of fragmentation and store-front groups."

The latest movement in this area is EPEN [no extension available], which appeared 6 months ago, and is "considered" to express the views of G. Papadopoulos, one of the leaders of the coup who is imprisoned at Korydallos. Upon his orders, Andreas Dimitriadis submitted to the Areios Pagos [Cassation Court] the statement required by Law 59/74 regarding "obedience to the Constitution and the State" and EPEN was given number 2440/83 on the register of parties. At the same time, it opened offices on the second floor at 19 Voukourestiou Street and branch offices in Pireaus and the province. Ostensibly there is a coordinating committee.

However, behind it--as reported to ENA by reliable sources--there is a group totally faithful to the "Aprilist" dictator.

The soul of EPEN is reported to be Khrysanthos Dimitriadis, an electrical engineer, maintenance man at the American embassy. He relays the views of Papadopoulos and keeps him informed about political developments. According to reports, some time ago, he had undertaken an investigation of the possibilities for founding a party, but that initiative was halted in order to arrive finally at the founding of EPEN. Kharalambos Papadopoulos; junta minister Alexandros Mattheou; attorney Takis Mikhaloliatos and economist Giannis Makarezos, son of another coup leader who is imprisoned at Korydallos belong to the same group, which, in effect, coordinates the activities of the Papadopoulists. It is also reported that Nikos Steiropoulos plays an active role in it, a fact that has given rise to reactions and criticisms in royalist circles, who remember his articles against the former monarch.

Khrysanthos Dimitriadis refused to speak to ENA and referred us to the secretary general, Mr. Apergis for an official briefing. He in turn avoided the meeting. However, we had an opportunity, on the afternoon of 20 October, to observe at the EPEN offices a quick briefing of four friends of the movement who were asking "What is the position of the party on the issue of Konstandinos?" A responsible official answered, "Papadopoulos did not oust the king. Konstandinos left of his own accord despite the objections of his sister, Eirini. Now, only Papadopoulos can bring him back..." However, the leader of the Salonica Royalist Union--which is considered to be the most important royalist organization--attorney Odysseas Toskas is waiting for EPEN to take an open position on this issue. He appears to be favorably disposed, however...Mikhalis Ieropoulos, in charge of the Union's Athens branch office and who often writes for ELEVTHERI ORA, on the contrary recommends that its followers avoid "any rapprochement with the men responsible for Konstandino's ouster." He told ENA that "this happened as soon as he learned that Steiropoulos and other anti-royalists are behind the movement."

Initially, Grigoris Mikhalopoulos appeared to encourage and, in effect, to support the movement in the sector of the extreme Right. As a matter of fact, he had proposed that former prosecutor of Areios Pagos, E. Mbletsas, or Nikos Farmakis, former leader of ERE's [National Radical Union] youth, take over the leadership of EPEN. Mbletsas, however, proposed a series of conditions that were not accepted. Something went wrong and the relations between EPEN and Mikhalopoulos soured.

"Instead of building a movement," Mikhalopoulos states, "which would represent the Greek officers, they built a clearly compartmentalized Papadopoulist movement. I believe that this took place unbeknownst to Papadopoulos. And I still doubt that, in the end, there will be a proclamation of his recognition of the movement."

#### ENEK Nationalists

Another organization which has recently become strongly active in the extreme Right sector is the United Nationalist Movement (ENEK). It was formed on 6 May 1979 during a conference that took place at the Xenia Hotel in Volos. One hundred ten persons, former members of the National Array's youth, participated in the founding conference. They have submitted the relative statement to Areios Pagos

in accordance with the requirements of Law 59/74. The ENEK has 6,500 members in 167 cities of the country. It maintains 27 offices and has a publishing house and a bookstore "New Position," on Ippokratous Street. It publishes a newspaper, SYNAGERMOS, with the double-headed eagle as its emblem. ENEK has a system for training cadres and the creation of reception, shock and cadres nuclei for grass-roots political struggle, "mobilization down to the sidewalk and education level." Until recently, they accepted only young people, because adults--as ENEK cadres say--have been corrupted and compromised within themselves. The leader is Polydoros Dakoglou. He had been ENEP's leader, but he was ousted by the Papadopoulouists--who considered him to be a follower of Ioannidis--who gave the leadership to Theodoros Perotis, who now joined EPEN. Several members of ENEK circulate, wearing leather battle dress jackets and black clothing, and are considered to be pro-Nazi. In general ENEK's operation has all the earmarks of a national-socialist organization. However, Polydoros Dakoglou, speaking to ENA denied categorically any connection with pro-Nazi nuclei and he added that "they believe in nationalism and they deal with national-socialism as a system to be applied according to the times, people and conditions that prevail." In answer to other questions by ENA, Dakoglou said:

"We believe that Zionism is an adversary force of Hellenism and a live danger to humanity. We believe, of course, that not all Israeli citizens are necessarily Zionists....

"With regard to Northern Ipeiros and Constantinople, we are duty-bound to remind the people that they are ours. However, the people must also desire it in order to attempt their repossession. There must also be an international opportunity and a long-term preparation. We are Greek nationalists and we refuse foreign models, regardless of their origin."

ENEK gives the impression of seeking the cooperation of other extreme Right groups, but it does not want to be absorbed by other organizations. Therefore, any cooperation with EPEN should be excluded. As a matter of fact, its cooperation with National Rally of retired Lt. Colonel Giannis Roidodimos was recently halted. On the other hand, it maintains good relations with Giorgio Almirante (whose recent interview was published in SYNAGERMOS) and other officials of the Italian Neofascist Party.

For a long time ELEVTHERI ORA reported ENEK activities. However, this reporting suddenly stopped. Mikhalopoulos was accused by the movement's newspaper of "friendly relations with PASOK." As a matter of fact, he was being asked by certain papers "how his newspaper manages to survive with such a small circulation; why he does not attack the socialist government with sufficient force and how he manages to have the trials for published articles postponed continuously."

In speaking to ENA, Mikhalopoulos pointed out that "he does not identify with the black battle dress jackets and the pro-Nazi slogans." He emphasized that "his newspaper was found to be 'a well-managed business' in two financial audits" and concluded, "Can the leaders of ENEK state what their opinion is on Fascism, how they make a living and where they work?"

Polydoros Dakoglou gives a different interpretation of these differences: "PASOK is our main objective and then our differences with New Democracy. It is like



billiards. First, you must hit one ball and then the other. During the first quarter of 1982 we had a meeting with Mikhalopoulos to whom we presented our strategy. He told us that what we were doing would only benefit New Democracy. We answered him that we did not agree with him and that we would follow our policy. As regards how I make my living, it is known that I am a salaried manager of the "New Position" publishing firm."

ENEK is attempting to mobilize the extreme Right organizations of Western Europe for the purpose of freeing the imprisoned coup leaders.

#### The National Rally

Another organization that has recently made its appearance in the extreme Right sector is the National Rally of retired Lt. Colonel Giannis Roidodimos who had been placed under house arrest by Ioannidis because he attempted to overthrow Papadopoulos before Ioannidis did! He maintains an office at 7 Sismi Street. For a time he cooperated with ENEK with which he published the SYNAGERMOS newspaper. This cooperation was shaken by the management of the funds for the publishing of the newspaper. The affair reached the courts. Roidodimos published another newspaper under the same name and is accusing ENEK of being "opposed to the principle of monarchic democracy and that its leadership group is pro-Hitler and pro-Mussolini." According to the sources, part of Roidodimos' cadres--the Papadopoulis faction--has already been absorbed by EPEN. In any event, it does not appear that Roidodimos is willing to join.

Of the remaining extreme Right groups, those of some substance are:

KEME [no extension available] of the dictatorship's minister Pavlos Manolopoulos. It has a network of approximately 100 cadres in the country. It maintains two offices in Preveza and Ioannina. As he stated to ENA, Manolopoulos intends to be a candidate in the European parliamentary elections once more. The previous time he obtained 55,000 votes. He sees to it that ELEVTEROS KOSMOS is published again, with the help of former ambassador to the OECD, Apostolidis.

The Ahtens Patriotic Association "Ioannis Kapodistrias" led by Vasilis Katsopoulos, M.D. and Filippos Livitsianos;

VEO [Royalist National Organization] and PAKDE [Patriotic Social Democratic Union], pro-royalist organizations. The latter has more of a political nature;

National Crusade of Frangiskos Papageorgiou. It has plastered the walls of Athens with his organization's symbol: a capital epsilon with an arrow in the middle. Recently he was convicted of "attempting to illicitly use Thai dancers."

There are also two clearly pro-Nazi groups: Golden Dawn, with Nikos Mikhaloliakos, brother of dictator Papadopoulos' attorney as the leader. He has offices on Zoodokhou Pigis Street. It has about 60 members in Athens and 30 in Salonica. Another group owns the "Free Thought" bookstore and is led by Andreas Dendrinis and Vladimiros Psiakis. It was created 6 months ago after the breaking up of ENEP. Another known organization, the "4th of August" of Kostas Plevris was dissolved.



Many neo-fascists of Ordine Nuovo took refuge in Greece during the dictatorship. After the restoration of democracy, Massagrande and Bizzarri were extradited to Italy. They had contacts with Greeks of similar persuasion and had opened a restaurant, the "Verona," in Plaka. As a matter of fact, there were reports that the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] organized a group of agents and trained them at a villa in Kifissia to collect information and for surveillance in this area.

### "The Salon Died"

How many, though are the followers of extreme Right tendencies in Greece? Political observers estimate that in no case do they exceed the number of votes obtained in 1977 by the National Array.

"Of the 400,000 votes of the National Array," Mikhalopoulos says, "New Democracy got 100,000; PASOK got 100,000 because of reaction and Markezinis got 200,000."

Mikhalopoulos' role is of special interest because his newspaper--despite the differences it has with the various organizations--is the only outlet for the expression of their tendencies and positions. Many maintain that "a lot of information is fed to Mikhalopoulos by the secretary general of Press and Information, Sotiris Kostopoulos, who plays the government's game extremely well in the broad sector of the Right."

"I have respect for Kostopoulos," Mikhalopoulos told ENA, "because he is openly anti-communist. I do not have family ties with him, but I must emphasize that he dealt with my newspaper and ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS, which were politically in the opposition, as he did with all others."

Mikhalopoulos believes that "the philosophy of the Center has been surpassed and that you have to be at the extremes to win a struggle."

"Kolonaki and the salon have died," he said. "In the sector of the Right a catharsis is necessary. It cannot always be identified with informers and political favoritism. There was need for the intervention of the officers on 21 April. They left the jeeps on the way, however, and took the jewels of Lalaounis. They abandoned the "Marel" and "Vitam" and began eating French butter. When I interviewed Florakis he told me, 'you are the rightist who offered the most to the Left.' But did not the Right perhaps strengthen it through its mistakes?"



1. Extreme rightists and neo-fascists during an earlier activity in the center of the capital.
2. Mikhalis Ieropoulos: "Far from EPEN."
3. Nikolaos Farmakis, former president of ERE youth.
8. Former Areios Pagos prosecutor E. Mbletsas who refused EPEN's leadership.

4. Grigoris Mikhalopoulos in his office. "Kolonaki and the salon hava died," says the editor of ELEVTHERI ORA..

9. Frangiskos Papageorgiou (left with the beard) with Sp. Markezinis. The leader of National Crusade has problems with the courts...





5. The leader of KEME Pavlos Manolopoulos. He sees to it that ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS is published again.

6. Junta minister Mattheou. Is involved in the activation of EPEN

7. Attorney Nikolaos Steiropoulos, considered to be anti-monarchist.

10. Kostas Plevris, leader of "4th of August" which was dissolved, in a photograph with Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi. Later Qadhafi "disowned" him with an announcement of his embassy in Athens.

11. Lt. Colonel Giannis Roidodimos who leads the National Rally.

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CSO: 3521/82

## POLL DISCOVERS SUPPORT FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT IS DROPPING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Nov 83 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The government's popularity continues to decline. Only 35 percent are satisfied with the work of the government, while 41 percent are dissatisfied. One fourth of the people are pleased that the minority government of the Conservative Party was changed to a majority government of the three nonsocialist parties. One third, however, are dissatisfied with the rearrangement of the government. Supporters of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party are most satisfied with the new arrangement.

This was indicated by this week's poll results from Norges Markedsdata, taken during the last half of October. Conservative Party voters are most satisfied with the Willoch government, but at the same time 32 percent of the Conservative voters are dissatisfied with the changes in the government that took place in June of this year.

In December 1981, 38 percent said they were satisfied with the government. The following year, 1 percent more shared this opinion, but in October of this year the figure was only 35 percent. The negative trend in the government's popularity is expressed most clearly by the increase in the number of dissatisfied voters. On 1 December 1981, 26 percent were dissatisfied. This group increased by 9 percent 1 year later. Now 41 percent of the people believe the government is doing a poor job. The remainder, 23 percent, are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.

The following percentages, according to party affiliation, believe the government is doing a good job: Labor Party 9 percent, Conservative Party 83 percent, Christian People's Party 56 percent, Center Party 46 percent, Progressive Party 33 percent, Socialist Left Party 4 percent, and Liberal Party 11 percent.

The dissatisfaction is greatest within the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party with 70 and 78 percent, respectively. Only 4 percent of the Conservative Party voters expressed discontent with the government's work. Dissatisfaction in the other parties is as follows: Christian People's Party 14 percent, Center Party 22 percent, Progressive Party 29 percent, and the Liberal Party 64 percent.

Only 8 percent said they were greatly satisfied with the rearrangement of the government. Seventeen percent were relatively satisfied, 39 percent were indifferent to the reorganization, 17 percent were somewhat dissatisfied, a similar number were extremely dissatisfied, and only 2 percent had no opinion.

There was little enthusiasm for the reorganization of the government among the parties. Only 2 percent in the Labor Party said they were extremely satisfied, 13 percent in the Conservative Party, 25 percent in the Christian People's Party, 25 percent in the Center Party, 6 percent in the Progressive Party, 4 percent in the Socialist Left Party, and 7 percent in the Liberal Party.

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CSO: 3639/39



## POLL FINDS GREAT INSTABILITY AMONG CONSERVATIVE PARTY VOTERS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Nov 83 p 5

[Text] The Conservative Party has lost even more of its 1981 voters. Only 62 percent said they would certainly vote for their old party, according to an opinion poll taken in October by Norsk Opinionsinstitutt A/S for AFTENPOSTEN. This represents a 13-percent drop in stability, compared to the previous month. The Labor Party, however, retained 88 percent of its voters. The Center Party and the Christian People's Party seem to have reached "rock bottom" with 83 and 81 percent, respectively.

The interviews were made during the second half of September, after the elections but before the budget was presented. The figures show that the Conservative Party is approaching the same level of "certain" voters as the small, unstable parties: 17 percent of the former Conservative voters are considering another choice and 14 percent stated that they would certainly vote for another party. Only the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party have similar percentages of "mobile voters." There are few defectors and little uncertainty in the Labor Party.

## Many Seeking New Party

Nationwide, 15 percent of the voters are changing parties and 17 percent are uncertain as to what they will do. In Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim as many as 21 percent are seeking a new party. Compared to the election results, this indicates that in its strongest bastions the Conservative Party is losing voters to both the Labor Party and the Progressive Party.

As usual, voters under 30 years of age, who comprised almost one third of the respondents, were most unstable. But here, too, the figure was unusually high: all of 38 percent were uncertain of how they would vote today. Only 37 percent now support the party they voted for in 1981. On the other hand, however, the figures show no differences according to sex.

## LO Members Stable

Unorganized workers also are unstable in their support. While 83 percent of the LO (Federation of Trade Unions) members are sticking with their party, stability among unorganized employees is only 57 percent. In this group,

17 percent are seeking a new party and 22 percent are uncertain about their choice of a party. Organized employees outside LO have a stability level of 71 percent. This figure also shows that the instability is greatest among nonsocialist voters.

The figures for next month will demonstrate the effect of the national budget. The October figures are shown in the table below.

#### NOI Questions On People's Choice

Question: Did you vote in the 1981 parliamentary elections? If yes: If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, are you absolutely sure you would vote for the same party, would you consider perhaps voting for another party, are you certain you would vote for another party, would you perhaps not vote, or are you uncertain as to what you would do?

The percentages of party supporters in 1981 who are certain they would vote for the same party if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow are presented below:

	1983 April %	May %	June %	August %	Sept %	October %
Labor Party	81	81	82	81	86	88
Progressive Party	70	63	56	59	65	59
Conservative Party	79	74	79	72	75	62
Christian People's Party	86	69	80	70	81	84
Center Party	79	71	79	73	83	88
Socialist Left Party	72	71	75	68	69	83
Liberal Party	49	57	54	39	63	56

The number of respondents in the individual monthly surveys may be as low as 30 for parties other than the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. For this reason, the margins of error for these parties may be considerable.

These figures apply to parliamentary elections.

The Conservative Party has lost even more of its 1981 voters. Now only 62 percent would still vote for the Conservatives. About 1,000 persons were interviewed during the second half of September 1983.

Norsk Opinionsinstitutt A/S.

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CSO: 3639/39



## LATEST POLL REGISTERS FIRST GAIN FOR CONSERVATIVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] Has the Conservative Party managed to turn the tide? Maybe--maybe not. The latest NOI (Norsk Opinionsinstitutt A/S)/AFTENPOSTEN opinion poll, which indicates that the Conservative Party was supported by 24.9 percent of the voters in November, compared to 23.9 percent the previous month, may mean that the party has ridden out the storm after the violent reaction to the budget and to the automobile taxes. Nevertheless, 24 to 25 percent for the party of Willoch and Benkow is still alarmingly low. The situation is still characterized by concern and instability among Conservative Party voters. A total of 38 percent indicated that the Progressive Party was their second choice.

According to the November poll, the Labor Party is supported by 40.3 percent, compared to 41 percent the previous month. This means that the party has consolidated its position just above the level of support it received in the local elections last September, when it received 39.2 percent of the votes. The only thing that could possibly alter this picture is reaction to the Labor Party's change in its security policy, which was made known by its final vote on the missile issue on 21 November. The present poll was completed before the missile debate in parliament.

The Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party together now have 45.5 percent of the vote, while the three governing parties (Conservatives, Christian People's Party, and Center Party) together now have 39.6 percent. If parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, the probable outcome would be a Labor Party government with Gro Harlem Brundtland as prime minister. Given the current strengths of the two groups, one possibility would be a situation in which the Progressive Party would hold the balance.

As we know, the Progressive Party scored points among the people because of their dissatisfaction with the automobile taxes and the relatively modest tax cuts proposed by the government in its budget. While the debate over the automobile taxes and the budget was raging, Carl I. Hagen's party registered 9.5 percent of the voter support. According to the November poll the Progressive Party received 8.2 percent, which may mean that enthusiasm for our

local protest-and-discontent party has cooled somewhat.

In all probability, it was the strong reaction to the automobile taxes that caused support for the Conservative Party to drop all the way down to 23.9 percent. Today's level is 1 percent higher, but compared to election results last September of 26.5 percent, this figure causes continued concern among members of our largest governing party. The opinion poll confirmed that the low voter stability that became evident during the September elections and in subsequent opinion polls continued to have an extremely unfavorable effect on the Conservative Party. There still is a credibility gap between the party and the voters.

In a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN, the Conservative Party chairman himself made the most fitting comments on today's opinion poll. "It gives us reason to hope that we have begun to move in the right direction again," Jo Benkow said. "In any case, it is encouraging to see the gap between the Labor Party and the Conservatives become smaller again, although we are still far from the more than 30-percent support the Conservative Party enjoyed during most of the period following the change in government in 1981. Benkow did not conceal the fact that the situation the Conservative Party now faces will require a much clearer political profile.

Relatively speaking, the Christian People's Party seems to have done the best among the governing parties, with 8.5 percent of the voter support in November, compared to 7.6 percent in October. The Center Party has remained at about the same level since the parliamentary elections over 2 years ago. It is now supported by 6.2 percent of the voters, compared to 6.8 percent in October.

	Parliamentary Elections, 1981	1983 May	Jun	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Labor Party	37.2	36.7	36.9	37.9	38.7	41.0	40.3
Liberal People's Party	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.7
Progressive Party	4.5	5.4	5.3	6.5	6.9	9.5	8.2
Conservative Party	31.7	31.8	31.8	30.5	26.7	23.9	24.9
Christian People's Party	9.4	8.8	8.3	7.2	8.2	7.6	8.5
Norwegian Communist Party	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.2
Red Election Alliance	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.0
Center Party	6.6	6.4	5.9	6.6	7.3	6.8	6.2
Socialist Left Party	4.9	5.6	6.0	5.2	5.8	5.7	5.2
Liberal Party	3.9	3.7	4.0	4.0	4.6	3.5	4.4
Other parties	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.4
Total	99.8	100.1	99.8	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
Labor+Socialist Left	42.1	42.3	42.9	43.1	44.5	46.7	45.5
Conservative+Christian People's+Center	47.7	47.0	46.0	44.3	42.2	38.3	39.6

		1983					
		May	Jun	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
Labor+Socialist Left+ Red Election Alliance+ Communists	43.1	43.5	43.8	44.2	45.7	48.1	46.7
Conservatives+Christ. People's Party+Center+Liberal People's Party+Liberals+ Progressive Party	56.6	56.5	55.8	55.6	53.9	51.9	52.9

The figures indicate the percentage of the vote the various parties would receive if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. Only those who are certain they would vote are included here. They also were asked how they voted in the 1981 parliamentary elections. The differences between the support for the various parties and the actual results in 1981 were used as weighting factors.

The figures were corrected by sex, age, and geographic location so that the distribution within these groups is the same among the respondents as among the population at large.

The results are based on interviews with 1,036 eligible voters between 5 and 20 November 1983.

The low figures for the Conservative Party in October may be blamed on the fact that preliminary work on the automobile taxes was already underway. Future developments will be of great interest.

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## PALME SEEN TURNING INWARD TO NARROW CIRCLE OF OLD FRIENDS

'Exhausted' After Rainer Affair

Stockholm 7 DAGAR in Swedish 25 Nov 83 pp 6-7

[Article by Ulf Wickbom: "President Palme"]

[Text] Is Olof Palme governing Sweden more as a president than as a prime minister? Is Olof Palme becoming all the more alone in the government and the party? Does Olof Palme surround himself only with yes men?

Olof Palme read from the paper in a clipped, businesslike tone: "When Rainer left office as cabinet minister, he was in a difficult situation. He wanted immediately to be appointed Supreme Court judge. At the time of the appointment the government took note of his competence and considered personal factors. Against the background of what we know today the appointment was clearly a mistake."

He put the paper aside. Once more he raised his eyes and saw Gustaf Olivecrona, Yrsa Stenius, the TV cameras and the reporters' notebooks. The color of his face, his eyes and his bearing said more than the brief communique.

The prime minister was worn out. He needed almost an hour to come upstairs to enjoy sparring with the press.

Olof Palme has been tired before: exhausted at Gotaplatsen in Goteborg after the exciting final spurt of the election campaign, out of breath after a nonstop leap between rostrums in London, Strasbourg, New York and the labor commune in Lulea, near the breaking point of impatience after debating with the opposition.

Now he was worn out by a very long stress situation which ended in embarrassment and disappointment. The prime minister had not been able to control events.

"I am disappointed in Rainer," Palme repeated several times during the press conference. The witnesses present confirmed the official picture of a minister of justice who had not told the entire truth.

"I have nothing to add beyond that which the prime minister has said," said they almost to each other. They were Ulf Larsson from the Cabinet Minister Drafting Committee and Harald Falth, permanent secretary in the Ministry of Justice.

#### 'The Palme Affair'

Their answers were hardly surprising. Ever since AFTONBLADET reporter Goran Skytte began to report on Ove Rainer's private affairs, nobody in the government, Riksdag group or the party had anything to add beyond that which the prime minister said.

But Saturday's press conference raised several questions about the events which from the beginning were called "the Rainer affair" and gradually and more frequently were called "the Palme affair."

- Was the appointment of Rainer as minister of justice more than just "a mistake" which could be explained by a hastily called press conference?
- Will Palme's too-hasty actions have consequences for himself?
- Has Olof Palme on different occasions governed Sweden more as a president than as a prime minister?
- Will Olof Palme be all the more alone in government work and in his party--dangerously alone when the situation requires quick and bold decisions?
- At age 56 can he physically manage the same hard pace as before, "after 30 years in the front lines," as he himself expresses it?

The years have inescapably left their mark--because few colleagues have managed to maintain his high tempo. Olof Palme came to Berwaldhallen to debate the wage earner funds with conservative leader Ulf Adelsohn. Secretary of studies Stina Andersson (Social Democrat) who sat beside him on the platform had apparently very little to do with the wage earner funds. Her task was only to tell Adelsohn when to speak, and to give throat lozenges to the prime minister.

Adelsohn was energetically seconded by his political secretary Olof Ehrencrona, and could now and then go on the offensive with new ammunition.

Olof Palme did not have a really successful evening. Adelsohn took the initiative, and the Conservatives had a secure and vocal majority in the

concert hall, and the TV revealed new disclosures about Rainer's loan in the PK Bank, and Norway's Prime Minister Kare Willoch was on his way to Stockholm for an official visit, and Willy Brandt squabbled with Helmut Schmidt about the West German Social Democrats' attitude toward the American missiles, and the war between Iran and Iraq continued, and DER SPIEGEL claimed that Sweden was a concentration camp for children...Olof Palme now and then appeared abstracted and very tired of Adelson's attack on Sigvard Marjasin.

The next day, Friday 18 November, Ove Rainer stated that he did not expect to take the post of Supreme Court justice. Now the newspapers seriously began to examine Olof Palme's actions in the appointment. The social democratic chief editors have hardly ever in Palme's time as prime minister blamed him so openly and so hard.

AFTONBLADET's Yrsa Stenius went the farthest. She wrote an editorial entitled "Shame, Palme!" The summing up of the editorial read: "The conclusion according to our impression should be that Palme must surround himself with more effective colleagues who are able to neutralize his impulsive temperament."

Other chief editors (Social Democrats) and even members of the party leadership dared to speak their minds about the party chairman, a subject which is traditionally taboo within the labor movement. Many maintain that Palme's solitude is becoming dangerous.

But the sharpest criticism came from independent liberal DAGENS NYHETER's chief editor Svante Nycander. Beneath the headline "Will Only Rainer Resign?" he wrote among other things, "It is unjust and inexcusable that Palme rises above the blame for the HD [Supreme Court] appointment of the already heavily criticized Rainer...With that maneuver the prime minister has made yet another contribution to his own character."

Stenius and Nycander met in a radio debate. Yrsa Stenius claimed that the whole issue has been blown out of reasonable proportion by the mass media.

But Nycander maintained that the issue should have still larger political proportions. The entire affair showed that Palme all the more governs Sweden as a president, he claimed. Palme can make decisions without consulting the government, the Riksdag group or the party leadership.

#### Presidential Rule

The latest example is Palme's appointment of Rainer to the Supreme Court. That happened without the usual advance notification to the members of the Supreme Court. According to available information Ove Rainer phoned Palme early in the morning of 10 November and asked to be a justice of the Supreme Court. A few cabinet ministers were hastily informed. At 8 o'clock the chief justice was notified of the appointment. At 9 o'clock the appointment was announced.

"Presidential rule? Yes, for once I agree with Nycander," said Gunnar Heckscher, professor of political science, and pleased to be able to participate in the debate as the offended party's leader (for the Conservative Party).

"In any case, it is not the rule of an American president. There all appointments must be approved by the Senate. There is something more French about the entire affair.

"Now that is nothing unique. I do not believe that Margaret Thatcher always informs her government colleagues. But I believe she always observes the usual forms for decision making.

"In the Rainer case it is noteworthy that he did not follow the practice of informing the HD," said Gunnar Heckscher. But he also pointed out that this practice is not required by the constitution. Palme therefore can not be censured by the Constitutional committee.

Gunnar Heckscher does not believe that the nonsocialist parties' questions in the Riksdag about the Rainer appointment are going to throw any new light on the issue.

"But it is necessary to question in order to preserve the Riksdag's reputation. Otherwise a member of the government could resign without it appearing in the Riksdag protocol," he said.

#### Ranks Are Closed

It thereby appears rather clear that the dramatic days involving AFTONBLADET, PK Bank, Rainer and Palme are not going to lead to Palme's resignation or the fall of the government. After an outbreak of criticism the Social Democrats are now closing ranks around their leader.

But AFTONBLADET's question remains: Does Palme have the wrong coworkers and advisors?

Palme has no close confidential "sparring partner," in the way that Palme himself and the other "boys" in Government House acted as pace setters in the Tage Erlander years.

He seems more and more to limit the circle of his advisors to comrades of his own generation: Ingvar Carlsson, Kjell-Olof Feldt, Thage Peterson and Krister Wickman. Krister Wickman was at Harpsund to work up the tactics before the funds debate against Adelson. Ingvar Carlsson has a central function as discussion partner. After the government dinner for Kare Willoch last Friday it was Carlsson who went home with Palme to Vasterlangatan for a late night discussion.

But the question is also if Palme listens to the viewpoints of others.

Gunnar Heckscher has an answer: "It seems as though Palme is accustomed to not associating with anyone who contradicts him. In any case that is a good old Swedish tradition. Karl XIV Johan also surrounded himself with 'yes men.'"

Ove Rainer gave a bitter parting statement about his last days with Palme: "When one is speaking with Palme there are moments when he seems preoccupied, as though perhaps thinking about something else."

#### Returning to Ideas of Yesterday

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 27 Nov 83 p 3

[Op Ed article by Olof G. Hedengren: "Do Not Shrink From Any Expedient"]

[Text] "When smartness and great power are combined in one person, the picture of a renaissance prince easily grows. Not a simple coupon clipper, or a gadget and arts collector, but one who does not shrink from any expedient to retain and develop his own personal and 'real' power," writes Olof G. Hedengren. Olof G. Hedengren is managing director of Fannyudde, a daughter company of Beijerinvest. Previously he was managing director of Argentus.

The leader of the Social Democrats, Olof Palme, prefers to refer in his rhetoric, remarkably, to days gone by. As proof of the excellence of the present leadership, the accomplishments of Social Democrats of former times are brought forth. We all, each in his own way, seek power from our roots.

Opponents are met with rude saber slashes. Social injustice of days gone by, previous generations' opposition to reforms and the like, is used in attacks against the current political opposition. Palme's application of the doctrine of original sin, as though being used in its religious form, used to be foreign for the party. It is a sign of weakness that the foremost representative of our largest party, and our country's prime minister, continuously falls back on referring to yesteryear, generations ago.

#### Little in Common

It is not remarkable that political leaders in former times and the parties they represented had another view of society than today's. No more remarkable than that several of Olof Palme's forefathers represented that which in today's indiscriminate debate is called transaction economy, speculation and cold-hearted capitalism. It is very dishonorable to condemn today's representatives of the nonsocialist parties by referring to the parties of former days which had the same or similar names.



Today's social democratic leadership, in this case defined as Olof Palme and his government colleagues, has relatively little in common with yesterday's social democratic leaders. Those who guided and accelerated the development to a democratic welfare state. Today's social democratic members of the government have in many cases an academic background, but often without experience in the working life, except for organization and politics.

In such an environment Olof Palme can probably best let his special leadership style rule. This development during recent times, together with the fact that the Social Democrats have for a number of decades mostly held government power, makes it so that the party is now a symbol for the state as a threat against the individual and freedom.

### Double Morality Flourishes

Social democracy undoubtedly bears the greatest single responsibility for the ongoing castration of parliamentarianism by union power, for the decay of the education system, for the absurdities of the tax and grant system, etc. Finger pointing, loud voices and uninhibited rhetoric are symptoms that the existing social democratic leadership does not tolerate examination by the observing citizenry. And then the detestable double morality flourishes.

Society's independent intellectuals, authors and other artists, have always been the feelers which were capable of detecting developments more clearly than the rest of us. We are nearsighted in our practical zeal.

When the recognized author Lars Gustafsson recently made a violent attack against Sweden and our prime minister people became thoughtful. There can, however, in many cases be reason to listen even to those who present their position in exaggerated terms. In other cases there is no reason to listen to our own prime minister who has made it a habit to use a sledge hammer on his opponents.

Another celebrated author recently declared plans, later certainly denied, to leave the country. And we remember all the reactions from Bergman and Lindgren.

Most people have known for a long time, possibly except for top politicians, that entrepreneurs and scientists are leaving the country. It is also widely known that it is largely impossible to afford foreign scientists and researchers in our country. Sweden's unique and well-developed equalization policies have led to widespread tax evasion, and professors and other academics who remain in many cases openly regard themselves as idiots. Many are aware of that.

## Lost Foothold

The total foreign press sees sudden questionable development tendencies, and is not calmed by quickly called and rebuking press conferences. Knowledgeable mass media experts became embarrassed when the mass media pedagogics did not have the intended effect. Curtain!

It is difficult to restrain the thought that the Social Democratic Party leadership has lost its foothold. In the long run, many press conferences can not manipulate the truth. Not in an open and free society!

The moderation and dialogue between society's power centers which previously characterized Swedish official life have disappeared with Olof Palme.

The events of recent weeks have clarified the picture further. Olof Palme's machiavellian ways have seldom been demonstrated more clearly. First a call for a lightning quick press conference without a chance for questions or dialogue. Then an unquestioning defense of a government colleague is declared. In order to remove all doubt about his own excellence as the builder of the government?

Then a lightning quick, desperate appointment to the country's highest court. In order to demonstrate dissatisfaction and personal power?

When things started to burn under the soles of their feet, there came a total reversal. A quick and simple incision with the knife to again protect himself? The reference to a loyal force of bold men who fearlessly and unselfishly were ready to bear witness to what was not said from the speaker's side was grotesque! Palme's explanation for his staged patching technique, when it was applied to finding out about his government colleague's property situation, was also tragicomic.

## Why Tell Lies?

Furthermore why should the victim lie now, when the inquisitors have forced out the probationary royalty, and it has laid itself flat on the ground? Palme's human explanation--which was that the victim lied--was that confusion and forgetfulness easily come to men who work under pressure.

An individual citizen observer is more likely to believe that Palme lied. To ruthlessly lie "when necessary" has always been an obvious ingredient in the practice of power. But perhaps Palme is an exception? The victim handled himself about the same as any Swede or director would have done under similar circumstances.

## A Renaissance Prince

When smartness and great power are combined in one person, then the picture easily grows of a renaissance prince. Not a simple coupon clipper or a

gadget and arts collector, but one who does not shrink from any expedient to retain and develop his own personal and "real" power.

On a scale where the ends are marked with the words "people's home" and "dictatorship," it is not obvious on which side of the middle Olof Palme stands.

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## BIRAND ON EUROPEAN STRATEGY IN WAKE OF TURKISH ELECTIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 83 p 7

["Corner" column by Mehmet Ali Birand: "Who is Preparing for What and Who is Doing What in the Wake of the Elections"]

[Text] With initial comments on the 6 November elections over, questions are now raised in Europe about "what to do with relations with Turkey" and tally sheets are being reviewed.

The government wing of Western Europe is generally prepared to soften its stance. A more flexible attitude can be felt in foreign ministries in many capitals. There is a new difference in the tone of the statements made. Although Europe does not favor immediate establishment of relations with Turkey, there is a feeling that holding out for too long will not be helpful. Of course there is a clear difference between the stances of socialist and conservative governments. However, if a generalization is to be made, it can be said that a tangible flexibility can be observed in the attitude of European governments.

Of course one cannot say that this flexibility will go so far as prompting Sweden, Norway, Holland and France to drop the case they have brought against Turkey before the European Human Rights Commission. The discussion of the case will continue at least for the moment.

Similarly, the EEC Ministerial Council should not be expected to bring relations with Turkey out of the freezer. They would like to have a certain "wait and see" period.

The first concrete indication within this framework will come from the meeting of the foreign ministers of 21 Council of Europe member countries in Strasbourg on 24 November. Turkey wants the Ministerial Committee of the council to issue an official statement in the aftermath of the elections. The terms to be used in this statement will reveal to a certain extent the official stance of various European countries.

A change in the stance of Western Europe's other wing--that is the national and international parliaments, international labor unions and other organizations--will apparently take a little bit more time.

The communist, socialist and social democratic factions of the parliaments are not satisfied at this stage. They continue to view developments in a critical light.

However, there are also liberals and switched-over conservatives who are prepared to vote in favor of Turkey as they did during the first half of the 12 September period. They believe that Turkey should no longer be kept outside and should be slowly reinstated in its place in Europe. But at the moment it is unclear how much support and how many votes this faction can muster.

The first indication of that will come from the discussion of a draft resolution by the European Parliament in November and the meeting of the Political Commission of the Council of Europe in Paris on 23 November.

In reality, there is a state of general confusion in the Council of Europe. There is an increasing number of individuals who think that the resolution adopted by the council's general assembly "not to admit the Turkish parliamentarians to be elected" went too far and was untimely.

The conjecture that is gaining increasing credence is that the Advisory Board of the Council of Europe will refrain from taking any decisions about Turkey at its meeting in January and will postpone it to May. An increasing number of observers believe that this way they will be able to gain time and to find a compromise formula without putting themselves in a difficult position.

International labor union confederations, however, have clearly stated that they will not change their stance.

European governments and parliaments will watch closely the following developments in Turkey in the coming months:

--How well will Ozal lead the government?

--Will certain austerity measures be adhered to?

--What will happen to certain politically-motivated lawsuits?

--Will death sentences be carried out?

--How long will martial law last?

--Will an amnesty be declared for individuals who were tried and convicted for their political views (not for terrorism)?

Grades will be assigned to developments on all these points and eventually a general opinion will emerge.

Our guess is that, if a new hardening does not occur in Turkey's administration, Turkey's relations with Europe will be put back on track in at most one year.

Of course the other important development that all the parliaments (the Council of Europe and the European Parliament) are waiting for is establishing contacts with the new Turkish parliamentarians and listening and talking to them.

In fact this is one of the chief issues that the new Turkish parliament must discuss as soon as it convenes.

EREL ON OPPOSITION ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY NDP

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Nov 83 p 6

["Telex" column by Teoman Erel: "Please Come This Way"]

[Text] We must take another look at those who were elected to parliament on the Nationalist Democracy Party [NDP] ticket:

Bulend Ulusu: Prime Minister, former Commander of Naval Forces and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense.

Ferit Melen: Former Prime Minister and former Minister of Finance.

Kamran Inan: Former NATO Deputy Secretary General, former Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and former ambassador.

Umit Haluk Bayulken: Former CENTO Secretary General, former Foreign Minister, former Secretary General of the President's Office, former ambassador and current Minister of National Defense.

Cafer Tayyar Sadiklar: Minister of Customs and Monopolies and former President of the Central Bank.

The list continues with the same grandeur. Former ministers, retired generals, two former TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Administration] directors, etcetera.

This situation reminds one of the words of a former Italian Communist Party leader after an election in which they came very close to the Christian Democrats:

"We are too few to become the government and too many to become the opposition."

The similarity between NDP's situation and the paradox described by the Italian politician is not in numbers. In terms of numbers, the NDP has not even come close to the main opposition party let alone the winner of the elections. But there is a feeling that this party, which has become a "warehouse of statesmen", will create problems for itself as well as Turkey's budding democracy.

Very few among NDP's statesmen are accustomed to being in the opposition. They are generally individuals used to "exercising power" in the higher offices of government.

The nation, on the other hand, has handed over the authority and power to form a government to the Motherland Party. The NDP is at a crossroads after emerging from the elections as the "numerically smallest" but the "highest quality and most ambitious" party.

Either they will sincerely try to become an "exemplary opposition party" as they have stated officially and they will constantly remind the government of what they have promised to the people and will try to realize those promises;

Or, they will draw strength from the fact that the Motherland Party has a slim majority in parliament with 211 deputies and they will try to become the government by employing short-cut, complex and irregular methods.

The desire to perpetuate the "hopeful patience" of the 4 million voters who voted for them and to hold on to their allegiance may push the NDP leaders toward the latter dangerous path.

We would not want to pass a definite judgement on what path the NDP will choose. That is why in our article yesterday we sufficed with simply drawing attention to Sunalp's words to the effect that "a state of uncertainty exists in the country." But new developments are forcing us to go beyond the stage of "drawing attention" toward open criticism and an "invitation to responsibility." According to stories in various newspapers, NDP leaders have endorsed the strategy of "early elections" before even the government has been formed. Not much can be said against that if it is going to be attempted using legitimate means, but according to a news item appearing in a high-circulation paper yesterday NDP founders put forth charges questioning the legitimacy of the Motherland Party during a meeting they held to examine the reasons for their defeat. The news item said:

"Some of the founders charged that the Motherland Party received about 4 billion Turkish liras in assistance from foreign sources."

According to the news item, Ozal used these funds to pay off the bank debts of influential people and some small businessmen in various provinces and thus won the voting potential of influential circles.

We hope that this news story is false in every respect. That is, neither the Motherland Party has received any foreign assistance nor such ominous charges have been leveled at the NDP meeting.

NDP's administrators, who are experienced in statecraft, today have an important duty to fulfill. If they have not made such charges they must openly refute this dangerous fallacy that is being disseminated by a high-circulation paper. If they have discussed such matters and they have documents and evidence in their hands they must make them public. If they are spreading rumors and allegations without having documents or evidence in their hands they must apologize without delay and they must renounce such methods.

We are calling upon the NDP leaders to take on their role of "exemplary and responsible opposition." Maneuvers to undermine the government before even it has been formed are dangerous not only for our nascent democracy but for NDP itself.

9588

CSO: 3554/78



## LOCAL PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION: INFORM ON BASE PLANS

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 2 Nov 83 p 18

/Article by Julut: "Dont' use Greenland For Offensive Purposes"/

/Text/ This was asserted by the Landsting, which wishes to be continually kept informed on plans for the construction of two radar stations on the West Coast.

"The Landsting maintains that Greenland must never be used for offensive purposes. In making this decision in principle, it has taken into account the military bases in Greenland. The Landsting also requests that it be continually notified of plans concerning the construction of two radar stations on the west coast."

The 3-hour long debate on military installations in Greenland concluded with a vote on the above statement, introduced by Bendt Frederiksen as an alternative resolution. No one voted against the resolution, but six members abstained. They were Isak Lund, Hans Iversen, Pavia Nielsen, and Hans Pavia Rosing of the Siumut party; and Jens Geisler and Arqaluk Lynge of the IA /Inuit Atagatik/ party.

An Area of 152 km<sup>2</sup>

The point of departure for the debate was the American desire to control two areas of 68 km<sup>2</sup> each at Nanortalik and Fiskenaesset, as well as 8 km<sup>2</sup> at the various landing facilities for each base and various road connections. Within each area, buildings of 3,000 m<sup>2</sup> are to be constructed. Each installation will have room for 20 people, but operation will normally required only 8-10.

The matter was submitted to the municipal governments of Nuuk and Nanortalik, but no reply has yet been returned. The Ministry of Greenland requested the Home Government to give provisional comments on the plants. When an answer has come in from the municipalities, the subject will be debated in the national planning committee; this debate will form the background for the Home Government's final statement.

For Offensive Purposes?

The Defense Minister prepared the aforementioned statement at the request of the IA. Now the party's chairman, Arqaluk Lynge, has asked how the Greenlandic

authorities will control activity on the bases; if the bases can be used for offensive purposes without expansion but through modernization; if the desire for a nuclear-free Greenland is being observed; and if the government agrees that there will continue to be military installations.

After having discussed the ICC /Inuit Circumpolar Conference/ resolution that the Arctic will not be a theater for war, he said:

"We are a little people without weapons. Therefore we must not let ourselves be misused by world powers. We cannot accept our being used as hostages so that those powers can avoid war within their own borders!" Arqaluk said further that the Defense Minister in his own statement did not deny that the bases in Greenland could be used for offensive purposes. And he is assured by the fact that Denmark is required to provide raw materials according to a 33-year-old agreement with the United States.

In conclusion, he asked the Landsting to support his suggestion of a plebiscite concerning the new bases on the west coast.

#### The United States Must Respect That

According to the mineral law, all questions concerning raw materials will be decided by the joint decision. Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt, in his answer to Arqaluk, said that the Americans will accept this. However, the situation would be different in wartime. If we survive a war and are occupied by a world power, we will not be able to control our own raw materials.

#### Siumut Does Not Want New Radar Installation

Siumut, with Sofus Joelsen as spokesman, opposed a plebiscite on the construction of the new radar bases because it could be misused by the world powers. The Greenlanders are not to be called biased in this matter.

"Siumut too does not wish the planned warning stations to be built. Siumut is against the placing of offensive weapons in Greenland and is against nuclear armament; no one must risk losing his life as a result of military action on Greenland," said Joelsen.

#### A Defense Policy Committee

Atassut, with Peter Ostermann as spokesman, also declined to back the proposal for a plebiscite concerning the new installations. The party did not wish to take a position on the subject before it was decided whether the existing radar stations on the inland ice would be dismantled. This problem may be discussed in the future, when it will have great significance for the airports in South Stromfjord and kulusuk and also for traffic between Greenland and Denmark.

Atassut suggested establishing a defense policy committee, since greater insight into these questions is needed.

Hans Pavia Rosing stated the ICC resolution not to use the Arctic for military purposes. He urged debate about the bases in Greenland and their purpose, and concluded by saying:

"We can no longer ignore the presence of defense bases in Greenland."

Arqaluk Lynge suggested that the Landsting vote on the plans for the new bases. At this point, Bendt Frederiksen introduced an opposing resolution, which the parliament voted on.

12573

CSO: 3613/41

## UDF DEPUTY CLAIMS AIR FORCE NEEDS NOT MET BY 1984 BUDGET

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Nov 83 p 7

Text UDF deputy Loic Bouvard of Morbihan, Air Force budget rapporteur for the Assembly's National Defense Committee, has drawn up a real indictment of the government for the "inadequacies" and "serious gaps" which in his view mark the planned 1984 budget for the French Air Force. Those plans, he considers, will not allow the gaps noted to be made up, and he particularly notes a grave failure to understand the "air factor."

Analyzing what he means exactly by the "air factor" in the world, the rapporteur cited as examples the destruction on the ground, in 1973, of part of the Egyptian air force by Israeli airpower; the severe losses inflicted on British forces by Argentine airpower during the Falklands conflict; the silencing of Syrian missile batteries by Israeli airpower; the role of airpower a few months ago in Chad; and finally the tumult caused by delivery of five Super-Etendards to Iraq, which would tend to prove a limited number of aircraft can change the course of a conflict.

The air arm, Bouvard pointed out, is the first of the armed forces to act in the event of conflict. It should, then, have the necessary means, and in that regard he expressed the most extreme reservations concerning air force funding for 1984.

The figure of 450 combat aircraft on line must be considered a minimum for France (Britain now has 620). Replacement aircraft for such a force must be ordered at the rate of 33 per year. After cancellation of 40 orders in 1982, 30 orders were placed in 1983, but only 28 are planned for 1984. The gap, in consequence, will reach 50 aircraft in 3 years.

But the threat, considers the rapporteur, is on the other hand quite real. The Warsaw Pact countries have clearly understood the importance of the "air factor": the Soviet Union having 5,950 combat aircraft, Poland 705, and Czechoslovakia 471. Offensive capacity of combat aircraft, moreover, has grown very appreciably: the Soviet Mig-17 fighter-bomber, which entered service in the 50's, could carry 0.5 tons of bombs, at very low altitudes, to an operating radius of 150 km; while the Sukkhoi-24, which entered service after 1970, can carry 6 tons to a 650-km range.

Concerning protection of bases in France, delays are noted in providing twin-barrel 20 mm guns, and the short-range ground-air missile will not be operational until 1987. Delays are also noted in building of shelters for aircraft, and in equipping them with doors. It will be possible to shelter only 70 percent of aircraft, notes the rapporteur.

M Bouvard made known his fears concerning a 9.3 percent reduction in funds for operational fuel, all the more since estimated oil prices for 1984 have been calculated on the basis of Fr 7.20 to the dollar. Air Force operations, closely linked to fuel availability, were set at 405,000 flying hours in 1982, after a steady decline for several prior years. Total planned flying hours for 1983 were but 403,000, and despite fuel economies new restrictions will have to be considered.

6145

CSO: 3519/94

## INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR ARSENAL

## LE MONDE's Military Expert's Views

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Nov 83 p 9

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Neither a Supplementary Force Nor an Extravagant Arsenal"]

[Text] The president of the republic forcefully reaffirmed the dual idea that French nuclear weapons are strategic in nature, as are the stockpiles of massive destruction of the Soviet Union and the United States and that, therefore, the fate of this national force of dissuasion has nothing to do with the discussions in Geneva between the two superpowers on their intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe.

Since the beginning of the discussions on Euromissiles, France has adopted an original, unambiguous attitude. Original in that France's leaders have encouraged the allied European nations to accept American missiles in their countries while France itself does not accept them on its territory. Unambiguous in that French governments have always refused to let the national force of dissuasion be counted with the American and British nuclear forces opposing the USSR, even though it was stated in 1974 during a meeting of the allies in Ottawa that France's nuclear weapons contributed to the overall dissuasive force of the alliance (a position reiterated by Mitterrand during the 1983 Williamsburg summit).

Those who believe France's attitude is not very consistent have been told that its peculiarity is due to the fact that for 20 years now there has existed in France the diversified resources of an autonomous force of dissuasion solely controlled by the French government. This force confers upon the government distinct responsibilities in the area of protecting its so-called vital interests.

Unlike what the Soviets claim (they consider the French dissuasive force an additional component of the U.S. force and believe it should be included when figuring the European balance of security), the conditions under which the French force might be used are truly independent, both politically and materially. By describing himself as a "kingpin" in this dissuasion, Mitterrand did not hide this fact.

Of course, the French bombers and missiles are not pointed toward the United States, but it is also true that the United States is not permanently assured of being able to count on the use of French nuclear fire alongside its own during

a crisis. On the other hand, it has been hidden from no one that the Soviets, who frequently speak about destroying Western Europe with their nuclear arms, have decided to point missiles of all types at France.

#### 5,000 Hiroshima Strength Bombs

Since 1964, the year that the Mirage IV planes carrying 70 kiloton A-bombs went into service (this is about 3.5 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb), the French nuclear force has gradually increased in power, with the introduction of megaton H-bombs (the combined energy of 50 explosions comparable to Hiroshima) buried in the Albion plateau in Haute-Provence or located on board strategic submarines.

If the tactical nuclear arms installed on Pluton missiles and Mirage III, Jaguar and Super-Etendard planes are excluded, the French arsenal of strategic dissuasion represents roughly the equivalent of 5,000 bombs of the force of the Hiroshima bomb. According to calculations by military headquarters, these weapons could kill over 20 million men, the same as the losses endured by the USSR during the last world war.

In the beginning of 1985, the French nuclear force should take an important step toward modernization with the inauguration of the first strategic submarine, the Inflexible, which will be capable of launching multiple warhead missiles (with a maximum of 6 warheads) that will each be directed to different targets. After this, each of the four existing submarines (the Redoutable being excluded), at the rate of one every 18 months, will be fitted with the same multiple warhead missiles as the Inflexible.

In concrete terms this modernization means that each French submarine, instead of launching its 16 thermonuclear devices from 3,500 kilometers as is currently the case, will be able to launch a total of 96 from 4,400 kilometers distance. The entire fleet will be able to deploy a total of almost 500 warheads of varying strength which, according to the same calculations, could kill 60 million men.

As French leaders have said, this nuclear arsenal was always understood to be "a central and intercontinental system" of defense for the national territory and its land and sea approaches in Europe. In sum, it is not an additional or complementary force to NATO's.

By "central and intercontinental system" the French mean a national arsenal--just like the strategic weapons of the Soviets and Americans for their own countries--for which they need account to no one. Mitterrand stated this once again: the threat of possibly using this force depends on the free determination of the government, and the stockpiling of these weapons over the years and their modernization was solely the result of the estimation by French authorities of the dangers to the survival of the national community.

To want to compare the 360 Soviet SS-20s with the 5 French strategic submarines under these conditions is a technical folly, because Moscow, in addition to its

semimobile SS-20s, already has 2,000 warheads on board its 80 missile-launching submarines and 6,200 other warheads on its 1,400 intercontinental missiles. And this does not include the Backfire type bombers, for example, that can reach France from the USSR without refueling.

The Soviet Union gives the impression of wanting to claim the right--that France obviously does not intend to give--to have enough weapons to counter both the American forces and the forces of other nuclear powers (today France and Great Britain and tomorrow, undoubtedly, the People's Republic of China). Accepting such a principle would be the same as granting the Soviet Union the status of the number one world power.

France does, however, accept the idea that its dissuasive force, which is not negotiable in the current situation of overarming in Washington and in Moscow, could become a party to an international negotiation the day that the two superpowers try to set an example by drastically reducing their stockpiles under an effective monitoring program.

Forty-eight hours before the televised appearance of the chief of state, the minister of defense, Charles Hernu, expounded the same arguments at the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies in Paris, calling it "the sufficiency" of France's nuclear effort and defining it as maintaining national dissuasion at a level of credibility that would avoid a destabilizing one-upmanship and would exclude all intimidation or aggression. It is precisely the concern for this "sufficiency" that today enables France to recommend to the two superpowers that they agree on the "lowest possible level" of nuclear arms.

#### Text of Hernu Statement

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Nov 83 p 8

[Excerpts from a speech by Minister of Defense Charles Hernu at National Defense College, Paris, 15 November 1983]

[Text] "Faced with the research and developments conducted on antimissile systems on both sides of the Atlantic, France's duty is to continue to give itself the means to maintain the credibility of its strategic nuclear force at an adequate level. The billions of dollars and rubles spent to hinder strategic arms' ability to penetrate airspace, in conjunction with speeches questioning the very notion of mutual dissuasion, forces us to deploy multiple warhead missiles." This is what Charles Hernu, minister of defense, stated on Tuesday 15 November at the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies in Paris during a speech made public after Mitterrand's appearance on channel 2 entitled "Balance, Will, Dissuasion."

"The naval component of the strategic nuclear force," explained Hernu, "will increase to five or six missile-launching nuclear submarines in 1985. A seventh submarine, the first of a new, quieter generation, will be in service by 1994. Through refitting, four of the existing submarines will be equipped with M-4 missiles.\*

\*The M-4 is a missile that can travel up to 4,400 kilometers and at the end of its course drops its six warheads over an area 350 kilometers long and 150 kilometers wide.



The theoretical number of warheads that can be launched will go from 80 in 1983 to 176 in 1985 to 496 in 10 years. Why such a change? First of all I would like to point out that France is installing multiple warheads 12 years after the United States, 10 years after the USSR and several years after the United Kingdom. We are therefore not initiating any kind of arms race in this area.... We need no further instructions when we note that the number of warheads carried by long and medium-range Soviet missiles went from about 2,900 in 1975 to 8,000 in 1983, an increase of 700 warheads per year."

"As for the land forces," the minister of defense added, "The 'hardening'\* of the second group of strategic missiles will be continued. In this respect I would like to emphasize the fact that the 18 missiles on the Albion plateau are an indispensable part of our strategic nuclear force, as are the missiles located on our submarines. The S-3 missiles are reserve weapons within a strategy that is not an antforce strategy but a policy of global dissuasion. France believes in dissuasion, in preventing war and does not believe in nuclear conflict that would supposedly be 'limited' to a geographical area or to a certain category of military targets."

"France," Hernu concluded, "is looking for ways to permanently ensure the credibility of its dissuasion--not more, not less. Not more because this would not correspond to our resources, which are not those of a superpower, or to our philosophy, which excludes any form of coercion or intimidation. Not less because we would lose our space of freedom, our ability to affect the course of events. Our actions in favor of peace, freedom, and human rights--our very identity--would be compromised. The moral legitimacy of this policy which aims to prevent war is not contested."

\*The 'hardening' of a missile enables it to resist the neutralizing effects of an adverse preventive nuclear attack.

9720

CSO:3519/136

## ROLE OF MERCHANT MARINE IN NAVAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Nov 83 pp 4-19

[Article by Pierre de Demandolx-Dedons, delegate general of the Central Committee of French Shipowners: "Merchant Marine: Supporting Naval Power"]

[Text] Continued, Reciprocal Support

Protection of merchant ships by the Navy and support of the armed forces by commercial shipping in time of war: the two world wars and numerous, more localized crises in the course of this century--but in which France took a direct part--have provided French shipowners every opportunity to prove the continued relevance of these two principles. The extent of the sacrifice made by the merchant shipping fleet during the two world wars provides evidence of this.

On the basis of a very complete legal and administrative system, cooperation between the merchant shipping fleet and the Navy has always been very close, even if this is not well-known to the ordinary citizen. Cooperation takes place in a national framework and in the broader structure of the inter-allied merchant shipping pool.

However, despite frequent updating of the lists of available shipping and in spite of the expansion of the missions which may be assigned to the merchant fleet, we have seen, here and there, some evidence of a loss of interest in these problems of cooperation between merchant shipping and the Navy in peacetime. The highly theoretical character of a possible future classic and general naval conflict between the great powers may explain this tendency which has developed, at the very moment when changes in strategic priorities adopted by the governments of the Fifth Republic were giving the French Navy a very special role but one focused on metropolitan France for the most part: the strategic force.

Beginning in the mid 1970's, the missions assigned to the Navy were becoming more diversified and therefore called for changes in the possible forms of cooperation with the merchant shipping fleet. At the same time the crisis in international maritime transportation posed a serious threat to the very existence of the shipping fleets of the Western countries and therefore to the defense potential of these economies. In the face of unbridled competition, of very active competition

by certain countries or groups of countries, and in view of the extent of the difficulties requiring to be overcome or dealt with, many countries have asked themselves whether it was worthwhile to maintain a merchant shipping fleet under national registry. For a country like France, the third-ranking naval power in the world, it has become essential to mobilize the support of the political authorities as well as the economic and social partners of French shipping interests to remind them of why having a national and efficient merchant shipping fleet of the proper size is essential. It has also become essential to call on all of them for the necessary effort to maintain it, adapt it to change, and keep it up to date.

#### Points of Friction Along the Shipping Lanes

The dimensions of the foreign policy which a country wants to follow and the very changes in the world and the concept of crisis give very tangible meaning to some of the roles of our naval forces: protection, prevention, presence, assistance, and maintaining the security of shipping routes are some of these missions likely to involve the merchant shipping fleet.

These roles may demand the prepositioning of ships or sending them quickly to areas of tension. It has become a commonplace to describe the formidable stakes involved in the Indian Ocean where, alongside the two superpowers, France maintains a substantial naval force which, I should emphasize, is very much appreciated by the merchant ships which must operate in areas where anything can happen. However, beyond the Indian Ocean and the vital petroleum routes which cross it, we might point to many other places on the map of the world which are likely to see a French naval presence, either off the coast of Africa, in the Mediterranean, or in the Pacific.

Furthermore, the new convention on the law of the sea provides France with an immense maritime zone largely located far from metropolitan France. In that case also there is no need at all to prepare very scholarly studies to determine the importance, the strategic or economic stakes, and the conflicts which may be generated by a new international legal system whose application will certainly be difficult. We must hope that France will maintain the economic, technical, financial, commercial, and military resources suitable to its power, particularly in the naval field.

#### "Classical" Support for the Armed Forces: Lessons of the Two World Wars

It is since the beginning of the present century that modern France has been organized to deal with conflicts in which it might become involved.

Certainly, at the beginning of the century, the "blue line of the Vosges Mountains" [a reference to the French claim at the time for the return of Alsace and Lorraine]. However, the priority objective was the acquisition of a large colonial empire, and big power rivalries gave the shipping world a special dimension and role. In the Franco-British alliance as it was developing, little by little, it seemed to be up to the British Navy to contain the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, while elsewhere it was up to the French fleet to maintain the security of the Atlantic coasts and above all the control of the Western Mediterranean, to ensure the security of imperial communications--so vital for our armies and our

economy during time of peace or war. The merchant shipping fleet, in the French wartime system, was requisitioned and mobilized and was given the priority assignment of transporting troops overseas and carrying essential supplies.

In the view of the experts, World War I would be short, and the needs of the economy would be limited. We know to what extent that forecast was to be contradicted by events and what an essential role the war at sea played in this conflict. First there was the matter of acquiring control of the seas, which was rapidly achieved by the allies. There was the naval battle off Coronel [on the coast of Chile], the first naval battle of the Falkland Islands, the cruise of the "Emden" [German raider converted from a merchant ship]. Then there was the war against merchant shipping in the North Atlantic. It was the torpedoing of the "Lusitania," a neutral ship [as published; the "Lusitania" was a British ship] which brought the United States into the war.

In 1939, as in 1914, the French merchant shipping fleet was entirely requisitioned by the state and used to provide for communications and the essential needs of the French economy. Already in 1939 many senior political and military figures were concerned about the inadequacy of our merchant shipping fleet in certain key areas. A number of quite original--and highly effective--steps were taken at the time to procure the tonnages of essential, modern ships, particularly in terms of tankers. The orders sent by the prime minister of the time to Maison Worms [a French banking group], acting on behalf of a group of shipowners, is clearly of historic interest. The orders are also of great interest from the point of view of the choice of procedures: the state had to be discreet in the way it operated. Private industry demonstrated its ability to deal with the mission asked of it. The 100,000 ton tanker fleet was rapidly acquired and quickly prepared for the sea. From the beginning of hostilities it carried out missions which had not been planned for it to undertake.

#### Contemporary Legal Framework

In providing the state with merchant shipping we must distinguish between what is required to meet the needs of the economy in the framework of the state's assuming control of all maritime shipping and what pertains to providing auxiliary ships for the Navy. Certainly, the legal basis can be the same, but the organization of responsibilities, the procedures, and the objectives involved are different. In the one case the ships retain their civilian character but are placed under the orders of the state. In the other case the ships become military vessels.

I think that the major principles for the organization of defense shipping are well known. They are based on the General Ordinance of 7 January 1959 and a decree of 15 December 1965 regarding transportation, and, for the maritime industry, an instruction of 6 January 1976. In brief, the minister charged with transportation, who is at all times responsible for meeting transportation needs necessary for national defense, will ensure transportation of all kinds by civilian means of what is needed for military operations, civil defense, and the requirements of the people, in accordance with government directives and in terms of a priority list and the relative urgency of requirements. To do this, the minister has a control organization, the Commissariat of Transportation, and a consultative body,

the Transportation Committee. These two organizations include civil servants and figures from the transportation industry.

The state has powers of military requisitioning under the Law of 3 July 1877 and of civilian requisitioning under the Law of 11 July 1938, as supplemented by the Ordinance of 6 January 1959 already mentioned above. In addition, a more flexible procedure, flowing from the Law of 20 May 1969 on transportation in the national interest, permits the performance on a continuous basis of all kinds of missions of a humanitarian, political, military, or simply economic character.

#### Conditions for Requisitioning

Undertaken to meet a purely military interest, the power of military requisitioning, as far as the merchant shipping fleet is concerned, involves all ships under the French flag, as well as equipment, provisions, and even merchandise loaded on board, if they belong to a French citizen. The maritime authorities have the power to requisition French merchant ships directly, including their officers and crews, once the conditions for the application of the law are met: general mobilization or a decision by the cabinet. Requisitioning is subject to indemnification of the owners.

The establishment of a fleet of naval auxiliary ships would be an example of military requisitioning. In the course of a situation involving general mobilization or a national or regional state of alert the instruction of 1979, mentioned above, provides that a portion of the merchant ships shall be requisitioned by maritime prefects to establish a "complementary fleet" for the Navy. The ships acquire the status of navy ships, and their use and direction shall be in the hands of the minister of defense, who will assign active duty or naval reserve personnel to them and will use them for military purposes. A list of the ships to be requisitioned in time of war or emergency is kept up to date in peacetime.

Civilian requisitioning is based on a group of more complicated pieces of legislation. However, it still requires a prior decision by the cabinet. It is possible to requisition personnel, property, or services, by decision of the prime minister, the minister of defense, the minister of industry, and ministers responsible for each sector of transportation. Regarding ships, a requisition may be made of a ship even when it is at sea, in foreign territorial waters, or in foreign territory. In case a ship is requisitioned the state will use it even though it remains civilian property, will arrange for the indemnification due to the owner, and will determine the way in which it will be used. The ship may be chartered, by mutual agreement, but the state has the power to require the ship to be chartered.

An arrangement for the use of a ship by mutual agreement involves the preparation of a charter agreement, freely entered into by the owners and the state. The terms are freely discussed in advance between the parties, but the shipowner does not have the ultimate right of refusing to sign the charter contract. If he refuses to sign it, the state could always acquire the right to use the ship, taking into account the powers flowing from the right of requisitioning.

The existence of a mutually-agreed procedure, reached in advance, seems essential for French shipping. This is to ensure that the state will have its needs met at all times and that the shipowners may be sure of anticipating all the consequences of the interruption of their normal activity and having their role and functions under a charter clearly stated. This mutually agreed procedure is also essential

for all means of transportation which might be affected by the application of the 1969 law, which provides, as we have indicated, that all "shipowners of French nationality are required to provide for transportation in the national interest."

#### Recent Cases of Requisitioning

In recent years it is the 1969 law which has been used on several occasions, but we should recall that it was in the framework of a provisional law of 1950, which introduced the idea of transportation in the national interest, that the charter arrangements necessary for the Suez operation [of 1956] were made (5 passenger liners, 19 cargo ships). Under the same law a charter agreement was prepared and signed in 1959 between the CCAF [expansion unknown] and the Ministry of Defense for all transportation needs related to the events in North Africa at the time.

More recently, in October 1973, the same law was used to evacuate French nationals living in Alexandria [Egypt] during the Arab-Israeli War, at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on the basis of a mutually agreed arrangement, placing at the disposition of the government the car-ferry "Avenir," which was in Tunis at the time. The conditions for the charter were negotiated in 48 hours, and before a definitive agreement was reached on the rights and duties of each of the parties to the charter arrangement, the ship had already begun evacuation operations.

In 1976 five ships were chartered by the Ministry of the Interior to evacuate the people of Basse-Terre to Pointe-a-Pitre [both in Guadeloupe, West Indies], at the time of the eruption of La Soufriere volcano.

More recently still, in June 1982, during the hostilities in Lebanon, the passenger ship "Azur" was chartered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take part in the evacuation of refugees. The "Azur" was engaged in a cruise with tourists aboard who had not yet completed their trip. However, the ship was close to the place where it could be useful. The shipowner made all the necessary arrangements to repatriate the passengers, and in 48 hours the ship was ready for the evacuation operation, even though not all of the financial clauses of the charter contract had yet been discussed.

The procedures and experiences described above refer to a period of crisis. However, the state clearly has need for sea transportation outside any time of tension. It must then follow the usual commercial practices and act like a normal charterer, subject simply to certain rules of a public order, particularly those pertaining to public market transactions.

#### Changes Under Way

However, if it is a continuing fact that one cannot simply improvise in these matters, it is nonetheless clear that regularly updating procedures and the texts of the agreements is an absolute necessity. The absence today of a clear, modern, effective, and balanced contractual framework to cover both charters involving civilian requisitions or transportation in the national interest is undoubtedly a handicap which discussions now under way between the industry and the Secretariat of State for Maritime Affairs should dispose of very quickly. The purpose of



these negotiations is to reach an agreement that will be usable both in the framework of the Law of 20 May 1969 and in the framework of a charter agreement corresponding to the requisition procedures set forth by the Ordinance of 1959.

Some of the clauses should be the same in the two documents, particularly those concerning changes in the crew, the work to be done on the ship, and putting the ship back in its original condition on completion of the charter. On the other hand the quite basic clauses related to the cost of the charter, insurance of the ship, and reconstruction of damage will be different, because the two contracts do not relate to the same situations in terms of the length of use, the same types of risk, or the losses resulting from depriving the owners of the use of the ship or as a consequence of changes in the ship's pattern of use.

The shipowners want to have clear, balanced, and easily applicable provisions which clearly guarantee the replacement of the shipping fleet in case of loss.

The merchant shipping fleet, which is subject to implacable international competition, has profoundly changed in the course of the last 25 years, under the impact of technological, economic, and financial factors which pertain to the international trade world.

I think it would be useful to try to describe and to evaluate these factors as a function of the needs of national defense or support of our naval power.

#### The Fleet Is Going Through a Technological Evolution

The first factor to be noted is the disappearance of the transoceanic passenger ships and the mixed cargo-passenger ships, which have been eliminated by air transportation. When you remember the role of passenger ships in the transportation of troops, such a change has some consequences in defense terms.

Today the French merchant fleet has 28 passenger ships, essentially ferries which thus have large capacities for the transportation of passengers and vehicles. This last-named function is an unquestionable advantage from the defense point of view. However, these ships have only limited range and capacity to house passengers directly as a function of the characteristics of the commercial lines. These ships are not always compatible with the need for long journeys or prolonged stays at a given destination.

Cruise ships are often sought first, as we saw in the case of the British campaign to regain control of the Falkland Islands or for French requirements in the Mediterranean. There are only three cruise ships under the French flag, and we know the difficulties that have been encountered in ensuring the maintenance of these ships and, above all, in planning for their refitting.

The second technological and economic factor is the appearance of containerization and roll-on roll-off technology. That has profoundly changed the makeup of the cargo shipping fleet and the technique of transportation. Support of a naval force must inevitably take into account these new factors, which are certainly favorable in general when you consider the resulting flexibility in the use of roll-on roll-off ships or their carrying capacity and the efficiency of container

ships having their own cranes. However, these ships require the use of auxiliary equipment, whether these involve the containers or tugs carried on board or having access to suitably adapted terminal installations.

The French merchant fleet has a large number of roll-on roll-off ships, of highly varied sizes. I think that we should take note of this very positive characteristic in handling the various support functions which may be asked for and provided.

#### Economic and Commercial Changes

The third factor of change is more economic in character. It involves two aspects: the growth of a standard size of cargo ship and the appearance of very specialized ships dependent on well equipped, deep water ports. Required by the search for essential productivity and made possible by the expansion of the total ocean freight being transported, the growth in size--spectacular in the case of tanker and bulk cargo ships--has also been very noticeable in general cargo ships, whether these are container or roll-on roll-off ships. Compared to most of the Western shipping fleets, the French merchant ship fleet is characterized by a large number of ships of the same size in each ship category, whether it involves bulk or general cargo. The first roll-on roll-off ships, were often of less than 500 Gross Register Tons. These have been replaced by ships of more than 1,600 Gross Register Tons, which operate in the same coastwise traffic. Similarly, the tanker ships in the coastwise traffic are more and more often units of more than 20,000 tons, since they are engaged in the international coastwise traffic and obtain their supplies from coastal depots by means of specialized ships.

As the flow of ocean freight has been either smaller (in the case of petroleum) or has not grown at the same rate as the productivity of the ships, the number of individual ships has declined, in certain cases much reducing the number of ships among which the government may choose in case of specific needs for national defense. Operating conditions under the French flag explain in large part this concentration of our units in rather high tonnage levels in each category. Compared to ships under the German or Dutch flag, there are practically no more "little ships" in France.

The last factor of change which I would like to mention relates to more commercial considerations relative to the operation of regular shipping lines on the major international routes. The French merchant ship fleet operates most often in consortiums consisting of shipowners under various flags. They try to use the same kind of equipment and to pool their transportation capacity and their trading possibilities. Whatever the opportunities offered by the freight market, the maintenance of continuous commercial services limits the capacity of a shipowner who is a member of a consortium. It may change the assignment of ship tonnages to such an extent that the fleet of ships may lose part of its available potential.

#### A Dual Requirement

Finally, the development of "offshore" activities, which are part of the maritime world, has required the creation of a multiplicity of "supply vessels," along with exploration or production platforms. These vessels provide support or



assistance. They include barges with living quarters or with various types of equipment. It would be perfectly possible to use them for defense purposes, and they may be particularly appropriate for certain tasks, whether these involve towing another ship or providing assistance or supplies. Finally, and for certain types of naval operations, it is perhaps in the "offshore" fleet that we may find the best-adapted support ships these days.

This brings out the essential idea of a dual requirement:

--Having permanently available and within a framework suitable for placing them at the disposition of the state units of the merchant shipping fleet, preferably under contract;

--Continuously watching to ensure that the evolution of the merchant shipping fleet itself, in its natural economic and commercial context, does not make it unsuitable for support missions which could be asked of it for military purposes in time of crisis.

#### Sticking to Real Needs in the Service of a New Strategy

Everyone seems to be in agreement in characterizing the present as reflecting tensions which will not necessarily end in armed conflict but which are leading the major actors on the world scene to take certain positions or display their interests or determination. Conflicts may be localized, may require direct or indirect support in terms of commitments for cooperation or assistance, or may simply lead to an effort to prevent any widening of a conflict or aggravation of the tension.

The strategic interests of France go well beyond the framework of our own territory or of Europe. In this indirect strategy the capability for action of our naval forces rests in large part on our aircraft carriers and on the ability of our ships to operate on their own. The likely use of our naval forces is rather different from that involved in a crisis of the "Malvinas" type which, in its "expeditionary force" aspect, is a relatively classic example. However, the consequences for what we have in the fleet are in large part the same. Our naval forces must react very quickly and even be able to deploy over great distances, to remain mobile, to have eventually rather long supply lines, and to be able to stay on station for a long time.

If the Navy must deal with this requirement for a French naval presence which is flexible, diversified, and may be required simultaneously in several areas of tension or crisis, it must necessarily have new resources to take care of these supplementary needs. The merchant shipping fleet must not be unaware of these concerns, because it may have to provide more substantial assistance than is imagined at times.

This new kind of collaboration does not require any new range of legislation, as what presently exists (or should exist) is sufficient and suitably adapted in principle. On the other hand this collaboration requires much more intensive cooperation and a more relevant kind of training of the merchant ships in their role of support for the Navy.

## A New Way to Use Ships

This new way of using ships has already begun. Since August 1982 the "Port-Vendres," a 25,000 ton coastal tanker which belongs to a shipping company which specializes in the coastal tanker traffic, has been under the operational control of the commander of the Mediterranean Squadron of the French Fleet. It receives its orders from the "Meuse," a Navy tanker and support ship.

The "Port-Vendres" was placed at the disposition of the state after an agreement had been reached between the government and the company owning the ship. A purely commercial type contract was signed. The only specific limitation was that of respecting the code of public transactions. The "Port-Vendres" remains a civilian ship. However, the missions assigned to it are decided by the naval command. Under the orders of the commander in chief, Mediterranean, the ship participates in all operational exercises, squadron escort missions, or resupply at sea of Navy ships. However, it is not subject to military disciplinary regulations. Its only obligation is to respect the police regulations established for naval ports and arsenals, as well as those of all ports in general. As far as the company owning the ship is concerned, the state is a charterer like any other. Moreover, deliveries of refined products which the ship makes for the supply of fleet depots resemble the normal commercial activity of such a ship.

The commander in chief, Mediterranean, knowing that he has a ship well-adapted for the purpose, can more easily deal with cases where naval ships are unable to operate and can speed up the schedule for drydocking ships. This allows him to resupply ships directly or indirectly, such as an aircraft carrier or a guided missile frigate. Finally, he can carry out operations involving the simultaneous transfer of hazardous cargo, by night as well as during the day, and can carry out more rapidly the resupply at sea of all types of Navy ships.

For the Navy such an operation constitutes a kind of support providing unquestionable flexibility under economic conditions which are considered quite competitive.

It might be suggested that this kind of experiment should be developed further in order to obtain more information regarding all of the potential Navy-merchant ship partners on the problems of cooperation between the two. However, it may be easily appreciated that continuous chartering by the Navy can only involve a small number of ships, and of a particular type.

### Limits of the System

In the case of a tanker, which is quite essential for the resupply of a fleet, the experiment with the "Port-Vendres," which has been satisfactory from all points of view, made it possible to identify the changes which needed to be made on the ship to perform its new duties. They were limited in scope and compatible with a charter arrangement for a certain period of time.

On the other hand we can easily image the limitations and difficulties that would be encountered if it was desired that all, or even a significant number of ships of the same type would be likely to be used, on very short notice, in the naval forces.

The first mission of a merchant ship is to be efficient and suitable for the use intended for it, for its traffic, and for its area of operations. Its commercial possibilities should be total and as flexible as possible. In the very competitive world in which we live any commercial restriction will mean either that it has to be laid up for a time or that at times extra charges will be involved which are unacceptable from the commercial point of view.

Therefore, we must consider the quite special procedures and reciprocal commitments of a new kind which would be involved in building and maintaining ships which offer this support capability for which the Navy today feels a need. In this regard it is clear that French shipowners are quite ready to consider in detail, with all of the responsible officials of the Navy and of the Secretariat of State for Maritime Affairs, the conditions for the development of the concept of an auxiliary force for occasional use and for its use in actual practice on the basis of joint experiments.

#### Establishing an Auxiliary Fleet for Occasional Use

The auxiliary fleet for occasional use would be made up of all of the ships used in peacetime by the Navy to carry out certain of its own missions, whether these involve public service, logistical support, or surveillance activities. Chartered ships must retain their civilian status, but their use and control will be in the hands of the Navy. Chartering for a single voyage, related to and considered as a transportation operation, would not fit into this framework.

To facilitate charters, a form of charter agreement could be developed which would deal in a very special way with the problems of insurance and of structural changes in the ship. This charter agreement should also deal with the conditions for strengthening the crew with specialized naval personnel if that should be necessary.

It seems clear that this auxiliary fleet, whose composition would necessarily be variable, could only be established over a period of time. It is easy to see how the naval authorities would like to have the possibility of "turning over" periodically the ships chartered from the same company or from various companies, in order to have the maximum number of crews or companies used to this type of co-operation. However, the shipowner will immediately see the difficulties involved in such an operation and the limitations imposed by the commercial use of the ship. In these times of crisis and economic difficulties these would be particularly hard to bear over a long period of time. No doubt it would be necessary to develop procedures suitable for translating the potential for cooperation into commercial terms.

#### Beginning with an Inventory of Possibilities

Therefore, to make progress in the development of the concept of an auxiliary fleet, based on satisfactory experiments with suitable ships, it seems it would be necessary to make an inventory of the types of ships which could be included in such a force. Within each ship type the potential and the desire for cooperation should also be set out. If the Navy high command wants to know, on a continuing

basis, the capabilities of the merchant shipping fleet, it will be necessary to develop, through appropriate contacts, exchanges of information on the developing needs, on the one hand, and the potential, on the other.

We can try to set down, on an arbitrary basis, a summary table of the types of ships likely to be involved and the principal problems which their inclusion in the auxiliary fleet could raise.

We will begin with the coastal tankers. On the one hand this is because we have some experience with this type and, on the other hand, because they play a fundamental logistical role. It seems to me that the principal problem at present is the decline in their numbers, as a part of the decline of French requirements for national flag coastwise shipping, which is not compensated for by the expansion of activity on the international market. Clearly, the maintenance of a fleet of coastal tankers and its modernization is a priority matter, if we take our defense needs into account. One must hope that the increased use of French ships for the import of goods in the framework of the 1928 law will make it possible to keep a basic core of ships. However, this core may be very small, and we must ask ourselves if quite specific measures should not be considered in this connection. Without wishing to play on words, it would then be our national defense which would come to support our merchant shipping fleet in economic terms.

The roll-on roll-off ships, as we have said, are well represented in the French merchant shipping fleet, but they operate most often in the framework of regularly-scheduled services or in specialized forms of transportation. Their adaptation to the needs of the Navy, although facilitated by the very concept of these ships, may require special characteristics. For example, special facilities may be needed for the loading of vehicles with caterpillar treads or the transportation of helicopters. We can also imagine looking into the question whether there may be a relationship between the normal commercial use of ships for the transportation of this kind of equipment and their possible naval use.

In terms of container ships, the case of the "Atlantic Conveyor," a British ship, has provided an example of the operational possibilities related to the conversion of this kind of ship. There is a wide field for research, whether this involves making an inventory of the modular possibilities offered by containers in terms of the transportation of fully-assembled equipment or of defensive or offensive sub-assemblies.

Finally, the transoceanic passenger ships can no doubt be adapted to military needs, but we have difficulty in imagining a permanent naval use for this type of ship, as such a use would be completely incompatible with its commercial role. Passenger ships seem likely to remain very special, high-speed means of operational support, but of only limited importance.

#### Foreseeable, Structural Difficulties

It seems that such difficulties will be limited in conceptual terms. They are more real once they are moved out of the framework of an experiment and it is desired to set up a system for use. Immediately, problems of investment, supplementary costs, and legal problems related to contracts come up.

We will not be able to make any progress without setting up programs for research and cooperation between commercial shipowners and the potential users. These should be structures in which the shipowners would provide their knowledge of the potentialities of their ships and the naval authorities could consider the precise extent of the commercial constraints which affect companies and the imperious need which the companies may feel to develop their shipping fleet quickly in terms of the evolution of freight traffic, without always being able to take other objectives into account. In particular, I must insist on the fact that the economic life of a merchant ship is much shorter than the life of a naval ship, which is often afloat for 30 years, with numerous periods of refitting in a shipyard.

So that the merchant shipping fleet will be able to support naval power effectively, it will certainly be necessary for the ships to be prepared for their possible defense role. However, above all it is necessary to ensure that such preparations do not involve unmanageable costs or create constraints which would lessen the commercial use of the ships. This is a fundamental point.

#### Relationships Should Be Closer

In terms of the means used, that is, the ships, it appears that there is an area of mutual support in the establishment of an auxiliary fleet for occasional use, made up in particular of coastal tankers of rather modest size and roll-on roll-off ships--and even of roll-on roll-off container ships. However, the designation of ships for such an auxiliary fleet implies that there is a certain limit on their being used at any given time.

The ships involved and their characteristics must be known to the naval authorities. Regular contacts should take place between shipowners and the potential users. The changes to be made on the ships should be understood in advance, and the necessary crews should be trained.

In terms of procedures, since the closest kind of cooperation is essential, routine restraints should be set aside, and contractual arrangements should be approved and regularly tested.

The establishment of closer relationships between the Navy and the merchant shipping fleet should therefore be encouraged, providing merchant shipowners with broader perspectives of the concepts of national defense. I hope that regular progress will be made in this area. These relationships will be all the more effective if each one will play his role properly, and if the role of the merchant shipping fleet is, above all, commercially, economically, and financially efficient.

It is by this economic efficiency and by its impact in the world of maritime nations that the merchant shipping fleet contributes the most to the power of the nation and, consequently, to its naval power. No naval power for a maritime country without its having a substantial merchant shipping fleet, in a developed, economic democracy, means power without effectiveness. A non-competitive and inadequate fleet is then a handicap, whatever the potential of the country, because such a fleet would use up too much of the limited resources of the nation.

Therefore, let us take our inspiration from the words of Colbert, but above all let us avoid falling into the opposite trap. The essential relationships between the maritime transportation companies and the authorities charged with the national defense should not lead into a narrow form of protectionism or a meddling form of conservatism and concentration on bureaucratic detail. The state should be "behind" the merchant marine to support it, but it should not substitute itself for the commercial figures who constitute the foundation of our economic power.

It is not possible to reject economic realities and to shift onto others the burden of the effort which needs to be made. Today that means that we have to respect the freedom of economic choices made by companies and avoid undermining the international character of their activities, which are the only means of preserving the efficiency and even the existence of a national merchant fleet. Colbert's efforts should not inspire us to withdraw within ourselves, particularly in terms of maritime affairs. Rather, they should lead us to open out and to ensure, through the merchant shipping fleet, the projection of our national power.

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## DECLINING IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Nov 83 p 10

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] Tarascon--Military service is going to become even less universal. Next year, the number of conscripts called into service is to be from 260,000 to 270,000 out of a total of 430,000 registrants, although the number this year is about 300,000. This predictable drop in the number of recruits in the military service is due to an increase in the rate of exemptions attributed to medical reasons.

Div Gen Pierre Morisot, principal director of the national service, spoke at length of this possibility on 23 November on the occasion of a visit by journalists to the Tarascon (Bouches-du-Rhone) selection center, one of 10 "factories" in France--that is his own word for them--which are responsible for the examination, selection and orientation of recruits. Since their establishment 25 years ago, these centers have processed 15 million young recruits.

There are several reasons for this phenomenon, which will be fully felt at the end of 1984:

1. Some provisions of the 8 July 1983 law which, according to General Morisot, "make commonplace" the classification of conscientious objection that previously was more stringent. Under certain conditions, the law also exempts young company directors from fulfilling their active-duty military obligations;
2. A ministerial directive issued in March 1983 which changes the physical and psychological aptitude standards. Thus young men with motor sequela of the lower extremities (difficulty in prolonged standing), deafness or loss of auditory acuity and neuroses incompatible with adaptation to group living are exempt from military service.

Specifically, exemptions for social or professional reasons should not increase very much: they will remain about 25,000 per year, that is 5 to 6 percent of the so-called "usable" resource (400,000 recruits) which includes the total number of registrants minus the number of enlistments and



certain young men--naturalized citizens who are overage or have dual registrations--who normally would not perform national service.

#### A Resource Greater Than Requirements

On the other hand, exemptions for medical reasons, which totaled 75,000 per year, that is 17 to 18 percent of the "usable" resource, should increase in consideration of the new rules and regulations.

In the first place, there should be from 3,000 to 4,000 young company directors who will be exempted from service. Next, the number of conscientious objectors should triple and reach a figure of 3,000. Finally, the new physical and psychological aptitude standards should produce 25,000 to 30,000 additional exemptions. That is, a total of 35,000 to 40,000 young men.

These "losses," General Morisot admits, explain why we must wait until the end of 1984 for the available resource to drop from 300,000 in 1982 to 260,000 or 270,000 even though, on the other hand, the number of those declared unfit for continued military service--that is, 25,000 discharges from service per year--will doubtless decrease by half as the result of this upsurge in medical exemptions prior to induction. The exemption rate in 1983 will be 21 percent.

Why such a phenomenon? A financial reason first: the command wanted to decrease the number of persons declared unfit while in military service, because they are costly in terms of pensions and miscellaneous benefits for the recruit; therefore, the command elected to announce these changes before induction. Next, a more political reasons: the demographic resource today is greater than the real needs of the armies, particularly since the government's decision to eliminate 35,000 military spaces in 5 years.

Although conscription is to remain the basis of French defense policy, there is no indication of whether or not this excess resource will long continue to be the rule.

General Morisot estimates, on the contrary, that demography is going to mark time in the armies from 1994 to 2000, with the decline in male births observed from 1974 to 1980 impacting at that time on the number of potential recruits.

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## DE RUITER ANNOUNCES NEW DEFENSE MEMORANDUM

## Cutbacks in All Branches

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 83 p 1

/Text/ The Hague, 28 Nov--Cutbacks in all three branches of the armed forces, an annual two-percent real increase in the budget through 1987, climbing to three percent through 1993, and the principle that the Netherlands must not in the future retreat from NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy--these are the essentials of the new defense memorandum published today by Minister De Ruiter.

The Dutch Cabinet will not formulate its definitive plans for nuclear weapons policy until next spring, when NATO consultation formally begins on the issue. A decision on deployment of cruise missiles will be made then too. Despite the annual budget increases already agreed on in the coalition agreement, defense was forced to make reductions--and then place orders after all--in the conventional NATO contribution.

The rising costs of weapons systems with their increasingly complicated technology will result in a declining number of tasks for smaller NATO countries like ours.

Defense's financial problems are being increased by the contributions that must be made by giving priority to navy orders on behalf of the RSV /Rijn-Schelde Verolme Shipbuilding Company) concern--about a billion guilders--and by the economic necessity of placing more defense orders in our own country.

The number of air force bases is being reduced from five to four for the same number of planes through the closing of the base at Eindhoven. The navy will lose six Brequet-Atlantic planes without replacement, and six Wolf-class frigates are being retired early, to be replaced by two M-frigates.

An army reserve artillery detachment is being mobilized, three "old" field-artillery detachments and six obsolete air-defense detachments, as well as a light reconnaissance battalion are being cancelled. The financial savings of these reductions are to be used partly for more exercises.

In the defense memorandum, entitled "Continuity and Renewal," the stress remains on the priority of quality--the average investment percentage through 1993 is 35. Defense is now to report to Parliament twice annually so that the progress of planning compliance can be better monitored.

The memorandum stresses that "more attention" must be given to improving materials use beyond the substantial investments that have been made and are planned. The personnel force--now reduced to 130,000--will remain unchanged during the coming years. The defense budget will grow from 13 billion for 1984 to 14 billion for 1987. A subsequent cabinet will have to judge whether annual increases of three percent are possible after this.

#### Nuclear Tasks

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 83 p 3

/Text/ The Hague, 28 Nov--The Netherlands must not withdraw from responsibility for joint Western security and must even make "a substantial nuclear contribution" to it. Nuclear weapons exist and can no longer be eliminated from the planet. They are not simply weapons of mass destruction but are a deterrence to war. For current NATO strategy, which is based on nuclear deterrence, there are no workable alternatives.

Thus De Ruiter's new 1984-1993 Defense Memorandum, published today and bearing the title "Continuity and Renewal." It contains no specific nuclear policy plans.

The memorandum does advance a number of arguments for nuclear weapons policy on which the Cabinet plans to assume a definitive position next spring. The issuance of a NATO declaration that it will not make a first nuclear strike is described as incompatible with the essence of current strategy. The establishment of nuclear free zones in Europe "does not contribute to NATO's chief objective: the prevention of war."

Nuclear weapons in Western Europe should be evaluated in each category as to their role in the strategic security guaranty of the United States and as to their political importance for preventing war. They must not be thought of as a supplement to conventional defense.

The size of the defense budget through 1993 is not predicated on the possibility of increasing conventional armaments as nuclear armaments are reduced, writes Minister De Ruiter. But it also provides that the recent NATO decision to withdraw unilaterally 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe does not mean a retreat "from acceptance of nuclear weapons on European territory."

Elsewhere, the memorandum states that the Netherlands accepts "critical support" from the NATO partners, but; that it goes without saying that there must be room for "a critical Dutch input."

Careful and profound deliberation--by the middle of next year--is yet necessary before a determination on the possible deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch soil.

The NATO reaction to the tentative "views" of the Cabinet of last summer, the recent reduction of 1,400 nuclear warheads and the course of the weapons-control talks in Geneva will have a bearing on the deployment decision and on the review of present nuclear tasks.

The Cabinet did not wish to render a decision on the matter under pressure of time and, despite other plans, arrived at such a split memorandum because the formulation of the defense memorandum was needed now for conventional defense policy.

#### Two Percent Budget Increase

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 83 p 3

/Text/ The Hague, 28 Nov--The defense budget will increase annually by an adjusted two percent through 1987--from 13 to 14 billion guilders--and then by three percent annually through 1993 in accordance with an existing NATO agreement. Due to the unfavorable experience in executing the plans of the previous defense memorandum, there will now be twice-yearly financial progress reports made to the Parliament.

Minister De Ruiter makes these statements in the new defense memorandum published today. Adjustment during the period 1979 through 1982 caused a financial loss of 1.5 billion guilders, whereas since 1976 defense has been forced to bear 400 million in extra charges totaling 750 million guilders because of defense orders being placed with Dutch industry. It was announced that in the coming years more standardization in NATO will be sought and that through more consultation in the EPS /European Policy Cooperation: standard expansion unknown/, the Eurogroup and weapons-purchasing boards, greater balance between the United States and Western Europe in the area of procurement must be sought--i.e., in the spirit of the so-called two-way street.

Thirty-five percent of the defense expenditures through 1993 will be for investments, 42 percent for personnel, 13 percent for materiel and 10 percent for the pension and unemployment funds. The army receives 41 percent, the navy and air force each 20 percent.

Defense must "advance" a billion guilders for the navy by 1988 in connection with the RSV /Rijn Schelde Verolme Shipbuilding Company/ problem by ordering ships earlier. The consequence of this obligation will also put pressure on the army and air force. Six Breguet-Atlantic naval aircraft are being scrapped without replacement; six Wolf-class frigates are being retired early and replaced by two M-frigates.

Cutbacks are being made in the army by cancelling three detachments of obsolete field artillery, six detachments of air defense and one light reconnaissance battalion. Also, one reserve artillery detachment is being mobilized. Plans to mobilize a reserve infantry-tank battalion will likely be scrubbed since NATO has reacted critically to them. For the same reason, the purchase of railway flatcars was set forward from 1985 to 1984, and orders were placed for two squadrons of air-defense Patriots to guard sea and airports during the planning period through 1993.

At the request of NATO, the air force will study more closely the decision to shut down the Eindhoven Air Base--especially its function in the event of war. The same number of jet fighters will now be spread over four bases instead of five. In 1991, a total of 243 Starfighters and NF-5s will be replaced by 213 F-16s.

## No Personnel Cuts

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 83 p 3

/Text/ The Hague, 28 Nov--Since 1972, defense personnel has been reduced by 16,000 people. Due to the lack of a troop limitation agreement between East and West, a further reduction of 10,000 has turned out to be impossible. No additional reduction of the personnel force of 130,000 is to be expected in the period through 1993, reports Minister De Ruiter in the new defense memorandum.

De Ruiter is investigating the possibility of extending the term of service for more complicated functions and of shortening that of the more simple ones. Tying the pay of conscripts to that of professional soldiers is financially impossible. The possibility of tailoring conscripts' pay to the difficulty and duration of their function is under study.

The memorandum states that, as a matter of course, professional soldiers who for reasons of conscience declare that they are unable to perform certain--i.e., nuclear--tasks, are retiring. Defense is aiming eventually at 58 as the "normal" military retirement age. In the navy, it is 50, and 55 in the other service branches.

## Editorial on Defense Policy

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 29 Nov 83 p 7

/Text/ These days it is not the custom to ply officials or members of the military with compliments. Yet, if only by way of exception, a word of respect might well be directed their way for the bulky document that passed through the copying machine at the Ministry of Defense over the weekend and was released yesterday as the new defense memorandum. The memorandum bears the title "Continuity and Renewal," a title that reveals a certain tension.

We'll examine some of these tensions. The NATO assessment of Dutch defense plans published by the Cabinet is not gentle. Two marginal notes on this. First, Foreign Minister Van den Broek was clearly not simply worrying last summer when he feared that the intended conventional retrenchments would put the NATO partners in an alarmed state of mind for their upcoming review of Dutch nuclear plans.

Secondly, a comparison of the recent reproachful NATO opinion with the 9 July 1974 criticism from Brussels concerning the previous defense memorandum--about the security of life--leads to the conclusion that the same gloomy scribe there edited both.

Great concern is again expressed about the Netherlands setting a bad example for the NATO partners and about a substantial reduction of the fighting readiness of the Dutch armed forces. In view of the strong economic head wind, the not inconsiderable material plans for the coming 10 years, and an investment plan averaging 35 percent for the Dutch armed forces, this criticism seems very harsh indeed.

Might it be that this criticism by this NATO undersecretary will not turn out so badly for the Cabinet on the national political stage either?--even though Mr Luns is no more than the communicator in this question. At any rate, in the face of reproaches from Brussels, the Cabinet has been able to cite approval by the ruling parties in The Hague, and it is this that the critical NATO partner has heeded first and foremost.

There is also tension--even before any definitive positions on nuclear weapons--in the still tentative portion of the memorandum dealing with nuclear questions. It is tentative because the coalition partners have not yet reached sufficient agreement on a decision that could be presented to NATO.

In the reflective portion of the memorandum, there is a clear treatment of the existence of nuclear weapons--an existence that cannot be reasoned or demonstrated away--of their role as a preventative to war in the deterrence strategy and of their chiefly political significance. More money for alternatives to nuclear weapons--insofar as there are any--is lacking.

It is striking that the Cabinet claims that it is willing to proceed with "accommodations" in the tactical nuclear area, whereas a recent NATO study--also praised by the Netherlands--regarding unilateral withdrawal of 1,400 warheads from Western Europe has not yet even become operational. The wishes of a Chamber majority--made up of the PvdA /Labor Party/ and the CDA /Christian Democratic Appeal/, among others--and the views of the allies will presently be squared with one another. The pending Dutch decision concerning deployment of cruise missiles will also weigh heavily in The Hague and in Brussels in this regard.

The 1974 defense memorandum attracted attention in those days primarily because the first Socialist defense minister, Mr Vredeling, had undertaken a much-needed drive to place quality before quantity and to bring about a more realistic relationship between means and possibilities.

This has not been entirely successful, due in part to unforeseen circumstances such as budgetary setbacks. On the contrary, critics of the financial plan passed for the second planning period--1978 to 1983--were right.

It is good to remember that Finance Minister Ruding attacked the new memorandum last summer even before it had been written, when he tried unsuccessfully in the cabinet to reduce by half the annual budget increase of two percent. In view of the country's economic outlook, the question is whether Ruding will want to forego a repetition of such attempts as far as 1987.

The question is also whether the annual three percent growth assumed in the defense memorandum for the period 1987-1993 will be realized. Because of the tensions already now existing within the defense budget and the relation between investment and operations expenditures--described by De Ruiter as "out of balance"--strong doubts are in order.

9992

CSO: 3614/16

## SOUTHERN NAVAL FORCES CHIEF COMMENTS ON SUBMARINE SIGHTINGS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 83 p 4

/Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Few 'Sure' Submarines"/

/Text/ During the 1970's, the ministry of defense has received four reports on foreign submarines in inland waters that were classified as "sure submarines." Three of these episodes took place in northern Norway in the beginning of the '70's, while one took place in southern Norway, but it is better known as the episode in the Sognefjord in 1972.

It was the commander of the naval forces in southern Norway. Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen, who submitted those figures in an orientation of the press on Tuesday. Rear Admiral Pedersen stated that 1983 has been a busy year where submarine reports are concerned. Since taking over his position in July, he has received 40 reports on foreign submarines in Norwegian territorial waters, but none which received the designation of "sure" or "probable submarines." Just before he took over the position of supreme commander of naval forces in the south, Admiral Pedersen participated actively in the search for a foreign submarine in inland waters in Sunnhordland. Against the background of his experience as the captain of a ship during actual operations, he says that he can hardly imagine that there can have been anything but a foreign submarine in that area.

Admiral Pedersen praises the vigilance of the people along the coast, and he believes that one can assert positively that anyone who wants to do something illegal in Norwegian waters will be detected and reported. Even though the danger of making mistakes in one's observations at sea is great, Pedersen calls upon the people along the coast to report it when they see something unusual.

During the period from 1969 through 1982, the ministry of defense received 226 reports on submarines in Norwegian waters, Admiral Pedersen states. In a half of those instances, there quite definitely was no submarine. Of the other half of those reports, the ministry of defense considered a scant 2 percent to be reports of "sure submarines," 5 or 6 percent to be reports of "probable submarines" and 105 reports ended up in the big, doubtful category of "possible

submarines." When one looks more closely at the geographic pattern of the observations in southern Norway, it becomes apparent that 35 out of the 47 reports were concerned with submarines in Sogn, Fjordane, More and Romsdal. Admiral Pedersen is cautious about drawing conclusions from that material, but he points out that it is striking that the smallest number of observations comes from areas where there are the most eyes to see. The same pattern also holds for submarine observations in northern Norway.

Where the possibility of finding a foreign submarine that is operating in inland waters is concerned, Admiral Pedersen says that, because of the special sonar situation, it often is like hunting for a needle in a haystack without actually knowing whether it is there. In addition, there is the fact that the sonar equipment in the frigates is worn and should be modernized, since it is technical equipment from World War II that is still being used. In as prosperous a country as Norway, it should be possible to obtain 100 million kroner to make the frigates' antisubmarine warfare efforts effective, he thinks.

Essentially, naval defense has three types of weapons for use against foreign submarines. They are depth charges, Terne missiles and homing torpedoes. Many people think that hits are guaranteed when torpedoes are used, and that is not true. Because of the fact that noise and false echoes reduce the probability of obtaining hits in coastal waters, torpedoes should preferably be used only in open water. Admiral Pedersen said. Therefore the operational leadership will often be somewhat sparing in its use of that weapon.

It is also often the naval defense system's submarines that have the best chance of finding other submarines. Admiral Pedersen states that there have been occasions in the past when a Norwegian submarine was "sticking to" a foreign submarine but did not have the capability of stopping it because it did not have torpedoes on board. "Therefore we do not want to preclude such a possibility," Admiral Pedersen says.

9266

CSO: 3639/36



## BUDGET CONSTRICTIONS FORCING EXERCISES IN FIELD TO BE CUT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Nov 83 p 56

/Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Soldiers' Field Exercises Cut in Half"/

/Text/ "Not all of the army's shortages of materiel are of equal significance for its combat effectiveness, but if one were to pick out the most important shortages in the mobilization report for 1982, they alone would amount to 2 billion kroner," Major General Egil Ingebrigtsen, the inspector general of the army, said at the Oslo Military Society Monday evening. He also pointed out that the amount of time for exercises outside of garrisons has been reduced by 50 percent for each individual soldier in recent times.

Although Major General Egil Ingebrigtsen assumed an optimistic attitude and was able to point to the successful employment of scientific management methods on many points, he did not hesitate to indicate where the shoe pinches. In recent years, the army has gotten behind on reacquisition and replacement of materiel. That is particularly owing to the large air defense acquisitions. The needs of the army have mounted up, and the most serious shortages are concerned with ammunition and mines, small arms, communications equipment, salvaging and repair vehicles, camouflage nets, tent equipment, mine detectors and protective clothing for use against chemical warfare and radioactive fallout. But if the defense branch procures what has been planned for the coming five-year period, it will be possible to fill most of the empty spaces in the mobilization dumps, Ingebrigtsen says.

Among the deficiencies on which the press has been concentrating is the need for small arms. Major General Ingebrigtsen said that if the army's total requirement for small arms to be kept in reserve for combat and ordinary use is to be met, an additional 40,000 standard rifles of the AG 3 type will be needed. If they content themselves with covering the primary requirement of all combat formations and, at the same time, want to avoid having to make the training units give up their weapons if mobilization comes, the army needs 10,000 weapons. Therefore the defense chief has decided that the army is to be supplied with 10,000 AG 3 rifles by the other branches of the service, which, in turn, will get back older weapons from the army. Needs over and above that will be covered with older small arms that the army has in stock.



Another important field is air defense. There the army has procured the mobile missile air defense system of the RB 70 type from Sweden. That takes care of the needs of two brigades, and an additional four brigades will be taken care of by 1986. Other types of missiles than the RB 70 will also be considered for procurement over and above that, Ingebrigtsen said.

Other challenges are concerned with antitank defense, where new types of tanks that can stand more require the Norwegian army to get weapons with a greater penetration capability. "The army must also get more mines and more effective ones, and over the longer term we must consider whether more advanced mine systems will not be more cost effective on Norwegian terrain and within our operational concept," Ingebrigtsen said, and he also said that our 105-millimeter artillery should be replaced with 155-millimeter guns.

At present, the army is working on adjusting and strengthening its organization with a view to the threat of the 1990's. Even though the new, so-called "1990 structure" will demand a big effort, Ingebrigtsen wants to keep the number of brigades the same as it is today. That should continue to be one standing brigade and 12 brigades that can be mobilized at need, or a total of almost 160,000 able-bodied men. That calls for maneuvering fields for mechanized formations, and work is being done on such fields in northern Norway, Trondelag and the East Norway area. "But no releasing of any of the fields is in sight," Ingebrigtsen asserted in his lecture.

#### Fewer Exercises

Where the personnel are concerned, there are bright spots. There have never been more applicants for the army's schools and the educational level of military leaders has never been higher.

"But if one has to hold one's own on the battlefield, one must be at least the equal of one's adversary," Ingebrigtsen said. He thought it would be something to worry about if the decline in maneuvering activity were to affect combat effectiveness--such things as the ability of Norwegian units to fight in the dark and to operate in large formations, for example.

For financial reasons, maneuvering activity was cut by 15 percent in 1982, which was a trial year. Funds were cut back an additional 10 percent in 1983.

"Because of the carryover of procurement costs from 1982 and the reduced scale of operations because of the reduction of the funds available, maneuvering activities for the purpose of training units and the individual men outside of the garrisons have been reduced by approximately 50 percent," the inspector general of the army pointed out.

On the administrative side, work on introducing scientific management is continuing. Up to the present, they have managed to combine the so-called delaying units with training and maneuver units at ten locations in the country. That has made personnel available. In addition to such combining action, combining certain administrative tasks for units in the same geographic region without formally merging the units together to form one unit is also being considered. Simultaneously, the chief of defense has gotten studies started to find out how to get the various branches of the armed forces better coordinated with each other at Kristiansand, Stavanger and Trondheim, Egil Ingebrigtsen said in his address.

9266

CSO: 3639/36

MILITARY

SPAIN

# SPAIN ENDORSES NATO DETENTE CALL, NOT FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Dec 83 p 3

[Article by Andres Ortega and Juan Roldan]

[Text] Brussels--Spain's Socialist government yesterday endorsed for the first time a North Atlantic Council political document in which the 16 member countries call on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations "to take advantage of the opportunity that we are offering them to maintain balanced and constructive relations and to work for genuine detente." Spain did not sign the meeting's final communique, however.

The proposal by the FRG was presented at the close of the biannual conference of NATO foreign ministers as an annex to the final communique; the annex is entitled the Brussels Declaration. Spain, which withheld its support for the final communique, gave its approval to the declaration, with the exception of a paragraph that refers to the "dual decision" on Euromissiles. Greece and Denmark also withheld their backing for this paragraph.

The Spanish minister, Fernando Moran, said at a press conference that his government was clearly in favor of a dialogue with the East and that save for the reservation about the Euromissiles, the rest of the German document was "perfectly acceptable" to Spain.

The declaration asserts: "Our alliance does not threaten anyone. None of our weapons will ever be used, except in the event of an attack. We do not aspire to superiority, but we will not accept others' having it either. Our legitimate security interests can be guaranteed only through a strong union between North America and Europe. We appeal to the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests, just as we respect its."

The allies also advocate progress in all arms control negotiations. It was also announced yesterday that all NATO foreign ministers would attend the opening session of the Stockholm disarmament conference on 17 January.

Fernando Moran made a point regarding how some media, including EL PAIS, interpreted his speech on Thursday. He asserted that the administration plans "to hold a referendum on Spain's continued membership in NATO or on its level of involvement in the West's defense" and that the question "would be unequivocal." In any event, he clarified that "the government is not neutralist about or indifferent to Western defense."

In his speech, which was distributed to the press, Moran said that "we did not want to be tempted to associate the issue of Spain's involvement in the Alliance with issues relating to our entry into the EEC and the Gibraltar issue," but "as you know, these issues are very important to Spanish public opinion." He pointed out, however, that "the EEC is not politically neutral," adding that our patient and determined efforts to belong to this organization "are irrefutable proof of our resolve to join the Western world."

Moran then voiced his concern over the failure of the European summit meeting in Athens. This is the first time that a representative of Felipe Gonzalez's administration has spoken within the formal NATO framework about the EEC issue. He also mentioned Gibraltar, and all indications here are that progress is being made towards a resolution of the first part of the problem within the context of the EEC, a resolution that could be announced on 20 December on the occasion of the Spain-EEC negotiating session.

Spain has agreed in principle to observe the EEC common property standard in every area from the time it becomes a member. The British have recently voiced concern over this issue in the area of foreign relations and social affairs, in connection with the free movement of workers. This agreement means that Spain will completely reestablish communications with Gibraltar on the day that it joins the EEC. The communications would be in both directions, however, because so far the British have spoken only about opening the gate, not about reciprocal rights.

Moran and his British counterpart, Geoffrey Howe, met to discuss this and other issues. The two ministers reviewed the progress made so far on the Gibraltar issue. Howe wanted to talk about NATO, but Moran pointed out that the outcome of the referendum would depend greatly on what might happen in connection with the EEC and NATO issues.

Moran also met with French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, who apparently encouraged Madrid to continue the negotiations with the EEC to secure a balanced result and explained that Francois Mitterrand's harsh words in Athens were for French domestic consumption and were not designed to frighten the Spanish people.

In answer to a question on Spain's refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the foreign minister said that Spain has submitted a proposal in Euratom that would leave open the possibility of developing nuclear power "for nonexplosive military purposes." He added that he personally is in favor of Spain having a nuclear submarine.

MILITARY

SPAIN

COMMUNIST CALL FOR NATO REFERENDUM REJECTED

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 2 Dec 83 p 10

[Text] The Congress of Deputies Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday turned down a non-legally binding Communist Party proposal calling on the administration to hold a referendum on Spain's membership in NATO before 31 December 1983.

Deputy Santiago Carrillo spoke in favor of the communist proposal, asserting that it was in Spain's national interest to safeguard itself from a potential nuclear holocaust and that he was worried about what NATO membership currently entails for Spain.

Carrillo underscored that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] first said that the referendum on NATO would be held in 1985, "and now it says when the conditions are right." He voiced his pessimism about whether a referendum would be held, adding: "The Americans are increasingly in charge in Spain, and the government's autonomy is conditional."

The Foreign Affairs Committee also took up the NATO issue yesterday morning, as Minister Fernando Moran appeared to answer several point-blank questions from opposition deputies. Santiago Carrillo's query made reference to the presence of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt Gen Lacalle Leloup, at the 84th NATO meeting in The Hague.

Fernando Moran replied to the Communist deputy that the administration considered it proper for Lacalle Leloup to attend the meeting of the NATO Military Committee, adding that the military High Command had made no suggestions in this regard.

He explained that the members of NATO's political organization have military advisers who meet within the military committee as occasion requires. "Lacalle Leloup's attendance at the meeting of the Military Committee in no way alters Spain's position on NATO's military structure," he noted.

8743

CSO: 3548/133

## SPANISH-ITALIAN MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Dec 83 p 19

[Article by Joaquin Navarro-Valls]

[Text] Rome--The signing of an agreement yesterday in Rome marked the beginning of a new era in Spanish-Italian industrial cooperation. Since the signers of the pact were the Spanish and Italian defense ministers, we can, of course, see that the new era will involve mainly the sophisticated military hardware in which Spain and Italy are both interested.

The document initialed by Spanish Defense Minister Narciso Serra and his Italian counterpart Giovanni Spadolini is technically called a "mutual agreement for the protection of classified materiel." This marks another step in the implementation of the Defense Agreement that has linked the two countries since 16 June 1980 and whose 4 January 1982 application protocol must now be ratified by the Spanish Cortes. Under this agreement, the minister said, Spain and Italy guarantee to protect the materiel that they exchange, which obviously contains high-level, top-secret military technology.

The significance of the Spanish minister's 2-day visit to Rome goes beyond the pact that was signed, however. It seems to herald a change of course of as yet unforeseeable proportions in Spain's procurement of military hardware. There has been much talk lately of the Italian missile system Aspid, which could fully meet certain requirements of our Armed Forces. Even more materiel is involved, though. The Spanish minister disclosed this when in answer to our questions he said that he and his Italian counterpart had, "in fact" talked about the Aspid system as well as about tanks, anti-tank helicopters, third-generation antitank missiles and air force cooperation." In spite of the logical discretion with which such issues are discussed, the Spanish minister frankly suggested that Spanish-Italian military cooperation could easily lead to an optimum contract for the purchase of hardware.

Confirming this impression, Narciso Serra spent most of his stay in Rome visiting the three leading weapons plants there: Selenia (state-run),

Contraves (partly owned by the Swiss multinational corporation Oerlikon of Zurich), and Elettronica (private). The catalogues of the three companies offer a full range of the latest high-technology defense hardware: missile guidance systems, electronic defense countermeasures, interceptors, antimissile missiles, antiaircraft guns and systems and, of course, the prestigious Aspid system, built by Selenia.

The Aspid has recently emerged as an unexpected and strong competitor for the three systems that the Spanish Government has been considering so far: the British Rapier, the French-German Roland and the American Chaparral. "The Aspid has a chance," went the comment in the Spanish Defense Ministry, "but now is not the time to say anything else." In the arms market a remark like that is almost like a final decision. The Aspid is already 40 percent manufactured in Spain for use by the navy.

Aside from what seems to be taking shape after the Spanish minister's visit to Rome, however, the Aspid represents an expansion of Spain's current commitments on the Italian weapons market. Minister Serra did not, of course, sign any purchase agreement in Rome. "What the ministers should do," Narciso Serra said, "is take an overview of the issues so that the technicians can then evaluate and discuss the specifications and capabilities of each system." But both during his talk with Spadolini and on his visits to the three weapons factories, the Spanish minister has confirmed the versatility ("and the economic advantages," someone told me yesterday) of the Italian market. Italy is currently the world's fourth largest producer and seller of arms, after the United States, Russia and France. Economic and other reasons are pushing Spain away from the U.S. market. There are obvious reasons why the Soviet market is permanently off limits. And there are also obvious political reasons why the French market is not a possibility either. The Italian market, which has been supplying radar systems for our naval units for years now, has presented Spain with an excellent quality selection. And the Spanish Government seems prepared to make a marvelously realistic political, military...and economic decision.

At a gathering with Spanish correspondents in Rome, the Spanish defense minister pointed out last night that Spain wants to cut its purchases of weapons systems to what is strictly necessary, adding that its major interest is participation in joint programs with other countries. In this sense, cooperation with Italy offers unquestionable advantages. "Spain and Italy are in a similar defense position because they do not have enemies. Their deterrence systems, therefore, are designed for peace."

The minister said that a final decision had not yet been made on the Aspid missile, although the fact that it is already being manufactured in Spain is an important factor. He said that Italy represents an advantageous diversification vis-a-vis France, although in the area of missiles cooperation with both countries is imperative.

He denied later that during his meetings with European defense ministers they tried to pressure him into pledging broader Spanish participation in NATO. He concluded by asserting that he hoped that Spain would be able to join the five-country group (along with Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain) that will execute the fighter plane of the 1990's project.

8743

CSO: 3548/133



## WIDE RANGE OF AMENDMENTS TO MILITARY SERVICE BILL

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 19 Nov 83 p 7

[Article: "PNV Proposes End to Compulsory Military Service"]

[Text] Out of the 85 amendments presented regarding the draft military service law, only one involves the need to return the bill to the government. This amendment was presented by the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]. The amendment--which the EUROPA PRESS AGENCY has seen--states that "this is an opportune time to reconsider and to rationalize the whole (military) system. Such a reconsideration could well take the form of the gradual abolition of compulsory military service, resulting in the professionalization of the armed forces."

In their amendment aimed at replacing the entire text of this draft law the Basque nationalists state that this bill presented by the socialist government "perpetuates a model for the army based above all on compulsory service by young men which was designed in accordance with a traditional concept of defense, now obsolete, and developed under social and political circumstances quite different from those presently existing."

Among the present circumstances which the Basques think should be taken into account are "the technological revolution," cultural and social parameters, the impact of compulsory military service on family incomes, and the slowdown in the productive and institutional process resulting from incorporating the youth of the country in the armed services.

The conclusion of this argument is that the new military service law is partial and unsatisfactory because it gives the impression of reducing military service to training and the performance of military tasks, when it is essential to consider such aspects as the program of rest and leave, access to education and culture, and other formative aspects for youth.

On the other hand all parliamentary factions, with the exception of the Popular Group and the UCD [Union of the Democratic Center], have asked that young men be permitted to do their military service in the military

region from which they originate. The Basque and Catalan nationalists propose that young men perform their military service within the territory of the autonomous community in which the person involved resides. The most interesting aspect is that this last amendment will be supported by the socialist group in parliament. For that reason there is room for hope that the government will make some kind of compromise on it.

The total number of partial amendments to the draft bill is 85. Only the two deputies from the Democratic and Social Center have not sought to amend the bill.

#### Conscientious Objectors

In their amendments the Popular Group proposes that military service for members of the clergy should be subject to agreements with the Vatican on this matter which have been in effect since January 1979. For this purpose it proposes the inclusion of a new section, because the draft law does not mention this aspect of military service.

The Basque Group has presented the largest number of amendments, 26 in all. In them it requests that conscientious objectors will only be required to express their objections to military service when they request exemption and they are included in the provisional list of objectors. They also ask that compulsory service for conscientious objectors be permitted to be performed in their own, autonomous community, that the length of normal military service be limited to 12 years (this refers to the entire period of service in the army), and that deferments may be granted for those contributing to the support of their families or those working in positions they may choose in any public administrative service.

5170

CSO: 3548/123

## PEACE GROUP PUBLISHES COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON ARMS EXPORTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 83 p 5

[Article by Mats Carlbom and Ingemar Lofgren]

[Text] Swedish governments have permitted arms exports for 39 wars since 1950. This has happened even though Swedish law prohibits sales to countries likely to become involved in a war or already engaged in one. That information appears in a report being published today, Wednesday.

The report, entitled "Swedish Arms Exports for War," is being published by the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association. It was written by Henrik Westander, a member of the SSU [Swedish Social Democratic Youth Association] who has been studying Swedish arms exports for 2 years.

## Rules Broken

His main sources have been the Central Bureau of Statistics, the War Materiel Inspectorate, and SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute].

The conclusions reached in the report are that Swedish governments over the past three decades have consistently broken the rules on Swedish arms exports--and that the trade in question is increasing steadily.

Since 1950, a total of 107 wars have been fought between various countries in the world. Swedish governments approved arms exports to either one or both of the belligerent states during the 2 years immediately preceding the outbreak of 63 of those wars.

In 39 cases, the arms trade continued even after war had broken out.

According to the guidelines established by Parliament, arms exports are not to be allowed in the case of:

1. A country involved in armed conflict with another country, regardless of whether war has been formally declared.

2. A country involved in an international conflict that threatens to lead to armed conflict.
3. A country experiencing internal armed violence.
4. A country that can be expected to use the materiel to suppress human rights in violation of UN rules.

Also according to Parliament's guidelines, special caution is to be exercised in approving arms exports if the purchasing country's external or internal stability is in danger.

### Third World

In the 1950's, Swedish arms exports totaled about 400 million kronor per year (calculated in 1981 kronor). The total dropped during the 1960's, partly because of a more restrictive export policy.

But since the mid-1970's, Swedish exports of war materiel have risen dramatically, primarily to Third World countries, and during the period from 1980 to 1982, they were up to 1.8 billion kronor per year.

As examples, the report lists 16 countries that are currently buying war materiel from Sweden even though, according to the report, they do not meet Swedish requirements for arms exports:

In Europe: Great Britain and France.

In Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma.

In Africa: Nigeria, Tunisia, and Cameroon.

In the Americas: the United States, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil.

Some of those countries are borderline cases--chiefly Singapore, Mexico, and Brazil, says Henrik Westander. But others are all the more obvious:

The United States, for example, is "involved in international conflict that threatens to lead to armed conflict" or is directly involved in a war.

As examples, Westander mentions the U.S. involvement in Grenada, Central America and Lebanon. He also discusses the special "firefighting force" that the United States is threatening to send in if petroleum deliveries are threatened.

### France

Under a preexisting defense agreement between the two countries, France has 3,000 men actively involved in Chad's war against Libya. France has similar agreements with several countries on the troubled African continent.

Great Britain became involved in a war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands.

Indonesia is at war with guerrilla forces in East Timor, and several of the other countries--India, Malaysia, and Peru, for example--have "internal armed violence."

When Swedish firms want to export war materiel, they must first submit an application to the War Materiel Inspectorate (KMI). The application is processed and then sent on to the minister of foreign trade. In certain routine cases, the minister himself may reach a decision, but in recent years the government has approved the exports in 95 percent of the cases.

The report shows how legislation and regulations governing the Swedish arms trade have become increasingly strict in recent years. But despite that, arms exports have grown larger and larger.

In 1971, the restrictions on Swedish exports of war materiel were tightened up. It was emphasized in particular that no weapons were to be sold to countries that might use them to suppress human rights.

#### Loophole

But at the same time, a big loophole was created: an exception was made for "defensive weapons." And since then, Swedish arms exports have doubled in terms of 1981 kronor.

Henrik Westander says that there are several reasons why the government has approved increased arms exports. For example, it has been difficult to reject large and comprehensive weapons orders, the arms industry and the military authorities have exerted pressure, and economic and employment factors have been taken into consideration.

The 13 largest defense firms in Sweden employed almost 40,000 people in 1980, and 6,500 of those worked directly for the export market.

The three leading firms in this field are Bofors, the National Industries Corporation, and Saab-Scania's aircraft division.

At present, 40 percent of all Swedish-manufactured war materiel is exported, even though the primary goal of Sweden's arms industry is to produce for the Swedish Armed Forces.

Footnote: To count up the number of wars that have occurred in the world since 1950, Henrik Westander used the list compiled by Hungarian peace researcher Istvan Kendes for the period from 1950 to 1974. For the period from 1975 to 1979, he used the list of armed conflicts drawn up by the ADCRU, a British arms monitoring organization. For the period from 1980 to October 1983, he compiled his own list of all wars between states in which over 50 people died.

To the United States as Well as Indonesia

According to the report, there have been 39 instances since 1950 in which Sweden exported war materiel to countries directly engaged in war.

Here are a few examples from recent years:

1. Pakistan against Bangladesh and India, 1971. Violent fighting broke out when East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan and established the state of Bangladesh. India entered the war on the side of Bangladesh. Swedish arms exports to India.
2. Indonesia against East Timor, 1975-1983. Indonesia invaded the independent state of East Timor, and the occupation continues even today. Swedish arms exports to Indonesia.
3. France against guerrillas in Zaire, 1978. French troops took part in fighting against guerrillas in Shaba Province. Swedish arms exports to France.
4. Peru against Ecuador, 1981. A border conflict in a large area of Peru claimed by Ecuador. Swedish arms exports to Ecuador.
5. Great Britain against Argentina, 1982. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a British colony. The British recaptured the islands. Swedish arms exports to Great Britain.
6. In September 1983, the United States took action against Druse positions in Beirut, Lebanon. In October, U.S. forces invaded Grenada. Swedish arms exports to the United States.

#### Erlander's Course Followed Until 1971

In principle, Swedish arms exports have been banned since the end of World War I.

In 1956, then Prime Minister Tage Erlander explained to Parliament the principles observed by the government in connection with the foreign trade in arms.

Among other things, he said that in general, the Swedish Government refused licenses to countries involved in acute international conflicts, those experiencing civil war, and those whose internal situation was so serious that there was a danger of violence.

#### Until 1971

The policy stated by Erlander was followed until 1971, when Parliament passed a more extensive resolution in the form of the 1971 guidelines on exports of war materiel.

In 1979, a government committee known as the War Materiel Export Committee was appointed. Its proposal--a supplement to the 1971 guidelines--led to a new decision by Parliament in May 1982.

A list of what is regarded as war materiel is revised at regular intervals. A product is classed as war materiel if, "from the standpoint of its military use, it is designed, equipped, or altered in such a way that it obviously differs from similar civilian materiel."

Military products with some degree of civilian application--radar materiel, radio equipment, and certain vehicles, for example--are not considered war materiel and can therefore be exported without restriction.

#### Exports of Licenses

Ever since the 1982 decision by Parliament, sales of licenses--that is, manufacturing rights--have been regulated in the same way as exports of ordinary war materiel. Exports of licenses have increased in recent years and will continue to do so because more and more countries are demanding the right to produce their own weapons.

To ensure that Swedish war materiel is not reexported to another country, the purchasing country must sign a so-called end-use certificate, which states that the weapons must be used by the purchasing country's own forces.

Only war materiel that the Swedish Armed Forces themselves use or plan to use can be exported. Product development solely for export is regarded as being incompatible with Sweden's policy of neutrality and its defense policy.

#### Arms Exports Determined by Economy

"The rules governing Swedish arms exports are better known than the arms exports themselves. Actually, the two have very little to do with each other.

"Swedish arms exports are determined primarily by economic and defense policy, not by the rules decided on by Parliament."

So says Henrik Westander, who wrote the report "Swedish Arms Exports for War."

In his investigation of Sweden's exports of war materiel, he concentrated primarily on purchasing countries in the Third World.

[Question] "Isn't there a danger that calling a halt to Swedish arms exports to the poor countries will force them to buy weapons from the big powers instead?"

[Answer] "Yes, but this is also a matter of the effect on public opinion. Sweden's criticism of the arms buildup does not mean much if we continue to export weapons to areas where there is conflict.

"Besides, the fact is that the Third World's military expenditures have risen by 82 percent over the past 10 years. That has contributed to underdevelopment, the intensification of local conflicts, and greater power by the military in those countries. Sweden has been helping that to happen."

[Question] "According to the report, one of the wars for which Sweden exported arms was that between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. But did Sweden have any way of knowing about that war in advance?"

[Answer] "It was already known that a conflict existed. But perhaps that example is a better illustration of how difficult it is to determine whether a country is likely to become involved in a war. If anything, it is an argument against exporting any weapons at all.

"Anyway, it can be observed that the Falklands War did not in any way influence our arms exports to Great Britain. On the contrary, those exports have increased since then."

[Question] "Other debatable examples are Mexico, Brazil, and Singapore; in what way would arms exports to those countries violate the restrictions on such exports?"

Westander answered: "Taking a restrictive attitude, one can say that their external or internal stability is in danger."

On the basis of such a restrictive attitude, are there any countries at all to which Sweden could export arms?

[Question] "Minister of Foreign Trade Mats Hellstrom claims that Swedish arms exports have dropped by almost 40 percent since 1980. So how can it be claimed, as it is in this report, that they are increasing?"

Henrik Westander said: "First of all, you cannot compare individual years-- exports must be considered over a longer period of time. And when they are, one sees that arms exports have doubled since the early 1970's.

"And second, the orders being received by the export firms indicate that arms exports are going to increase in coming years. Bofors, for example, has as many orders for war materiel now as it did just before the record year of 1980."

Hellstrom: Our Strict Guidelines Are Followed

"I cannot say whether the United States, Indonesia, or any other country is at war. That would mean anticipating government decisions."

So says Mats Hellstrom, minister of foreign trade, concerning reports that Sweden has been exporting weapons to belligerent states.

Mats Hellstrom told DAGENS NYHETER: "We have strict guidelines for arms exports. There have been careful investigations in connection with each government decision on exports of war materiel."

According to Mats Hellstrom, the fact that arms exports have long remained at around 1 percent of our total exports shows that the guidelines are being followed.



We asked: "But what about specific cases? Aren't Burma, Indonesia, the United States, and France countries that are either at war or in danger of becoming involved in one?"

Mats Hellstrom said: "The exports to Burma are currently being investigated by the Constitutional Committee, so it would not be appropriate for me to say anything about them. I cannot say anything at all about individual countries because that would mean anticipating government decisions."

[Question] "Do you feel that the United States is not currently involved in conflicts that might lead to war--in Lebanon or Central America, for example?"

[Answer] "I cannot say anything about that."

[Question] "France currently has 3,000 men fighting in Chad. That is no secret, is it?"

[Answer] "I am sorry, but I cannot say anything about specific countries. The government never announces in advance the countries to which the firms can export war materiel."

Mats Hellstrom said: "I don't feel that the secrecy surrounding issues involving arms exports is satisfactory. Effective with the start of 1984, therefore, we are going to ease the restrictions."

Mats Hellstrom does not agree with the report's statement that Swedish arms exports are increasing:

"In real figures, they have declined by just under 40 percent since 1980, and I don't see any indication that they are going to increase."

[Question] "But looking at developments over a longer period of time, haven't they indeed doubled since 1970?"

Mats Hellstrom answered: "I don't understand why people start counting from that year. Arms exports increased in the late 1970's, that led to a debate and stricter rules, and now they are on the way down again."

"The government makes its decisions on exports of war materiel on a case-by-case basis, and that, of course, does not please the firms."

Mats Hellstrom says that the reason for Swedish arms exports is that Sweden wants to maintain a high level of self-sufficiency in war materiel.

"But that is a very tough problem. On the one hand, we want to maintain our credibility as a neutral nation by manufacturing our own weapons."

"On the other hand, to be able to do that, we must also export in order to keep our know-how alive."

Hellstrom says: "If we say no to Swedish arms exports, we are also saying no to the high level of self-sufficiency we have chosen for the sake of neutrality."

11798

CSO: 3650/58

## GAP BETWEEN MILITARY NEEDS, POLITICAL WILL IS WIDENING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Dec 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Santesson: "Dollar and Defense"]

[Text] No supreme commander of the Swedish Armed Forces has had such large economic problems as the present one. A combination of an unfavorable cost development--above all an extremely high exchange rate for the dollar--and some "overplanning" that has not been carried out right, has changed the entire basis for the defense decision of both 1982 and 1983 (that is with a decrease that the social democrats pushed for). Now it is up to the military leadership to save as much as possible of what is about to become lost.

The new plan of action for the 1984-1989 time period that general Ljung has submitted to the government--only a couple of months after the previous plan--is mainly serving an educational purpose. He wants to show how much new money is needed to meet the defense power ambitions that the parliament had established earlier. More than 5 billion kronor would be required to maintain the agreed-upon level. Our politicians are actually placed against the wall in an intellectual sense. Who do they want to determine the extent of Swedish defense in the reasonably long run, they themselves or a high dollar rate?

The plan of action of the supreme commander of the Armed Forces will, however, in practice be handled within the framework of what is politically possible. The general is protecting himself against reality by, on the other hand, hoping for 2.5 billion kronor for the current year plus the next 5 years. The figure is based on a "dollar rate loss" of at least 420 million kronor per year.

It is reasonable to think that he will get some compensation for the dollar effect--however, certainly not as much as what he is talking about. An absolute minimum is that the supreme commander can count on a sufficient increase in order to maintain freedom of action in regard to the three Scanian Draken divisions. To have to give up those now would be a flagrant waste of capital and a weakening of the air defense, which no party would reasonably want to be responsible for. During the first stage--the current defense decision period--an extra 200 million dollars are required according to the air defense chief.

The other big issue for the politicians--the peace organization--will according to the plan of action be postponed somewhat further into the future. This does not, however, apply to the Navy; the supreme commander of the Armed Forces expects that some money will be saved on the west coast, even if it will not be quite as much as the commander-in-chief of the Navy is expecting it to be. Lennart Ljung says in regard to the Army that future measures must be at least as extensive as he suggested before the 1982 defense decision. Changed economy measures may, however, evidently enter the picture--maybe another infantry regiment besides I 3. The supreme commander does not, however, expect any kind of cut in expenses before the next defense decision, 1987. Is it really not more urgent than that?

The perspective of significant military changes in the military apparatus that Sweden for such a long time and as long as possible has tried to maintain and improve is coming closer. The gap between what the politicians think they are getting for their money and what the supreme commander is able to accomplish with the money is beginning to become painfully wide.

9662

CSO: 3650/60

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

INDUSTRY MINISTER: NO GENERAL WAGE HIKE FOR 1984

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 30 Nov 83 p 48

[Text] In an interview with MORGUNBLADID yesterday, Industry Minister Sverrir Hermannsson stated: "The premises on which the 1984 budget's wage projections were based have foundered. Before we were apprised of the condition of the cod stock, we had figured on a 6 percent general wage increase on which to base the budget. That figure will now be wiped out."

Sverrir stated that these were the hard facts and that with no margins, no general wage increases could materialize in the coming year. On the other hand, everything possible would be done to lighten the load for those on the bottom of the economic scale, taxwise or otherwise.

9981

CSO: 3626/11

## PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES GOALS FOR ECONOMY

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 83 p 31

[Text] A Governmental survey of the situation of the country's minimum wage earners is at the present taking place. This survey is in part based on tax returns; partly on a spot survey by the Wage Investigation Committee. This survey could prove useful, both in future labor disputes and in showing where to base possible governmental measures to improve the lot of our society's underprivileged. The above proposal was among many in Prime Minister's Steingrímur Hermannsson's speech introducing the Government's Wage Bill (provisory legislation) in the Upper House.

The Prime Minister stated that Hagvangur Ltd on their own had surveyed people's attitudes on temporary wage reductions in order to halt inflation. One of the questions was: "If wage reduction can influence the reduction of inflation, are you yourself prepared or not prepared to accept the limiting wage increases that the Government has proposed for the next 12 months"? Four possible answers include: 1) Yes, 2) No, 3) If everyone else did, 4) Don't know.

An overpowering majority or 65.4 percent answered yes, 16 percent answered no, 11.4 percent answered "if everyone else did" and undecided ("don't know") comprised 7.2 percent. In the metropolitan area 60.6 percent answered yes; in other towns and cities 71.3 percent answered yes, in farming communities 74.4 percent.

The Prime Minister stated that the bill had been amended by the Lower House. At the Government's suggestion a prohibition against further increase in base pay was struck. On the other hand, the abolition of indexing, a method agreed by all to be both dated and injurious, was firmly supported by the Lower House.

The base wage provision was adjudged safe to drop, as it had already served its purpose. It is clear that inflation will be brought down below 30 percent before the end of the year, i.e., a decrease of more than 100 percent. As a matter of fact indexing for the construction industry has decreased even more. Interest rates have been decreased three times and the fourth decrease will be effected, unless something drastic happens, by the middle of next month. In spite of this attainment which has prevented stoppage of basic trades and

unemployment--prospects which seemed likely last spring--financial prospects are about as bad as they have ever been. This situation is based first and foremost on new conclusions by marine biologists and their proposals to limit the cod catch to 200 thousand tons in 1984, a half of the total catch just two years ago. The future obviously calls for continuing conservation and cooperation on everyone's part.

9981

CSO: 3626/11

## UNION CHIEF COMMENTS ON POLL SHOWING SUPPORT FOR WAGE LIMIT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 83 p 2

[Text] Asked to comment on the survey administered by Hagvangur, the results of which indicated that more than 65 percent of the nation are prepared to accept lowering the wages in order to halt inflation, Icelandic Federation of Labor's President Asmundur Stefansson stated: "It is impossible for me to comment extensively without a thorough examination of the survey's premises and results; however, I can confidently state that I doubt very much that nearly two-thirds of the nation is prepared to take on wage reductions based on the onesided premises presented by the Government.

"It is obvious that people are willing to make considerable sacrifices in order to halt inflation; however, I think it is equally obvious that these people will demand that any measures taken will be within the framework of a consistent economic policy."

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CSO: 3626/11

## POLL DISCOVERS INCREASING OPTIMISM REGARDING ECONOMIC ISSUES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 3 Dec 83 pp 48, 24-25

[Text] According to a poll taken by Hagvangur Ltd not too long ago, increased optimism is evident among people as to the possibility of solving the nation's most pressing problems: inflation and economic conditions in general.

Presently 13.6 percent believe general economic conditions to be the nation's main problem; last April 22.3 percent were of that opinion. Presently 38.4 percent think it possible to solve these problems to a considerable degree; last April only 27.9 percent agreed with that premise. Presently 39 percent consider the problem partly solvable; in April 37.1 percent thought so. Last April's poll placed lack of direction and responsibility as the third greatest problem of the nation; presently the nation's third largest problem is seen as living beyond one's means.

Particulars from Hagvangur Ltd's two questions in their second poll of this follow:

It has been determined that the poll covered the entire country and included participants 15 years and older picked randomly from the National Register by the University's Statistical Bureau by permission of Iceland's National Bureau of Statistics and the Computing Committee.

Response was 85.7 percent of questionnaires administered, 76.9 percent of questionnaires returned. The answers were found to be typical for the group polled as far as sex, age, residence, tec. The poll was administered by telephone and took place from 28 October to 6 November.

The questions were:

1. What do you consider Iceland's biggest problem today?
2. Do you think that this problem can be solved during the next few years?

Earlier this year, or last April, Hagvangur administered a similar poll with the same questions. A comparison of the conclusions of the two polls is shown below. Note that in the comparison only individuals 20 years old or older are considered.



There is a valid difference (95 percent true) between the conclusions, for example concerning inflation and how optimistic participants are regarding solutions of problems in question.

Otherwise we point to individual charts. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest decimal; thus totals may not always be exactly 100 percent.

<u>Period of Polling</u>	<u>28 October - 6 November 1983</u>
Population polled	1,300 persons
Response	76.9 percent
Valid response	85.7 percent
Age	15 plus
Method	By telephone
Residence	Entire country

What do you consider Iceland's biggest problem today?

<u>Category</u>	<u>April '83</u>	<u>Oct-Nov '83</u>
General economic conditions	22.3	13.6
Inflation	37.2	29.5
Lack of direction and responsibility	12.2	5.4
Living beyond one's means	8.1	7.7
Alcohol/Drugs	5.5	6.3
Other	14.7	37.5

Do you think this problem can be solved during the next few years?

<u>Response</u>	<u>April '83</u>	<u>Oct-Nov '83</u>
To a considerable degree	27.9	34.8
Partly	37.1	39.0
Minimally	17.8	12.6
Not at all	10.4	7.2
Don't know	6.8	6.4

9981

CSO: 3626/11

## POLL SHOWS WIDE SUPPORT FOR ANTI-INFLATION MEASURES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 83 p 48

[Text] In a survey administered by Hagvangur Ltd 65.4 percent declared themselves ready to accept limited wage increases within the framework the Government has fashioned for the next 12 months, if that could influence the reduction of inflation.

Verbatim the question read: "If wage reduction can influence the reduction of inflation, are you yourself prepared or not prepared to accept the limiting of wage increases that the Government has proposed for the next 12 months"? Four possible answers included: 1) Yes, 2) No, 3) If everyone else did, 4) Don't know. An overpowering majority answered yes, or 65.4 percent; 16 percent answered no; 11.4 percent answered "if everyone else did": undecided were 7.2 percent.

In the metropolitan area 60.6 percent answered yes, in other towns and cities 71.3 percent answered yes, in farming communities 74.4 percent answered yes. The questionnaire was administered to 1,300 persons; 1,167 persons returned the questionnaire. Or, response was 85.7 percent of questionnaires administered, 76.9 percent of questionnaires returned. The survey was carefully administered and should be statistically valid. Hagvangur Ltd administered it independently of the Government.

9981

CSO: 3626/11

## CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES APPROVAL FOR 1984 STATE BUDGET

Madrid YA in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 24

[Text] Yesterday afternoon the congress of deputies approved the general state budget for 1984, at a total of 5.399 billion pesetas. This budget has been fully debated during the past 2 weeks. The budget bill was passed with 159 votes in favor, 96 opposed, and six abstentions. In explaining the vote, the spokesman for the popular group, Pedro Schwartz, said that the state accounts presented by the government had not been structured according to programs, as had been promised, there was a total lack of objectives, and it was impossible for this budget to be monitored by parliament, because of the discretionary authority given to the minister of finance, who is empowered to transfer budget credits.

Francisco Fernandez Marugan, speaking for the socialist majority, criticized the opposition as being incapable of designing an alternative budget, and said that the opposition had taken the most doctrinary and conservative elements from economic formulas in use throughout the world.

In a press conference attended by all the economic officials of the popular group, Ramon Lasuen said that, based on these budgets, and in line with the finest traditions of the government in terms of economic growth, unemployment should increase by 170,000 next year. He criticized the government's policy of timidity in dealing with the industrial reconversion, and called for a thorough liberalization of the system.

Abel Matutes said that the government's volume of spending and deficit would absorb over half of the nation's private savings, thus strangling investment. The popular group believes that accepting its amendments would have saved 117,000 million pesetas in the budget; the group announced that during a forthcoming

discussion it will introduce a proposal providing a new parliamentary procedure in order to be able to contrast the government's figures and the alternative offered by the opposition.

### Over 3 Billion for Social Security

Yesterday's session concentrated on the debate on the Social Security budget, which amounts to 3.116 billion pesetas. During this debate the groups revealed their differing social and political models. Ramon Lasuen from the popular group called for the devolution of this item which, in his opinion, will lead to the collapse of the Social Security system. He described the Social Security budget as insolvent, corrupt, poorly designed, and unjust. He spoke of the waste entailed in keeping the number of permanent disabled at 1,300,000, when a normal figure would be about 300,000. He later added that this is wasting over 300,000 million "on cheaters."

Finally, the popular group's representative offered an alternative based on a system of payments with a social minimum for the people in greatest need and some complementary levels of private funds acting in conjunction with the state for retirement pensions, illness, and unemployment benefits.

The minister of labor and social security, Joaquin Almunia, spoke briefly in response to Lasuen, stating that never in the history of Spain had a government made such a great effort to cover the needs of Social Security.

### RTVE: a Slipshod Budget

In the afternoon, during the discussion of the RTVE [Spanish Radio and Television Broadcasting System], an independent agency, budget, Gabriel Camunas from the popular group asked the government to agree to launch its own satellite. This would provide the state with one additional channel, and two channels which could be operated under private licenses. He estimated that the cost of this satellite would amount to about 35 million, which is equivalent to the loss of RENFE [Spanish National Railroads] for a 2-month period; this could be underwritten without problems by private bidders. "The RTVE budgets are inadequate and slipshod," he said, "and for the first time, they were not approved by the administrative council of this public agency. This demonstrates even more clearly that the government is the sole party responsible and it is converting our public radio and television into an instrument for feeding its information to public opinion."

Pedro Bofill, speaking for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], complained that the arguments of the popular group were related only marginally to the budget. He agreed about the possible need for a new debate on private television. He also criticized the popular group for not having exercised its alternative proposal when RTVE was headed by Robles Piquer, a member of that political group. He pointed to RTVE's achievements in having managed to pay off 7.8 million in debts, and the efforts it has made toward cleaning up the financial disorder inherited by the agency.

7679

CSO: 3548/127

## SOLCHAGA OUTLINES INDUSTRIAL RECONVERSION DECREE

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 2 Dec 83 p 13

[Article by Mayte Mancebo]

[Text] The administration estimates that it will initially spend between 900 billion and 1 trillion pesetas on its industrial reconversion plans, which are being implemented under a decree-law, even though the administration and the industry minister in particular have repeatedly come out in favor of carrying out the reconversion under a draft law. Surprisingly, after failing to hammer out a thoroughgoing agreement with union federations in lengthy negotiations, the administration's Council of Ministers passed the Industrial Reconversion Decree-Law on Wednesday. Industry Minister Carlos Solchaga informed the press of its content yesterday.

The minister, who arrived a half-hour late for his appointment with the media, exhibited subtle irony in commenting that "even though fuel prices have risen, the traffic today is a mess." He acknowledged that the industrial reconversion (the minister always used the word reindustrialization) was initially going to be undertaken via a draft law but that after the negotiations with the social forces the administration opted for the Royal Decree-Law, which has the status of law to deal with the country's industrial problems and takes the form of a decree to streamline processing in the legislative chamber. Speed of implementation was the objective that emerged from all of the minister's explanations yesterday. He even asserted that in this case the "single reading" procedure could not have been employed inasmuch as the document in question consists of 36 articles in addition to transitory provisions; debate on them would have greatly delayed their implementation, which is urgently needed to set the stage for industrial policy as a whole.

Regarding the possible opposition of parliamentary groups to processing it as a decree-law instead of a bill, Mr Solchaga said that these groups have no reason to be surprised inasmuch as he himself has been talking with the main groups for the past 15 days and all of them had agreed that debate on the issue would conclude before the end of December.

## Labor Conflicts

The minister asserted that the decree-law contains many of the requests voiced by the unions and the employers organization. Nevertheless, agreement was not reached on one of the main points, access to the Unemployment Fund. This will be dealt with in a subsequent decree that will contain all of the pertinent aspects and conditions. The drafting of this decree will not, however, hinge on a continuation of the negotiations, which in the minister's words have concluded.

Mr Solchaga asserted categorically that the plans for monitoring and following up the reconversion would not include the union federations that have not signed the reconversion proposals, because the government cannot reward unions that express their opposition through street rallies and then want to monitor the programs from within. With specific regard to the labor conflicts that could arise in connection with the reconversion, Mr Solchaga said: "This is a delicate issue. The administration has analyzed the situation in depth and is moving ahead regardless of the conflicts that might arise. We have to cut short the deindustrialization trend of the past 10 years. The only thing we will do now is prudently determine how we should parcel out our actions. But the administration maintains its political will to carry forward its plans urgently."

In answer to a question from EL ALCAZAR on the number of jobs that the industrial reconversion will cost, the minister stated curtly: "The plan will not cost jobs. It will save jobs, and what I regret is that it cannot save them for all sectors." He went on to say that the number of excess workers is not known yet (the excess of which the minister speaks means the workers who will become unemployed), inasmuch as that depends on the number of sectors and companies that avail themselves of the reindustrialization plans.

There is, however, an initial estimate of the economic cost, with the reservation that this too depends on the number of sectors and companies affected. The minister then added: "We are going to have problems of financial restraints and administrative problems undertaking a great many reconversion plans at the same time." Estimates are, nevertheless, that the operation will cost between 900 billion and 1 trillion pesetas. As an example, the minister said that for a sampling of 30,500 workers in various affected sectors the projected sociolabor protection measures would cost 80 billion pesetas over the coming 10 years, a higher estimate than the one in the Basic Employment Law.

According to the minister the plan will be financed through the INEM [National Employment Institute], the entities created from Employment Promotion Funds and general financial inflows. Regarding the latter, he mentioned the following numbers: 150 billion pesetas in the General State Budgets for subsidies or participatory credits; another 150 billion from the INI [National Institute of Industry] as compensation

for the loss of its companies; 100 billion under the heading of capital expansion in private companies; 130 billion from the INI in the form of loans and guarantees for its companies under reconversion, and 325 billion from the Industrial Credit Bank, part of which will come from its own funds and part from the issuance of type "B" bonds pursuant to the obligatory bank investment index.

#### Business

While asserting that the sectors subject to reconversion will be determined over time, the minister stated that everyone is aware of certain industries in which the revamping has already begun: integrated iron and steel, shipbuilding, specialty steels and large household appliances.

With respect to the employers' stand, Mr Solchaga asserted that the most controversial issue was the administration's involvement in the reconversion associations; however, the employers' representatives themselves had stated at the bargaining table that the issue "had been resolved to the satisfaction of the parties." According to him, the disagreement was over the 51 percent share initially set for the administration, which the employers regarded as an imposition that would make the associations unworkable (the employers themselves have stated that they actually regarded the move as a covert socialization). The final agreement now states that the State will be represented in all administrative bodies of the associations and that all reconversion measures and proposals must have the prior approval of the administration's representatives; no percentage share is set for it, though. The employers' representatives have accepted a provision entailing the same sort of control, however, Mr Solchaga noted.

Another provision being considered in connection with the reconversion associations is that prior to handing over the subsidies for the company reorganization the subsidizing agency can demand the same percentage of voting power as its subsidy represents of the association's assets.

Excess manpower is without doubt, however, the most heated issue and the bone of contention between the unions and the administration. The minister stated in this regard that the measures to be taken are the same ones as stipulated in the Workers Statute: changes in working conditions, the suspension of labor relations and the annulment of contracts. He pointed out that the unemployment fund, early retirement and permanent retirement provide "a cushion to soften the blow and are not cruel, as the leader of one union has claimed."

#### Popular Alliance Protest

Regarding this issue, Manuel Fraga, the president of Popular Alliance, has stated that "the administration's decision to approve the industrial reconversion by decree-law represents an abuse of this constitutional instrument."



## SOCIALIST POLICY SEEN JEOPARDIZING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 25 Nov 83 p 19

[Article by Higinio Paris Eguilaz]

[Text] In the failure of the socialist government's economic policy, what is of greatest concern now is to determine whether there is a valid alternative.

In the real world, politics can not be separated from economics. They are so closely united that we can only speak of economic policy. Considering economic theory as something isolated from politics is purely tautological, as theory forces us to accept certain suppositions, and once we have accepted them, the solution is already predetermined, but in social life the opposite happens: the variables are constantly being changed. This applies not only to endogenous factors, that is, those which act within the system itself, such as technological progress and institutional factors, but it applies also to exogenous factors, which act outside the system. These include not only economic factors, which act through foreign trade, but also political factors, such as matters related to national defense. As Ronald Fisher indicates, we can't replace uncertainty by a pure mathematical probability, though it is essential to use valid data.

Economic policy has to be based upon the following three factors: an analysis of events; the establishment of causal relations among these events, to the extent possible in a quantitative form; and short-term forecasts. This is especially true when dealing with market economy systems.

To go beyond these limits, we would have to be able to see the future as we can see the present, a power which has not been given to human beings.

The marxist-inspired socialism of the present government has two phases: the first phase consists of destroying the system of private ownership of all large businesses. This is done by making it impossible to earn a profit, or by keeping profits too small to amass enough fixed capital to maintain the dynamic process. As property and capital only have significance in terms of their ability to create profits, it will be the businessmen themselves who will ask the state to buy out their companies. So nationalizations will follow one after the other, as scheduled in the marxist program, although this will be accomplished without violence.

And what happens after the businesses are nationalized? For Marx doesn't say anything about that. It was Lenin who imposed economic plans, or what was called a capitalism without capitalists, by replacing business leaders with bureaucrats, and by moving from the realm of liberty to the realm of socialist bureaucracy, by eliminating individual initiative from economic planning. If there is still any doubt left about this, it is sufficient to see what is happening to Spain's nationalized businesses.

In a system in which power is obtained by winning a majority of the votes, marxism-leninism can not win power through legal means, for it is unconstitutional. Our current socialism is in that first phase, which is the only one known to marxism. It is a phase of destruction, though without physical violence. European social democracy is unknown to marxism, for social democracy is a system which accepts private ownership of business and the conditions required for its normal operation. So in the coming year, 1984, we will reach an impasse, for we are like blind men who, since they cannot see, continue to bump into things until they finally collapse. Because we are denying facts and the interdependent relations between these facts, our fall may be a tragic one.

Despite this, I believe that a socialist government was necessary, what the current president called "a turn to the left," so that the people might find out and experience what socialism really is. It was necessary for the businessman to see that, despite all his hard work, he will continue to lose his business; the workers will have to suffer from a huge rate of unemployment, and savers will have to see how they are left without any real savings. Spain will also have to see how, in the international arena, our industries are being dismantled, so we can eventually enter the Common Market, as an economic colony of the industrialized countries. It was necessary for

the Spanish people to suffer all this, and they are suffering, until they finally experience the truth of the old saying: "Suffering makes a fool wise."

I believe that the current president sees these facts and wants to correct them, but the lack of knowledge of his economic team is so great, and the pressure from the anarchic elements behind him is so strong that he will not be able to make the necessary changes, and soon it will be too late. For this reason, the problem of a government alternative is taking on an urgent character.

Popular Alliance could offer an alternative to the socialist policy, if the following three conditions are met:

1. Its party platform, which is today liberal-conservative, must be changed;
2. All politicians involved in the centrist movement of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] must be eliminated from this party;
3. Popular Alliance's economic program must be spelled out in detail.

If those conditions are not met, the party may win an election, but that will not be enough for it to govern, and after a certain amount of time, the situation would again become untenable, and the prospects unforeseeable.

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CSO: 3548/127

## BUREAUCRATIC REFORM STRESSED FOR PUBLIC SECTOR

Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Dec 83 p 60

[Text] Segovia--The quickening pace at which public enterprises (INI [National Institute of Industry], INH and State Patrimony) have been losing money has slowed if the 378 billion peseta estimate for this year is confirmed, Economy and Finance Minister Miguel Boyer stated yesterday at a symposium on public enterprise. The losses amounted to 22.3 billion in 1975 and 187.48 billion in 1980. The loss figures for subsequent years were 238, 332.3 and this year 378 billion pesetas.

The slowdown comes in spite of the shortfalls expected for enterprises like Iberia, Astilleros Espanoles, Butano and Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo. Miguel Boyer highlighted the financial troubles of public enterprises. Current transfers have risen from 6.98 billion pesetas in 1975 to 162.6 billion in 1983, and the forecast for next year is 239.592 billion.

Capital transfers have risen from 24.3 billion in 1975 to 163.185 billion in 1982 and 171.267 billion this year. The total of more than 400 billion in transfers this year represents seven percent of the budget and two percent of the gross domestic product. In 1975 it was 0.5 percent.

In the minister's view the fundamental shortcomings of public enterprise have been inflexibility, a failure to adapt, the bad example set by poor employee performance and a wage policy that provided for unjustifiably high increases in recent years.

The future of these enterprises, which are harder to run than private companies because of the scope of their objectives, thus depends on correcting these shortcomings. The first measure to streamline these enterprises will be taken before the end of June 1984; an autonomous agency suspension law will be drafted along the lines of what will be done soon with the Post Office and the Postal Savings Bank.

Miguel Boyer said that he opposed the drafting of a public enterprise statute like the one that emerged from the Moncloa pacts and was against a State participations ministry. He said, on the contrary, that he

avored maintaining the present structure but introducing one of the features called for in a non-legally binding proposal submitted by the Socialist congressional bloc late this spring: representation for the social groups and the autonomous communities in some of the state-run enterprises.

Also speaking at this first session of the symposium were the president of the Banco Exterior, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez; the secretary of government budgeting and spending, Jose Borrel; the president and vice president of the National Institute of Industry, Enrique Moya and Julian Garcia Valverde; the director general of Electronics and Information Science, Juan Majo, and the secretary general of energy, Martin Gallego. Fernandez Ordonez outlined the status of the financial public sector, underscoring its relatively minor role in comparison to other countries. Jose Borrel pointed out that the financing needs of state-run enterprises would total 150 billion pesetas, 13 percent of the public sector deficit. The itemization of the borrowing needs is: INI, 117 billion; INH, 29 billion, and others, 62 billion. Current transfers will rise to 287 billion and capital transfers to 387 billion, yielding a total of 824 billion pesetas, which accounts for 71.4 percent of the public sector deficit in national accounting terms.

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## CONFERENCE EXAMINES ENERGY ALTERNATIVES, OIL DEPENDENCY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 24 Nov 83 p 13

[Article by Birgitta Jernvall Ingman]

[Text] "The energy issues must not be blown out of proportion. We must make sure, instead, that we have enterprises that are operating efficiently and that the politicians do not get too involved.

"A very controversial, but at the same time very crucial question is how much we can blame the problems of the world economy of the past 10 years on the increases in oil prices and to what extent the reasons are to be found within our decaying economic systems."

This was said by Prof Ingemar Stahl at the Energy Day 83 which was arranged yesterday at Helsinki. He also said that a continued investment in nuclear power is significantly profitable at the current oil price level.

The main issue of the Energy Day was electricity. Minister of Trade and Industry Seppo Lindblom said in his introductory speech that electricity has brought equality to our country. Sparsely populated areas and urban areas now have about the same modern conveniences. He also said that a prerequisite for our prosperity is that electricity is now available at a reasonable cost.

The production of electric power is profitable and should be expanded also for economic reasons and not only based on the quantitative needs, according to Nokia's Acting Manager Kari Kairamo, chairman of the energy policy committee of the Central Union of Industry.

Nuclear power was the main topic, although Neste's Acting Manager Jaakko Ihmuotila said that the use of oil will not be discontinued after the end of this century.

#### Slow Growth, High Inflation

[Question] To bring up the issue of sluggish economies again, what is that, Professor Ingemar Stahl?

[Answer] As soon as the resources are no longer growing, we do not know how to solve the problems. When growth was slowing because of the oil crisis, they could be handled only by means of a high inflation rate. Slow growth and a high inflation rate can go hand in hand only in highly industrialized countries, which are at the same time thoroughly organized countries and where different interest groups are following the activities of one another.

Stahl pointed out that it is possible to afterwards see that the thoroughly organized Western economies were unusually poorly prepared to face the demands for structural reorganizations that the oil crisis brought with it.

"The steel crisis, which has followed as a result of the increases in oil prices, has lasted for almost a decade and the excess capacity is still significant. The shipbuilding crisis seems almost permanent."

#### Vicious Circles


"The countries have tried to compensate for the reduced investments with a public expansion. To a large extent this had to take place through a budget deficit, which has driven up the interest rate--a high interest rate which in turn has made it harder to invest in industry. The 1970's have in this regard been characterized by a number of vicious circles, which together have had clearly depressive effects. The combination of the increases in oil prices and 'sluggish' thoroughly organized economies have gotten to too much," said Stahl.

According to Stahl one can estimate the direct loss in standard of living caused by the increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979-1980 in Finland to be 3.5 and 2.8 percent of the gross national product, respectively. If the normal growth of the 1960's is used as a norm, the loss in growth did not correspond to more than about a year. But the 1970's experiences indicate that the crises of the decade were significantly larger.

#### A Brighter Future

Stahl's positive message had to do with the future.

"It definitely looks better," he says to HUFVUDSTADSBLADET. The price of oil is stable and great strides toward adaptation have been taken. The economic problems of the 1980's will be to manage the problems of the public sector--that is to some extent the consequences of the 1970's oil problems.



The price of industrial electricity in (from left to right) Norway, Canada, Sweden and Finland in 1982. The level in Finland is by far the highest.

#### Use of Oil Decreases

"The share of oil in energy consumption decreased both in Finland and in the EC during 1973-1982," noted Jaakko Ihamuotila. "The decline in Finland was from 56 to 40 percent and in the EC from 59 to 49 percent. Since there was an increase in the use of other energy in our country, one can ask if the saving just involves going from oil to another source of energy," he said.

The decrease in consumption has mainly affected heavy fuel oil. But since Neste, according to its managing director, is technically ahead in regard to refining the product so that the portion of heavy fuel oil is small, the refinery of the company has been able to operate at full capacity.

According to the estimate of the oil price development that was presented in the fall at the London oil conference the dollar price of oil will be kept more or less constant until 1985 and it will rise to some extent toward the end of the century, but still at a slower rate than inflation in the most important industrialized countries.

"While consumption of oil in the Western industrialized countries will, according to the estimates, increase by less than 1/2 percent annually until the year 2000, it will increase by more than 3 percent in the developing countries. This means that there will be a total increase of 1 percent per year in all countries with a market economy. In the year 2000 the global oil consumption will be about 10 million barrels per day, which is 500 million tons more per year than in 1981," Ihamuotila emphasized.

#### "Nuclear Power is Best"

Securing the industry's power to compete and the national economic interests support nuclear power, since it is most advantageous both in regard to production engineering, effects on the environment and foreign trade. This was stated by Kari Kairamo at the Energy Day 1983.



Kairamo was of the opinion that a basic decision concerning the construction of a new nuclear power plant should be made without delay, in order to establish a sound basis for the energy policy planning. It would therefore also be an advantage to straighten out the nuclear power legislation during the winter, according to Kairamo.

He emphasized that those who are against nuclear power often bring up so called security risks and attitudes.

"But increased knowledge has shown that nuclear power is the best alternative both in regard to safety and environmental effects," he said. And he also emphasized that international experience has confirmed that the power plants that use fossil fuel are causing significant damage to forests because of acid rain and the temperature balance of the earth is changed because of the formation of carbon dioxide.

"Investigations made in different places show that nuclear power is the economically most advantageous alternative. And the cost of energy right now and in the future will have a determining effect on our ability to compete, on our export volume, production and employment rate," Kairamo said.

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